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
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The Middle East Journal

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ISRAEL IN THE PATTERN OF MIDDLE EAST POLITICS

Yaacov Shimoni

THE STATE OF ISRAEL, now just over two years old, is striving to take its place among the other states of the Middle East. The vigorous dynamics of its internal growth, the vitality of its social and political organs, the very nature of its struggle for economic and political subsistence — calling for revolutionary changes in agriculture and industry, and the total use of soil and water for rapid development — all seem to have designed Israel for an active role in this still under-developed region.

Israelis are not newcomers to Middle East politics. The *Yishuv* (Jewish Community) of undivided Palestine, which preceded the establishment of Israel, was, in fact, a body politic of

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its own — the embryo of the future state. From the start it tried to shape its own policies vis-à-vis the surrounding region and succeeded in making itself so felt that even then both the nations of the Middle East and those foreign powers concerned with the area were constrained to regard the Zionist community of Palestine as one of the most compelling forces in the region. The birth of Israel in 1948 brought to the fore the problem of its place among the surrounding states of the Middle East. The embryonic problem has become a fullgrown one of vital importance for Israel and for the area as a whole.

THE "MIDDLE EAST" NOT A POLITICAL ENTITY

Any attempt to call the "Middle East" an active political entity is an oversimplification. The area is certainly a strategic, economic, or political entity for the Great Powers, in whose politics it has always appeared as a passive factor if not as an active partner. But there is, for the time being, no concert of the Middle East nations themselves, every one of which shapes its policy according to its own interests and by no means in accordance with any unified concept. There is no "Middle East bloc." Even the mere idea of forming such a bloc has not crystallized. Turkey, which would have to be its main pillar, does not take a very sympathetic attitude toward such a project, preferring to look for stronger allies in the Central and Western Mediterranean, in Europe and on the shores of the Atlantic. Iran, too, is little inclined to join a Middle East bloc. The only state genuinely interested in such a bloc appears to be Pakistan, but there, again, the idea is more Islamic than Middle Eastern, and Pakistan's sphere of interests and activities cannot easily be termed Middle Eastern.

Nor does the Arab League represent a genuine and efficient factor unifying and coordinating the policies of its member states, in spite of its efforts to appear as such. The League itself is split into rival, mutually antagonistic, "blocs," whose differing attitudes to each other and to some of the most vital problems of the Middle East render impossible in most cases any real coordination. Moreover, the League is constitutionally weak, since its

pact jealously guards the unlimited sovereignty of each of its member states. Far from constituting a "super-state" representing general Arab interests to which the separate national interests would have to be subordinated at least in part, the Arab League is no more than a function of these frequently conflicting national interests. The member states support it or neglect it, display enthusiasm or indifference at their convenience and according to their shifting concerns. The "Middle East," therefore, becomes a rather vague, almost theoretical term whenever real political relations and interests are to be discussed. Israel's present and future relations with it can be examined and analyzed only in relation to the various individual states of the region.

RELATIONS WITH TURKEY AND IRAN

There appear to be no special problems or obstacles preventing the emergence of friendly, even close, neighborly relations between Israel and Turkey. Existing trade relations are indeed capable of further development to both countries' advantage (although Israel cannot, in the long run, be satisfied with the present one-sided pattern of its trade with Turkey, in which it does practically all the purchasing and importing). In fact Turkey and Israel exhibit a certain parallel in social thought and political problems. Turkey, like Israel, is European in outlook, modernist in intention, vigorously activist in its approach to social and political problems. Turkey, too, would like to base cooperation of Middle Eastern countries on purely geographical-regional considerations, and rejects outright the idea that national-linguistic affinity, as exemplified by the Arab League, or common religion (an "Islamic bloc") should be considered necessary for regional cooperation, or determine its scope.

This parallel between Turkey's and Israel's outlook should not, of course, be exaggerated. Turkey, like most of the countries of Asia, faces as its main task the transformation of large masses of illiterate and backward peasants into a modern industrial and rural population capable of forming and supporting a modern state. It faces, in other words, the problem of accelerating and directing the processes of urbanization, industrialization, west-

ernized education and modernization, while Israel's main problems are much different: the "Ingathering of the Exiles"; the transformation of an overwhelmingly urban population into one properly balanced between town and village, i.e. *de-urbanization*; training a largely nonproductive society to be productive; integrating peoples from all countries of the world into one nation.

Moreover, in certain spheres of external and world affairs, Turkey's and Israel's policies are at variance. In the conflict dividing the world into two rival blocs, Turkey may be considered as definitely belonging to the Western camp, led by the United States; whereas Israel aspires (while preserving its own form of government — a social democracy shaped according to Western pattern and rejecting Communism and any dictatorial regime) to maintain its neutrality in any conflict between the world powers.

Nevertheless, friendly relations between Israel and Turkey, now well established, can be assumed to be progressing on the road to further strength and development. It should not be forgotten that Turkey was the first Muslim country and the first Middle East state to establish full diplomatic relations with Israel.¹

In Iran feelings of pan-Islamic solidarity seem to be stronger than in Turkey. They tended to delay Iran's recognition of Israel, and if allowed to develop could trouble the cordiality of future relations between the two countries. However, it should not be overlooked that the practical effects of pan-Islamic sentiments have never been considerable. While such feelings certainly exist in a number of Muslim countries and do color, to a degree, the state of mind and the spiritual life of their peoples, they have never been allowed to wield too great an influence on practical external politics. This statement is borne out by a study of the several abortive attempts to engineer *jihads* during the last half-century, as well as by close scrutiny of the day-to-day

¹ *De facto* recognition was extended on March 29, 1949. The Israel Minister to Turkey presented his letters of credence to President Inönü on January 9, 1950. On March 9 it was announced that the Turkish Foreign Office had informed the Israel Minister that the establishment of diplomatic relations was to be considered as full *de jure* recognition.

politics of all Muslim powers, even including Afghanistan and Pakistan. In addition, the Muslims of Iran are Shiites, a fact which lessens their sentiments of pan-Islamic solidarity (although the Sunni-Shiite antagonism should not be overestimated). Actively Muslim or pan-Islamic circles are not too strongly represented in the Iranian Government and political circles; and the Government, although it must always take into consideration the feelings of the Muslim-Shiite savants and their followers, does not allow them too much influence on foreign policy.

Apart from these pan-Islamic sentiments — potential rather than actual — and the degree to which the Iranian Government sees fit to let them influence its foreign policy, there appears to be no reason preventing full, friendly, and even cordial relations from developing between Iran and Israel. By extending *de facto* recognition,² Iran has now become the third country with a Muslim majority,³ after Turkey and Indonesia, to establish normal contacts with Israel, thus enabling cordial relations to begin their natural growth.

ANTAGONISM OF THE ARAB STATES

Israel's main problem in the Middle East therefore, is reduced to the question of its relations with the various Arab states. At present these relations are characterized by the unabated hostility of the Arab states; moreover, a state of war with them still exists, technically although not legally or officially.⁴

The five Arab states whose armies invaded Palestine on May 15, 1948, have so far refused to transform the existing armistice agreements into full-fledged peace treaties or to establish normal relations — diplomatic, commercial, or other-

² Officially announced on March 15, 1950.

³ States with considerable Muslim minorities which have recognized Israel include France, USSR, Yugoslavia, China, Burma, and the Philippines.

⁴ As the Arab states did not recognize Israel, and as an official declaration of war would have been interpreted as recognition of the fact of Israel's existence as a state, no war was ever officially declared. Nevertheless, the Arab states have shaped their conduct and internal legislation (declaration of a blockade, establishment of Prize Courts, etc.) as if there existed a fully fledged war.

wise. Israel, on the other hand, is prepared to establish such relations immediately. It is, of course, easy for Israel to be so prepared, since to do so does not require the renunciation of any important political interest or principle: Israel's major sacrifice was made prior to its birth, when its present leaders — then the leaders of the Zionist movement — agreed to the partition of Palestine, the whole of which is historically regarded as the homeland of the Jewish people. The recognition of the fact of Israel's existence and the establishment of normal relations with it is much more difficult for Arab statesmen. Such a step would be tantamount to admission of final failure, of utter defeat. So long as no peace is made, no facts recognized, and no relations established, the defeat — which remains a fact — can be explained away as a temporary setback which must and will be made good in the future.

There are, of course, short-term practical problems retarding the achievement of formal peace. Among these are questions of boundaries, exchanges of territory, compensation, return of refugees, rights of passage, and the like. These problems, however, do not appear to be insurmountable. Most of them, and certainly the most complicated, affect Israel's relations with the Kingdom of Jordan: e.g. the future of Jerusalem; Israel's access to Mount Scopus; Arab use of the road to Bethlehem; the fate of the Jewish Quarter of the Old City of Jerusalem, including the Wailing Wall; the Latrun salient cutting Israel's main highway to Jerusalem; and King Abdallah's desire for a Jordanian outlet to the Mediterranean. And yet, of all the Arab states, Jordan has advanced the furthest on the road to preparedness for talks on a final adjustment. On the other hand, there seem to be no short-term problems of detail between Israel and Egypt except the fate of the Gaza district, now occupied by Egyptian forces. This is not a very serious obstacle, since Egypt cannot be greatly interested in keeping an area which serves no Egyptian purpose. Between Israel and both Syria and Lebanon there would appear to be no such problems outstanding, except perhaps those of water rights. Still, Egypt, Syria, and Lebanon remain adamant in their refusal to come to terms.

It is obvious, therefore, that the main obstacle to peace and normal relations is not to be found in the short-term problems — complicated and hard to solve though they be — but in the basic refusal of Arab statesmen to acquiesce in the existence of Israel.⁵

POSSIBILITY OF A "SECOND ROUND"

In the long run, the only Arab alternative to accepting facts and normalizing relations is a war of revenge, a "Second Round." This idea, indeed, appears to be dominant in Arab circles. While talk of a "Second Round," or a "Hundred Years War" disappeared during 1949 from the speeches and statements of Arab representatives to the UN and Western Powers, it is still cherished in the Arabic press and in statements intended for domestic use. Such statements and articles are, in fact, so numerous and so ubiquitous that no quotations seem necessary. The Arab governments are doing little to stop this constant flow of threat and abuse; nor do responsible Arab officials offer statements better suited to guide public opinion toward the facing of facts and toward peace. On the contrary, some of them are among the authors of the most violent "Second Round" speeches. The few calls for peace and moderation invariably emanate from individual statesmen not connected with the Government, such as Isma'il Sidqi Pasha, and journalists belonging to the opposition.

Naturally, not everything said or written by Arab politicians, journalists, and public men need be accepted at face value: a certain manner of speech, certain combinations of ideas and phrases, are *du bon ton* in the Arab world. Every reputable politician and editorial writer is expected to repeat them, even if there is no will or means to act accordingly. The resulting discrepancy between Arab political talk and Arab political realities is one of the most important characteristics of Middle Eastern

⁵ The Arab claim that Israel should accept the area and frontiers as laid down by the resolution of November 29, 1947, (accepted on the assumption that Partition could be carried out peacefully and Israel's defense requirements therefore need not to be taken into consideration, and that the Arabs would not invalidate this decision by armed invasion) can be cast aside as a tactical maneuver. Moreover, the Arabs, in putting forward this demand, have by no means unequivocally committed themselves to conclude peace and to establish normal relations in the hypothetical event that Israel should accept it.

social and political life, and has, in fact, been recognized as such by the more critical Arab observers themselves — men like Musa Alami, Qadri Tuqan, and Costi Zurayk. This discrepancy has always been especially discernible in the Arab attitude to the Palestine problem ⁶ and was undoubtedly one of the major causes of Arab failure in the Palestine war.

Nevertheless, no responsible statesman or observer can light-heartedly brush aside such talk of a future war of revenge — not when it is so consistently repeated by every organ of public opinion, and when it is accompanied by so concentrated an effort to enlarge and reorganize military forces and to purchase vast quantities of war material and equipment of the most aggressive type, even at the cost of suspending work on vital projects of development, education, and health services. The possibility of an Arab war of revenge has, therefore, to be taken into account in the formulation of any policy.

If there is to be such a "Second Round," there remains only speculation, somewhat idle speculation at that, as to who will win. It would appear that the Arab states could prevent a repetition of their debacle of 1948 if they secured active Great Power support for their war of revenge, which does not seem very likely, or if they managed to assemble so truly overwhelming a superiority of manpower and modern equipment combined with technical know-how as to make even the most valiant Israel resistance hopeless. It would sometimes seem that the Arabs are attempting to follow this latter course, to judge from their feverish arming, but their success would appear doubtful, since the tremendous financial requirements of assembling such an overwhelming superiority must necessarily clash, sooner or later, with the realities of the Arab states' economics and financing.

⁶ E.g., the Arab boycott of Jewish goods and services — solemnly declared in 1946 and vociferously prepared, but only partially carried out (especially in Palestine, where no government machinery was at the Arab leaders' disposal to enforce the boycott and where they had to rely on voluntary compliance on the part of the Arab population, or else on intimidation and internal terror); the axiom that the sale of Arab lands to Jews was to be regarded as high treason — never publicly disputed, but consistently broken even by perfectly respectable leaders and notables, who publicly professed their adherence to the axiom; the high pitch of popular wrath and readiness for self-sacrifice in the war against Israel — as compared with the actual effort of the Arab peoples.

Finally, the Arabs might win a second round if one or more of the reasons for the Arab defeat of 1948 could possibly be eliminated.

There were, in this writer's opinion, three basic reasons for that defeat: lack of serious military preparation and planning; lack of unity and coordination among the different Arab states and armies; and deeply-rooted social, cultural, and moral characteristics of the Arab nations — resulting mainly from the state of public health and education, economic life and social conditions — which prevented them from rising to the serious, self-sacrificing, all-out war effort needed to match the last-ditch struggle of Israel. Of these three main reasons, elimination of the first would not appear to be very difficult. As to the second : a detailed analysis of the prospects of real Arab unity falls outside the scope of this article, but they do not seem to be very bright. Finally, the social and moral phenomena which prevented an all-out Arab war effort cannot be easily and quickly eliminated. They could be eased or even cured in the course of generations if the Arab world devoted all its strength and efforts to the revolutionary reforms which have been recognized as necessary by its best sons. But if the Arabs seriously undertook the gigantic task of social and economic reform in their own house, they would have no time and energy to spare for planning a war of revenge against their neighbors. Moreover, should the Arabs succeed in building a truly progressive society, it may be anticipated that the future members and leaders of such a hypothetical society will be in no mood for aggressive adventures, but will be wholly absorbed in the glorious adventure of peaceful development and cooperation.

Finally, there remains the Arab hope that the profound change required to bring about the elimination of Israel will occur not on the Arab side but in Israel itself: the hope that Israel might collapse under the burden of its economic and social problems, that it might deteriorate to such an extent that the ability and will of its people to sustain self-sacrificing effort would be so weakened that the same forces which failed to conquer Israel in 1948 would be able to do so at some future date.

ARAB FEARS OF ISRAEL EXPANSIONISM

We are concerned here primarily with the problems that would remain should the Arab states, after all, face the facts and acquiesce in the existence of Israel. For such acquiescence—however necessary if a war of revenge is to be prevented—would not in itself eliminate the antagonism between Israel and the Arab world.

The Arab-Jewish struggle that has unsettled and poisoned the Middle East for three decades derives from two main conflicts. The first was the struggle for the domination of Palestine, the shaping of its political future and national character. This struggle, the parties to which were, first and foremost, the Jews and the Arabs of Palestine (the Arab states appearing on the stage as supporters of their Palestinian brethren only, not on the strength of their own claims) can be considered as at an end. So as far as realities are concerned, it was decided in 1948, when Israel was established and Palestine ceased to be a political unit, and when the Arabs of Palestine—scattered and divided among refugees, Arabs of Israel, and Arabs of the Jordanian and Egyptian occupation zones—ceased to form an active body politic of their own. (The struggle over the future of what is now called "Arab Palestine," i.e., the parts of Palestine occupied by Jordan and Egypt respectively, may linger on, although this struggle, too, was decided as far as realities were concerned even before the formal proclamation of the merger of Jordan and Jordan-occupied Palestine. But this is now an inter-Arab struggle which has no direct bearing on Israel-Arab relations.)

The second struggle—that between the Arab states and Israel—is now to the fore. The Arabs regard Israel, and will in all probability continue to do so for some time to come, as a foreign enclave in their midst; as a heterogeneous element disturbing the Arab unity they strive for; as separating—geographically, militarily, economically—Egypt and the Maghrib from the Fertile Crescent; as making forever unrealizable both the much-desired equation between Middle Eastern regionalism and Arab unity, and the second-choice equation between Middle

East regionalism and Islamic unity (embracing Turkey and Iran, too, and perhaps even Afghanistan and Pakistan).⁷

These are serious obstacles to cordial cooperation. The Arab considerations are based on facts which cannot be disputed. Israel is indeed the only non-Arabic-speaking enclave between Morocco and Iraq (disregarding the Kurds, the Armenians, and Syriac-speaking remnants); it is the only non-Muslim and non-Arabic enclave between the Maghrib and Pakistan, again disregarding the Armenians and minority groups of little political importance. These facts have to be faced. But the Arabs can accept them if once they admit that regional cooperation need not and should not be based on national, linguistic, or religious bonds, as Turkey, for instance, certainly understands and accepts. At the same time, however, they can accept the fact of Israel only if it is assumed that Israel will be a peaceful, cooperative, constructive neighbor. The main problem is that the Arabs apparently doubt this, and that they conceive Israel as a hostile, expansionist, disruptive power in their midst.

The Arabs say they fear Israel expansionism; they say they are certain that Israel is bound, sooner or later, to try to burst out of its existing frontiers, and that even if the assurances given by Israel's present leaders are genuine and serious (which the Arabs doubt), they might be disregarded by future generations. There is no doubt that these fears and warnings of the potential might of Israel, the danger of its expansionism, and the real prospects of its domination are depicted in much exaggerated terms⁸ in order to keep alive a popular hatred. But there also can be little doubt that most of the Arab leaders have serious misgivings, if not actual fear, of Israel's future military expansion. If real peace and cordial cooperation between Israel and the Arab

⁷ This does not mean that Arab unity—much less Islamic unity—could easily be achieved were it not for Israel's existence. The exploits and failures of the movement for Arab unity during the last five years have proved that this movement has still a long way to go before it can think of realizing its theoretical aims. It is also obvious that Israel has indirectly served as a unifying factor, being the "common enemy," and that, were it not for the concentration of pan-Arab efforts on the fight against Zionism, and later Israel, real achievement of Arab unity might well have been still less conspicuous.

⁸ These exaggerations of Israel's might contrast strangely with the boasts of the "40 million Arabs" and "400 million Muslims" who will eventually "throw Israel into the sea," and with the continued talk of a Second Round, in which victory is, according to Arab internal propaganda, assured to the Arabs.

world are to be achieved, ways and means must be found to convince the Arab leaders that their misgivings and fears are baseless.

To fears of military expansion must be added dire expectations of Israel's economic domination of the Middle East. Since the Arab countries, except Lebanon, are mainly agricultural countries with a backward rural population, are underdeveloped and still using out-of-date methods of production, with an appallingly low standard of living; and since Israel, on the other hand, has a modern Westernized economy, and can subsist only by developing its industry and finding markets for its products, the Arabs fear that Israel's industry, banking, and commerce will in the long run subject the Arab states. These fears are aggravated by an exaggerated idea of "World Jewry's" influence on the finances and economies of the whole world, and especially on those of the U. S.

There is certainly also some fear of Israel's fermenting influence on the social systems prevailing in the Arab countries. Since the concept of a progressive social democracy, which best describes Israel's own system and ideas, is basically foreign, not to say inconceivable, to most Arab statesmen, they sometimes genuinely, if erroneously, regard Israel as a hotbed of communism from which revolution will spread to the neighboring countries. Even if it is not anticipated that Israel will intentionally spread communism, socialism, or simply social fermentation and unrest, the Arabs fear the spontaneous influence which Israel's social democracy — its well developed cooperative system, its high wages and standard of living, its concepts of basic equality of all citizens, its free elections, the predominance of left-of-the-middle parties, the legal existence of a Communist Party (although very small and without influence) — must unavoidably exert, in the long run, on the economic and social structure of the Arab countries.

There may also be misgivings, among the Arabs, as to Israel's potential influence on non-Arab or non-Muslim minorities in the Middle East. Even if it is not anticipated that Israel will actively and intentionally encourage such minorities and stir up

trouble between them and the Arab-Muslim majority, its mere existence as a non-Arab and non-Muslim power, may, of course, encourage minority elements. Those in Lebanon, for instance, wishing to preserve the Christian character of their country and its independence vis-à-vis pan-Arab pressure; Kurdish nationalists striving for their own independent state; Druzes and Alawites of Syria, seeking to preserve their autonomy against centralist Damascus — all these might well find Israel's mere existence an encouraging fact, even if they do not apply for direct support.

PALESTINE REFUGEES: A FURTHER IRRITANT

The problem of the Palestinian Arab refugees, too, although it does not belong to the basic fears enumerated, certainly represents an important obstacle to peace and cooperation. This problem — serious and important as it is — can be dealt with here in passing only, since any more detailed discussion would require a special article; moreover, the refugee problem appears to have been exhaustively discussed. In a very condensed form, Israel's main assertion is based on the fact that the bulk of the refugees left Israel, in the hour of its birth and during the struggle for its existence, either actively fighting against the new state or passively assisting the attackers, or — at the least — preferring to leave the country rather than live in Israel. (Israel vigorously denies Arab assertions that these refugees have been "expelled" or forced to leave.) Israel does not, therefore, recognize that it is under a moral or political obligation to take the bulk of these refugees back. Insofar as Israel is obliged, as a member state of the U. N. and as a Middle East country, to share in the solution of the political and humanitarian problem — an obligation which it fully accepts — its leaders consider that it has already contributed more fully than some other Middle East and Arab countries.⁹ Israel would, however, be prepared to discuss further

⁹ No official, accurate figures are so far available as to the number of Arab refugees living in Israel or taken back by Israel. The number of those Arabs who were uprooted by the war, but did not leave the area of what is now Israel, is generally estimated at about 31,000. The bulk of them had left their towns and villages on their way to the neighboring Arab countries, but did not get far enough and were overtaken by the Israel

its contribution within the framework of a general resettlement plan and in the context of peace treaties with the Arab states.

Since no *a priori* obligation or responsibility is recognized by Israel, the dangers and unsurmountable difficulties which the return of the bulk of the refugees would unavoidably create must necessarily be Israel's primary consideration. The economic and social sphere in which the refugees used to live, their means of living, have been destroyed by the war of 1948; their houses, villages, and townships either no longer exist or have been densely settled. The vacuum which was deliberately created to prevent Israel's emergence has been filled. Refugees returning would have to start from scratch, to be rehabilitated and resettled. Israel has neither the resources nor the duty to undertake this resettlement. The 20th century has witnessed many attempts to solve minority problems by exchanges of population; almost nowhere have there been serious attempts to bring displaced persons back to the countries they left, world opinion and international organization always preferring resettlement plans: it would be sheer folly for Israel to recreate a substantial minority problem (in addition to the problems posed by about 180,000-200,000 Arabs — 16% of the population — who are already living in Israel). Problems of security, too, necessarily are among the decisive factors shaping Israel's policy — the more so since the Arab states' insistence on the return of the refugees has to be taken together with their refusal to make peace and with their talk of a "Second Round." Moreover, the desired return of the refugees is sometimes openly described by Arab leaders and press organs as a move in the preparation of the future war of revenge, as the planting of a fifth column.¹⁰

As it turns out, Israel's refusal to take back the refugees, al-

Army, mostly in Nazareth and Galilee. About 6,000 of them have already been resettled by Israel, while 25,000 still await their final rehabilitation. (There were also 17,000 Jewish refugees of the war of 1948.) The number of refugees who were able to return under the "Reunion-of-Families" scheme has already reached about 5,000. Many refugees have illegally crossed back into Israel territory and subsequently achieved legalization of their return; their number cannot be ascertained, but it may be estimated at some 15,000-20,000.

¹⁰ From among the many possible quotations let one suffice: ". . . Thus [by the return of the refugees] there will be established in Israel a strong Arab minority which will be the nucleus for the rehabilitation of Palestine's character as an Arab country and will serve, when the Day of Judgment and Revenge comes, as a most potent fifth column." (*al-Sayyad* [Beirut], Apr. 6, 1950.)

though primarily dictated by its needs of self-preservation, does not conflict either with the regional interests of the Middle East as a whole or with the ultimate interests of the refugees themselves. The avoidance of newly created or resurgent minority problems; the striving for more or less homogeneous national and geographical units; the prevention of irredentist movements liable to breed future conflicts — all appear to be in the best interest of the Middle East. Resettlement among their own kin should be a happy solution for the refugees themselves, too. Moreover, the bulk of the refugees could serve as the missing link for many of the development projects blueprinted in the Arab countries: the surplus population, the working hands, lack of which has so far prevented the execution of many schemes, especially in the vast spaces of northeastern Syria and north-western Iraq (*al-Jazirah*), the eastern side of the Jordan Valley, and the Orontes plain — cultivable, even irrigable, but most sparsely settled.

It would appear that the UN and those Western thinkers and politicians interested in the development of the Middle East, have already adopted similar views. The UN Economic Survey Mission (the "Clapp Mission") certainly based its plans and ideas on them: although owing to political and financial difficulties not very much of practical and immediate importance has so far resulted from its survey, its basic idea has linked the refugee problem with plans and schemes for development, or, in other words, has considered the resettlement of the refugees in the Arab countries.

The Arab states and the refugees themselves still insist on the return of all the refugees to Israel — or, at least, on their *right*, in principle, to return. It would appear, however, that they, too, are slowly coming around to more realistic views. As the refugee problem is considered one of the most valuable cards in Arab hands in the political struggle, the Arab statesmen have, so far, neither openly renounced their claims nor advocated the resettlement of the refugees in the Arab countries; they have, moreover, taken a very critical, sometimes even negative, attitude toward the Clapp Mission and its plans. They have also put forward the

return of the refugees as *conditio sine qua non* for any talks with Israel — a condition which should also be viewed as a primarily tactical maneuver. In reality, however, they seem to be slowly adjusting their views to the need for refugee resettlement in their own countries. Syria and Iraq have already granted the refugees the right to become citizens. One Arab ruler, at least (King Abdallah), has proved with regard to this problem, too, a wiser statesman than most of the other Arab kings and politicians: he has accepted those refugees living in Jordan and Jordan-annexed Palestine as full citizens; he is planning refugee resettlement connected with general development schemes of his country; and he has called upon refugees in other Arab states to migrate to his realm.

ISRAEL'S POLICY TOWARD ARAB AFFAIRS

Most of the problems and difficulties enumerated seem to involve primarily a mental and political adjustment on the Arab side. Israel's position vis-à-vis the main problem is much less problematic, since Israel is prepared — although it cannot fail to note the Arabs' feverish arming and to have some misgivings regarding it — to conclude peace immediately on the basis of the existing situation.

Once normal relations between Israel and the Arab states are established, Israel would still have to face a number of political problems. Its attitude toward the existing rival blocs would be one of these problems: although the division of the Arab world into a "Hashimite" bloc and an Egyptian-Sa'udi group need not be considered as rigid and permanent, it seems to be sufficiently deep-rooted to require a clear-cut policy. It would appear that Israel's interests cut across these inter-Arab rivalries. Israel might, therefore, form a kind of common front with Jordan on the Jerusalem question, as well as on economic problems of mutual interest. On the other hand, it would certainly side with Egypt in that country's opposition to the "Greater Syria" scheme and other expansionist plans of the Hashimite Kingdoms, as well as in Egypt's general desire to prevent changes in the equilibrium of forces in the Middle East.

The fact that Israel's interests cut across the inter-Arab rivalries, combined with Israel's preoccupation with its own constructive efforts and its resolve not to meddle in other states' internal affairs or in power politics generally, would certainly make for Israel's neutrality, or at least its complete noninterference, in inter-Arab rivalries and problems as such. It is, of course, to be assumed that this situation might be changed should one of the Arab blocs or states be prepared to make peace and normalize relations, while the others persisted in their recalcitrance. In that case, Israel would certainly develop a pronounced sympathy for the state which had made peace.

Other possible developments and problems toward which Israel must formulate a policy include its role in any plan for regional cooperation, either by transforming the Arab League into a truly regional body in which Israel could participate, or by establishing a new regional organization; its attitude toward the minorities of the Middle East—an attitude which would certainly consist of sympathy for the minorities and a natural opposition to Muslim-Arab attempts at *Gleichschaltung*, although here, too, the guiding principles of Israel's policy would be one of strict non-interference; its cooperation in large-scale development projects vital to Israel's own economy and progress and which could be put into effect only—or in a better and mutually more profitable way—through concerted action by Israel and one or the other of its neighbors; and finally, the shaping of Israel's trade relations with the Arab states to their mutual advantage.

Israel's statesmen may be excused if they refuse now to consider such problems of future policies in detail, since they cannot arise before the one essential primary step is taken: the conclusion of peace and the establishment of normal relations.

FORMAL ESTABLISHMENT OF PEACE THE PRIMARY NEED

We return, therefore, to the starting point. The first and currently most important question is: When will the Arab states be prepared to accept the fact of Israel's existence? The answer to this question is mainly a problem of Arab internal politics. But

even after the fact of Israel's existence has been accepted and recognized — as is inevitably bound to happen, sooner or later — the actual shape of Arab-Israel relations will be determined by the extent to which it will be possible to overcome the Arabs' triple fear of Israel: their fear of Israel's military expansion, of its economic domination, of its social fermentation. Success is in the interest not only of the Arabs themselves, but of Israel and the civilized world as a whole, and especially of those powers wishing to preserve peace and stability in the Middle East and to assist in its progress.

There are, unfortunately, no master plans, no prepared blue-prints and easy short cuts as to how these Arab fears can be eliminated. Clear, unequivocal guarantees given by the Great Powers and the UN for the frontiers of both Israel and its neighbors, might do much to alleviate the fear — on both sides — of military aggression. True understanding, on the part of the Arabs, of Israel's real position and problems — its isolation in the midst of the Arab ocean; its preoccupation with tremendous problems of construction and economic subsistence; its self-interest, therefore, in preserving peace with its neighbors and in refraining from any act of aggression or any interference in their internal affairs; its self-interest, also, in that agreements and treaties should be honored — should help the Arabs to realize the exaggerated nature of their fears.

Some indirect, unintentional social influence of Israel on its neighbors cannot be helped. But again, if the mere fact that there exists in the Middle East a true democracy with a progressive economy, a well developed cooperative system, free and independent labor unions, high wages and a decent standard of living, modern methods of agriculture and industry, and a society not content with whatever nature gave it but striving to develop its country — if this fact should inspire the Arab nations, or parts thereof, to strive for similar progress and reforms, the Arab statesmen should not regret it, but greet in it the dawn of a new day for their own societies.

It is today generally accepted in the West that the only means of protecting the Middle East and Asia against revolution and

anarchy, decay and disintegration is raising the standard of the peasant masses, democratizing the patterns of governments, developing industry and agriculture by modern methods and on the basis of a freely organized society. If the Arabs, too, accept this idea, they need not fear Israel's indirect social influence, for it would act in the same direction and in the same spirit: toward the social reforms which are inevitable if the Arab states are to avoid anarchy and survive.

POINT FOUR AND THE ARAB WORLD

An American View

Arthur Z. Gardiner

THE ACT for International Development, intended to carry out those phases of President Truman's Point Four program relating to technical assistance, has recently received final legislative and executive approval. Congress, in drafting the introductory sections of the Act, found that "the peoples of the United States and other nations have a common interest in the freedom and in the economic and social progress of all peoples. Such progress can further the secure growth of democratic ways of life, the expansion of mutually beneficial commerce, the development of international understanding and good will, and the maintenance of world peace."¹ Congress also found that the efforts of people living in economically underdeveloped areas to improve their lives can be furthered through exchanges of technical skills and knowledge, and by the flow of investment capital; and that such assistance and investment can only make its optimum contribution "where there is understanding of the mutual advantages of such assistance and investment and where there is confidence of fair and reasonable treatment and due respect for the legitimate interests of the peoples of the countries to which the assistance is given and in which the in-

¹ Act for International Development, Section 402(a).

ARTHUR Z. GARDINER joined the Department of State in 1947, working on the Greek-Turkish Aid Program which got under way in that year. Following a period on loan to the Economic Cooperation Administration, he returned to the Department in 1949 to act as special assistant on Point Four and economic operations to Assistant Secretary McGhee, in charge of the Bureau of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs. Prior to the war he had a business career in New York; during the war he served with the Foreign Economic Administration (FEA) and was a Vice President of the U. S. Commercial Company, the corporate instrument for all foreign purchasing of FEA.

vestment is made and of the countries from which the assistance is given and in which the investments are derived.”² The Act continues by declaring it to be a policy of the United States to aid the efforts of peoples in economically underdeveloped areas to develop their resources and to improve their working and living conditions by encouraging the exchange of technical knowledge and skills and the flow of capital to such countries, thus providing conditions under which such assistance can be expected to improve standards of living and create new sources of wealth.

The Act includes a further statement of criteria to be used in reviewing requests for technical assistance. These are three in number: “(1) whether the assistance applied for is an appropriate part of a program reasonably designed to contribute to the balanced and integrated development of the country or area concerned; (2) whether any works or facilities which may be projected are actually needed in view of similar facilities existing in the area and are otherwise economically sound; and (3) with respect to projects for which capital is requested, whether private capital is available either in the country or elsewhere upon reasonable terms and in sufficient amounts to finance such projects.”³ Under the Act there is authorized to be appropriated sums not exceeding \$35 million to provide means to engage the services of technicians and to pay for the educational facilities and services contemplated under the Act.

The Act, in its final form, includes only general references to the problem of investment. Nor are capital grant funds to cover merchandise movements made available, as they are under other titles of the Foreign Economic Assistance Act of 1950. Funds available under the Act for International Development are intended, and will be used, to pay the salaries and expenses of technicians sent abroad; and to pay the dollar costs of educational services arranged for trainees from abroad, and for purchases of equipment intended to permit technicians to demonstrate activities in various specialized fields.

In the absence of grants in aid to carry forward economic de-

² *Ibid.*, Section 402(c).

³ *Ibid.*, Section 403(b).

velopment along lines that may be suggested by technicians employed under the program, it is clear that other sources of capital must be available to carry out the objectives of Point Four. Specifically, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the Export-Import Bank, already well established, are able to provide funds. With special reference to the Arab world, the United States grant of \$27,450,000, available under the Palestine Refugee Aid Act of 1950, is intended to be used in large part for permanent improvements suggested by its legislative history in the General Assembly of the United Nations and in the United States Congress. This fund will be swelled by contributions from other governments. Private capital also, under appropriate conditions to be discussed later, may well be forthcoming.

CRITICISMS OF THE PROGRAM

Skepticism has been expressed on the possibilities of the Point Four program by many thoughtful people in the Arab states. Objections, however, are frequently self-contradictory. To one, the program is too small, and involves too many preliminary surveys; to another, it is too large and involves too great a degree of foreign influence and control. It does not take into account the weakness of many small governments, which may be unable to prevent exploitation of the masses through corruption of local ruling classes by foreign investors; or, it will fail because it involves too small expenditure on plans for training in governmental procedure and insufficient assistance in the fields of health and social welfare. Point Four technicians will spend too much time in contact with local government bureaus, rather than at the "grass roots"; but, says another, they will cause unrest by fomenting peoples against their rulers. On the one hand, not enough provision is made for capital investment; on the other, the program will leave poor but otherwise solvent countries embarrassed by heavy debt charges. The program might eventually help the peoples; but the governments fear the reaction of their populations to the programs of austerity that must accompany periods of savings and investment. Local officials and technicians

would like assistance, but they fear that newcomers from abroad will affront their pride and cause loss of face.

Cannot this fog of misapprehension and frustration be clarified? It can, but largely only by thought and analysis in the countries designed to benefit from the proffered aid. Mr. Paul Hoffman has pointed out from his experience that technical assistance is an article which can be imported but cannot be exported. In order to make a mutual exchange of views worthwhile, there must be a desire to benefit and profit by another's experience. No foundation for continuing development can be built unless those concerned in participating countries share responsibilities for planning and administration, and thereby increase their store of skills and information. Such skills and knowledge are not imparted save with effort on both sides. The group of skilled and sympathetic observers who formed the United Nations Economic Survey Mission to the Middle East in the fall of 1949 found that a principal obstacle to the economic development of the area lay in the shortage of administrative skills. The countries concerned are challenged to remedy this reproach, and the Point Four programs of the United States and of the United Nations can be so handled as to assist them to meet the challenge. But the effort will be greater for those receiving than for those tendering Point Four aid.

It may be that expectations have been unduly aroused by the proponents of Point Four, offering both undue optimism in its possibilities and undue disappointment with what seems to be its lack of boldness. Should not the critics of the program reappraise their position in the light of realistic optimism, examine the motivations of the United States, and determine how best their peoples can profit by proposals now being formulated by the United States Government and the United Nations?

MOTIVES OF THE UNITED STATES

Why does the United States take such an interest in affairs abroad, and why has it continued to support programs involving grants of foreign aid? Why is it the will of America that foreign aid, as envisaged in the Point Four program, be proffered to

the world? The proof of this interest is clear and demonstrable in a series of votes in the Congress, and in statements of policy by the executive branch of the Government.

The first obvious answer, and probably the prime reason that motivates the thinking of the American public, is a growing conviction that if the United States is to maintain and improve its present standards of living, peoples in other countries must improve theirs as well. Americans do not think that their country can continue to prosper while poverty, misery, and dissidence threaten the livelihood and well being of other countries throughout the world. Americans are genuinely convinced that the world has grown smaller, and are fearful of changes that may adversely affect the good will which they think is theirs. They are convinced that the rights of the individual are sacred, and are fearful that in a world where the individual is unduly subordinated to the State, America cannot long continue to preserve its individualistic ideal. Americans have a conviction that wealth is not something that belongs to one man today and another tomorrow; they do not believe that a wealthy individual or a wealthy nation necessarily owes its position to circumstances which deprived others of wealth. On the contrary, they are of the opinion that wealth available to all individuals increases as the forces of capital and manpower are effectively harnessed. These long range considerations, not search for tomorrow's export markets, are what lead them on.

Over and beyond these considerations of materialistic nature, an analysis of American motives leads one to conclude that humanitarian considerations play a large part in American policies, governmental and private. The type of thought and action that led to the founding of the American University of Beirut in 1866 still finds expression. Americans have had valued contacts of an educational and religious nature in many Middle Eastern countries for nearly a century. It is from idealistic and humanitarian sources, as well as from economic considerations, that the inspiration underlying American foreign assistance programs has sprung, and such sources will continue to influence the policy and the execution of these programs.

Further indications of American attitudes, if proof is needed, may be found in specific examples. It certainly was not American economic imperialism that led the United States Government to assist Brazilian interests, for example, to establish a steel industry. Capital, equipment, and technical assistance were forthcoming to create an industry clearly competitive with North America. The Arab world might consider the motivation leading the United States to assist Egypt in establishing a factory to manufacture fertilizer, competitive with fertilizer of North American manufacture, with funds provided by the Export-Import Bank. Such undertakings as these are difficult to reconcile with allegations that narrow commercialism or old-fashioned imperialism motivate the Point Four program.

THE COOPERATIVE APPROACH

How best can the Arab countries take advantage of the present United States attitudes? The initiative is up to them, for it is certainly not the intent of the United States to force Point Four aid on any country that does not seek it. Moreover, the law is explicit in requiring contribution toward the cost of the Point Four projects carried out by the United States from the local treasuries concerned. Aid will not be rendered unless it is requested, and unless the authorities conducting the program in the United States are convinced that such aid, sought by the recipient country, will be used to the best advantage for the general welfare of its peoples.

American authorities appreciate the impatience of those who have long waited to improve their lot and who must wait still longer while preliminary studies and surveys are carried out. They are, nevertheless, convinced that any increment of aid will be most effective as part of a general plan consonant with the aspirations and potentialities of the country or area wherein it is conducted. Americans aim at action, but are convinced that careful planning and good order make for better results in the long run. Problems of land tenure and methods of distributing foodstuffs may have to be considered before undertaking assistance related to large-scale programs for agricultural develop-

ment. It may be, on the other hand, that the case for a specific development project is clear on its face, within acknowledged limits of finance and resources of skill and manpower. However, projects which best fit the possibilities of bettering the largest groups of individuals will clearly tend to take preference in the minds of those dealing with considerations of priority.

Examples of the effectiveness of technical assistance can be found in specialized fields in areas of the world where it has already been applied. Efforts of a comparatively small number of individuals thoughtfully directed have, in cooperation with local officials and local institutions, produced results surprising in their nature. Through the help of one American horticulturist working under the auspices of the agricultural station managed jointly by the U. S. Department of Agriculture and the Ministry of Agriculture of Guatemala, the possibility of tripling the yield of coffee trees in that country has been demonstrated. Joint efforts of the U. S. Department of Agriculture and Brazilian authorities discovered the cause and cure for a virus disease threatening to destroy the entire citrus industry of Brazil. Doctors of the Rockefeller Foundation eradicated a malignant malaria epidemic in Northern Brazil in 1938-39, and again a similar epidemic in the Valley of the Nile in 1942. The combined efforts of doctors attached to UNRRA and others with the U. S. Aid Mission to Greece have eradicated malaria from that country, saving millions of working days a year and improving the health and wellbeing of the entire population.

Arabs will recall the work of the Near East Foundation recently in identifying and controlling a pest responsible for serious ravages to the tomato crop in the Biqa'a Valley. Work of the Near East Foundation in improving village life through intensive efforts in certain local communities bears further witness to the value of its programs.

PROSPECTS FOR CAPITAL INVESTMENT

So much for technical assistance as such. The second phase of the Point Four program—that of American capital investment overseas—has aroused the greatest skepticism. What are the

possibilities of such investment? American private capital has clearly shown its interest in various extractive industries, of which petroleum is the primary example. There is every reason for Arab countries to count on a continuance of this type of investment, and there are many grounds for believing that the expenditure of such capital will be beneficial in its effects. Such enterprises require trained personnel in mechanical, clerical, and administrative fields; this training can be especially useful to Arab communities when, as is so often the case, employees return to their native villages and establish their own enterprises. Exchanges of personal contacts, and the increasing interest that Arabs can take in all phases of such enterprise, are all positive forces. The increasing demand for skilled people is likely to be a powerful leaven in the whole educational structure.

The extent to which interest in other fields of private investment will become manifest in the years to come is less predictable. Much depends on market demands, political stability, and the possibilities of expanding trade in general in the Arab area. Large-scale agricultural development and the well-being of farming people would provide inducements for private foreign capital, through the expansion of demand and through conditions of stability. Resources of the Arab countries may not suffice to support industrial enterprise on the scale known in Western Europe and the United States; on the other hand, factors of transport costs, accessibility of markets, and local skills favor the development of various types of industry, and capital from abroad, as well as domestic capital, will be attracted by such possibilities. Typical examples might be auto assembly plants, and a variety of new industries that can follow in the wake of the development of petroleum resources, either close by the oil wells or at the terminals of the pipelines. Fertilizer and cement are cases very much to the point. Treaties of commerce and navigation, some now under negotiation between the United States and Arab countries, will, if ratified, go far to improve the chances of attracting American venture capital. Political stability in the Arab world will of course contribute to the confidence of foreign investors. American capital is showing increasing in-

terest in enjoying a partnership with local private capital in many countries. It may well follow this pattern here.

Aside from private venture capital, there are sources of funds available from inter-governmental and governmental banking institutions specifically designed to assist in the development of sound economic programs throughout the world. While the Arab countries will necessarily be in competition with countries in other areas for funds available from sources of this nature, there is no reason to think that they cannot obtain their full share of such funds, always provided that their planning and enterprise justify such investment. The \$12,800,000 International Bank loan to Iraq for construction of the irrigation and flood control dam on the Wadi Tharthar, which was announced on June 15, 1950, is an example of what can be done. So also are loans made by the Export-Import Bank to Egypt and Turkey.

Many undertakings related to the development of basic economic resources, in particular expansion of highway and railroad networks, development of water resources for electric power and irrigation, and reforestation, are especially suited to financing through public rather than private channels. There is ample evidence that the Arab world's basic resources, which in past centuries served to support considerably larger populations than are now living in Syria and Iraq, can be reclaimed through modern engineering enterprise. Here is, therefore, a further substantial area for investment.

Point Four technicians, as assistants to interested governments, can bridge the gaps frequently apparent in furthering proposals of such a nature to the appropriate foreign banks. Misunderstandings have arisen in the past regarding proposals for such developments because of the barrier of language, and because of barriers in the thinking of the borrower and the lender which fuller explanation could have broken down. Thus, better understanding of technical engineering and financial problems can be one profitable outcome of the Point Four program. Ways can also be found to combine the use of resources available in banking institutions abroad with local sources of finance and credit. The new Bank for Industrial Development in Turkey is an ex-

ample of an interlocking of resources, and progress in that venture will deserve careful study in the Arab countries.⁴

FINDINGS OF THE UN ECONOMIC SURVEY MISSION

Such thinking in the United States on the possibility of economic development in the Arab states has been influenced by the approach of the United Nations Economic Survey Mission to the Middle East. This Mission, international in composition, was led by a distinguished American — Mr. Gordon Clapp — who has guided the Tennessee Valley Authority through many pitfalls in its search for improvement in the economic, political, and educational standards of an area which has lagged behind the development of the United States as a whole. The disappointment expressed by Arab authorities regarding the conservative approach of the Economic Survey Mission is not justified by a careful examination of its conclusions. The Mission laid bare many idle resources which could be put to work in the best interests of the population. In the language of the report, it found "the need for the development of the unused resources of the Near East, where lack of available capital is responsible for much idle manpower. This is a task for the Near Eastern Governments to do in their own way and in due course with the help of competent counsel and substantial financial credits."⁵

The Mission also determined that there were obstacles to the full and prompt development of these resources. These obstacles are of a nature which the governments and peoples of the Arab world are challenged to overcome. Quite aside from political factors, which may well defer considerations of proposals for development of water resources involving international agreement, the Mission found that large-scale developments within the boundaries of various Arab countries must necessarily await the development of administrative and technical skills among the nationals of those countries.⁶ Accordingly, among other objectives

⁴ For a full description of this bank, see pp. 349-52.

⁵ *Final Report of the UN Economic Survey Mission to the Middle East, Part I, Interim Findings, Paragraph 7, p. 16.*

⁶ See *Final Report of the UN Economic Survey Mission to the Middle East, Part I, Chapter II.*

of Point Four is the advancement in technical skills through the wise use of funds in training programs at all levels of activity, undergraduate and postgraduate. This training is to include a wide range of technical and cultural and administrative fields. The Economic Survey Mission has pointed out the value of such a program, but it is to be wholly the responsibility of the Arab governments and peoples to shape the course which such a program will follow.

The Economic Survey Mission also considered problems requiring immediate action and results. Its members were deeply conscious that time was the essence of many issues faced in the area. It therefore has recommended the prompt development of several projects meeting various criteria, including first of all the desires of the governments of the countries concerned. As demonstrations of technical teamwork and the administration of complete developments, these pilot projects will lay the basis for larger, more important development schemes to come later.

Americans hope that the proffer of such counsel and the manifestation of public good will in the United States, as expressed in governmental action in making funds available for the purposes of the Economic Survey Mission and the technical assistance program, will be considered sympathetically by those responsible for the well-being of the Arab peoples. In the past the Arab countries have welcomed and benefitted by technical assistance programs proffered them by such private bodies as the Rockefeller Foundation, the Near East Foundation, and the American colleges in their lands. In the Point Four program, such efforts as these are raised to the level of a national policy and a national program. In the long pages of Arab history it would be difficult to find such an offer, from abroad, of talent and resources which can be devoted to purposes selected by the free will of these nations, devoted to their own national purposes, and administered in such manner as these nations, in full agreement with their friends abroad, may determine.

RELIGION, ECONOMICS, AND VIOLENCE IN BENGAL

Background of the Minorities Agreement

Richard D. Lambert

(For map of East Pakistan and surrounding territory, see facing page 277.)

IN AUGUST 1947, when a Muslim state was carved out of British India, the key provinces of the Punjab and Bengal were divided between the two new dominions of India and Pakistan. In the Punjab a violent upheaval and a mass migration marked its division, and only a few thousand Hindus are now scattered over the most inaccessible areas of Western Pakistan. Bengal had been divided before, from 1905 to 1911, and the partition of 1947 passed off more peaceably. A large Hindu minority of about 12 million remained in East (Pakistani) Bengal amidst a Muslim majority of 32 million. In the vast expanse of the Dominion of India, estimates place the Muslim minority at about 40 million out of a total population of 335 million. Thus sizable minorities remain in both countries. The political events of the partition have left them bereft of leaders, many of whom have migrated to the new homelands of their religious communities. It was a population transfer on a hitherto unprecedented scale caught half-way, and further trouble was almost inevitable.

On April 8, 1950, Liaquat Ali Khan and Jawaharlal Nehru, the Prime Ministers of Pakistan and India, signed a pact which gave new life to the hopes of the minorities in each country. Troops were lined on the frontiers, talk of war was open and unequivocal when the discussions opened. In their wake has come almost universal approval, and wistful hope that this pact, like so many others between Hindus and Muslims in this sub-

♦ RICHARD D. LAMBERT has been in India and Pakistan for the past year on a Social Science Research Council Fellowship to study the basis and nature of communal rioting.

continent, would not end in recrimination and accusation. As both sides know, the agreement was a gamble for high stakes. It had to be more than a patching up of specific quarrels of high-level diplomats—it had to be a turning point in the animosities which had come to threaten the minorities scattered over both India and Pakistan. Its conclusion meant that the signatories had faith that the issues involved could be decided and enforced by governmental authority, and that the decision would be completely accepted by millions of people concerned. It also meant that if this gamble were lost, if a contagious series of incidents were to mar the perfection of its working, the full prestige of the respective governments could not again effectively restore public confidence and safety.

THE BASIC ISSUES BETWEEN INDIA AND PAKISTAN

The outstanding issues which separate the two nations lie in four primary disagreements. The first and most dramatic is the battle for Kashmir. This continues to teeter in the United Nations: a cease-fire line has been drawn, a truce declared, and both governments have agreed to accept the results of a plebiscite. The difficulty is to reach agreement upon the prerequisites of an impartial vote.

The second issue is in reality a potential one. The fertile areas of both halves of divided Punjab are watered and irrigated from five principal rivers: the Sutlej, Ravi, Chenab, Jhelum, and Indus. Two of these rivers have their headwaters in Indian territory proper, and the other three (the Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab) spring from Indian-held Kashmir. Pakistan fears that the proposed hydroelectric schemes and irrigation projects that India has planned in its section of Punjab will divert the flow of water, and turn Western Punjab into a desert.

The third issue involves compensation for property which migrants driven out of the two countries have abandoned. Progressively more stringent ordinances have been passed by the two central governments and by the various provinces concerned. These ordinances broadened the definition of evacuee, made the title to all property left behind reside automatically with a gov-

ernmental custodian, and restricted the transfer of funds or the sale of property. India claims that the Hindus leaving Pakistan have lost a far greater amount of property than Muslims moving in the opposite direction. Thus India presses for compensation at the government level. The fourth issue is a trade deadlock which resulted from divergent decisions upon devaluation of the Indian and Pakistani rupees.

These issues in themselves are probably strong enough to strain what little formal goodwill there might have been between the two countries, but they seem to be only symptoms of a larger disaffection. In fact, there were many other smaller issues that flared for a few months and died down: India's action in taking by force the princely states of Junagadh and Hyderabad; the stream of refugees trickling from Sind down into Bombay; Pakistan's breaking of the economic boycott against the racial policy of South Africa; a dispute over small enclaves on the boundaries of the two countries; attempts of India to prevent an influx of Muslims into Assam; desecration or neglect of mosques, temples, and *gurdwaras* (Sikh shrines); teaching in Pakistani schools and textbooks of the necessity of jihad on the Kafirs — seemingly endless squabbles bearing witness to a heritage of animosity which lies deep in the history of the Hindus and Muslims of the subcontinent. Of the four major issues only the fourth directly affects Bengal as a whole, while the third threatens the Hindus residing in Pakistani East Bengal.

CONFLICT OVER DEVALUATION

At the end of June 1948, the two dominions (India has since made her link with the Commonwealth more tenuous) negotiated an agreement for the transfer of funds and securities from one to the other. Article I of this agreement stated: "The official rate of exchange as between the India rupee and the Pakistani rupee will continue to be at par, and will not be altered by either Government except after due notice and mutual consultation." Balances were to be cleared in free sterling up to a maximum of Rs. 150 million and after that in blocked sterling. On September 16, 1949, India was advised of the sterling devaluation.

Within three days it had submitted its own new rate to the International Monetary Fund, a rate which brought the Indian rupee back into its former ratio with sterling. Pakistan merely indicated that it had noted India's decision to devalue. By September 28, it appeared that a new exchange ratio between the two currencies had been worked out, to become operative on October 3, but on the 2nd negotiations broke down and India refused to clear sterling balances at what they claimed was an enhanced ratio. Each country accused the other of violating the exchange agreement. India claimed it had maintained par with the clearing currency (sterling) and thus Pakistan had broken the par agreement; Pakistan replied that it had taken no action, while India had changed the value of its currency. The effect of the disagreement eventually was a complete deadlock of trade between the two countries.

EFFECTS ON JUTE INDUSTRY

In the two Bengals this impasse struck directly at the very foundation of their economies—jute. The bulk of the world's raw jute supply and virtually all of the jute grown on the sub-continent comes from densely populated East Bengal. However, neither East Bengal nor the rest of Pakistan has any mills with which to process the jute, and thus it is dependent upon the Indian mill areas around Calcutta for about three-fourths of its export; the remainder goes directly on the world market. The devaluation crisis meant that the Indian mills would have to pay about 44 percent more for the raw jute, and after processing sell it at competitive prices on a rapidly diminishing world market. Indian mills refused to buy at rates above 35 Indian rupees per maund (82 lbs.) for lowest grades delivered at Calcutta. Pakistan set a minimum price which represented a cut of about 28 percent in previous prices but which still would have brought delivery in Calcutta to Rs. 10 above India's maximum. This difference might well have been negotiated had not each side suspected the other of an attempt at political and economic domination. India, for instance, raised the export duty on hessians from Rs. 80 to Rs. 350 per ton, indicating that higher purchasing

prices for raw jute could have been accommodated. Pakistan attempted to reorient its jute economy in terms of internal financing and foreign markets. A Jute Board was created on October 25 to underwrite minimum prices, and to set up a chain of agents to purchase and store the crop. To finance this program and to fill the gap left by the departure of the Indian Marwari financiers, a National Bank of Pakistan was promulgated by ordinance as an emergency measure several months ahead of schedule. This brought the capital of West Pakistan into East Pakistan's jute economy.

The results of the jute deadlock were quickly apparent in the two provinces. In West Bengal idleness and the threat of unemployment settled on the mill areas in Howrah and along the Hooghly River. In East Bengal, jute stockpiled, prices tumbled, and the growers carried their jute to the nearest market and sold to small dealers at far below the minimum price.¹ There can be little doubt that India thought it could force Pakistan to change its nondevaluation decision. In accordance with such a policy it raised the price of coal by Rs. 12 per ton and eventually stopped the shipment of coal altogether. The assumption was that East Bengal, feeling that it was forced to bear the brunt of the retained value of the rupee, would bring pressure to bear upon the Center for a change of this policy. If this pressure were successful, devaluation would follow; if not, the rift between the Eastern and Western sectors would be immeasurably widened.

This rift had expressed itself previously over several other issues. Immediately after partition, East Bengal feared that the Urdu language of the Western sector would be imposed upon its Bengali-speaking millions. Secondly, East Bengal had demanded representation in the Pakistan Constituent Assembly on the basis of population, which would have given it a controlling majority. Third, the administrative cadre of East Bengal was heavily populated with representatives from Western Pakistan and from Uttar Pradesh (formerly United Provinces) and Bihar. At the time of partition only two members of the Indian Civil Service, the "steel framework" of administration, had been East Bengal

¹ Adjournment Motion by Dharendranath Datta in Pakistan Constituent Assembly, Dec. 24, 1949.

Muslims. And fourth, a quarrel over the share of jute duty proceeds between the central government and the province had been inherited from previous decades. In addition to the lion's share of jute export duty, the Central Government takes the full benefits of income and sales taxes. This leaves the East Bengal Government only Rs. 4/8 per head in annual provincial taxes, as compared with Rs. 18/9 in Sind, Rs. 7/9 in West Punjab, and Rs. 17/8 in West Bengal.² However, counterbalancing these factors has been the tremendous national feeling in all of Pakistan, which resulted from the euphoria of its creation; and economically, the decline in the price of rice and fish, the two primary food items in the East Bengal diet. These two factors so far have outweighed separatist tendencies and have left East Bengal firmly Pakistani.

BACKGROUND OF FRICTION IN BENGAL

There is another long-term tendency which has jeopardized amicable relations between the two halves of divided Bengal. Historically, when the British gradually took over Bengal, a Muslim aristocracy founded upon court patronage faced displacement. Its position was threatened by the "court" of the new rulers themselves, and a little later by a corps of civil servants attached to the new "courts." Muslim education died of lack of funds and lack of immediate reward. The sentiments of centuries of dominance kept Muslim youths from the schools of the Kafirs, where a Hindu teacher taught Christian subjects in a Christian language. And without the new education, the Muslims found that the term *babu*, or white collar worker, be it applied to somebody in government or commerce, law or medicine, kept its decidedly Hindu ring.

Moreover, the method of land settlement in Bengal, by bestowing possession upon persons who had previously been tax farmers, and by insisting that other ownership claims be based upon written deeds, placed large land holdings in the hands of Hindus. The remnants of the Muslim aristocracy dwindled until its

² Budget speech of Finance Minister, East Bengal, 1949, published by Government Press, Dacca.

strength barely reached out of Dacca. When the strong Nawab of Dacca died in 1923, his descendants splintered into three groups and surrendered most of the power they had retained. Thus, at the time of partition, out of 2,237 large landholders (zamindars) in Bengal, only 358 of them were Muslim.³ The Muslim landholders were concentrated in Chittagong and Dacca districts. Under the predominantly Hindu zamindars were intermediaries and small holders known as *jotdars*, who were frequently Muslim. At the bottom of the land structure were Hindu untouchables, and a vast majority of the Muslims who had originally been recruited to Islam from the ranks of the lower levels of the Hindu fold.

When the cash crop of jute became important, the brokerage, baling, shipping, milling, and marketing were controlled through British and Hindu commercial firms in Calcutta. The professions were almost exclusively Hindu; money-lending was not a Hindu monopoly, but those who made their living solely from lending money were invariably Hindu. According to a high, but indicative estimate,⁴ 80 percent of East Bengal's trade and commerce were in the hands of Hindus before partition, 90 percent of the professional men were Hindus. After the advent of a Muslim ministry in Bengal in 1937, economic legislation inevitably encountered a discussion of its effects on the two communities, Hindu and Muslim. Muslim ministries tried to increase the proportion of their community in the government services and educational institutions, to protect peasantry from debt exactions, to abolish or modify the holdings of the large zamindars. Each of these attempts the Hindus considered to be aimed directly at them.

At the time of partition, a similar economic unbalance had been violently purged by forcing the Hindus and Sikhs out of the Punjab, a solution which has left the tangled skein of the evacuee property dispute. Bengal was relatively quiet at that time, and thus the large-scale population transfers did not take

³ Figures from analysis of Landholders' Constituency under Government of India Act of 1935.

⁴ Estimate of Council for Protection of Minorities, *Hindustan Times* (Delhi), Feb. 22, 1950.

place. Inevitably such an economic disequilibrium in a Muslim state, which had been founded upon the promise of ending Hindu domination, began to change. No major enactments of the East Bengal Government were required to accomplish this. Feelings of insecurity and subtle discriminations of practice first pushed out those Hindus most mobile. By April 1949, out of 175,000 who had registered as displaced persons from East Bengal, one-third had been engaged in trade and business, more than one-fourth in governmental services, 6 percent had been non-cultivating landowners, and doctors and lawyers together about 5 percent.⁵ Medical practitioners registered with the East Bengal Government had changed from virtual Hindu monopoly to more than two-thirds Muslim; among advocates, Muslims were almost equal to non-Muslims. The jute impasse had produced a new ratio of balers: 37.5 percent Muslim, 42.5 percent Hindu, and 20 percent European; shippers: 25 percent Muslim, 55 percent Hindu, 20 percent European; general brokers: 45 percent Muslim, 50 percent Hindu, 5 percent European; and small indigenous brokers: 70 percent Muslim, 30 percent Hindu.⁶ Politically, the Hindus have no representation on the provincial cabinet, and although 30 percent of the places in the services are reserved for non-Muslims, the quota has never been filled, and the higher administrative posts have few Hindus. The direct governmental action which the Hindus objected to most strongly was the requisitioning of houses in Dacca, Mymensingh, Comilla, Chittagong, Rajshahi, and other district headquarters. A pre-partition estimate⁷ had declared that 80 percent of the urban property in East Bengal was in the hands of the Hindus. It was not surprising that the brunt of the requisitioning of houses should fall on Hindus, but the communal interpretation was equally inevitable.

Two further threats to Hindu property are state acquisition of large estates and the extension of evacuee property ordinances to East Bengal. Pressure for land reform in Bengal has been strong for many decades and generally demands the abolition of

⁵ *Rehabilitation Review*, January–April 1949, Table 24, p. 67.

⁶ Figures supplied by East Bengal Government.

⁷ Memorandum of Bengal Congress Committee to Boundary Commission, 1947.

the large landholdings. Since the majority of the large estates are owned by Hindus, the pressure is given a communal interpretation. Strengthening this suspicion is the fact that compensation for appropriated lands will take a graduated form, with smaller landholders receiving proportionally more benefit—and as pointed out above, the smaller landholders, or *jotdars*, are primarily Muslims. The evacuee property dispute has created even greater fear. Since the mass migration at the time of partition was confined to Punjab, the Pakistani evacuee property ordinances were not extended to its eastern salient in Bengal. However, in the fall of 1949 local boards collected rough information on the amount of property left behind by Hindus who migrated to West Bengal. Rumors quickly spread that all Hindu property would be claimed by the State.

As the general relations between India and Pakistan deteriorated, the movement of Hindus from East Bengal increased, and stories of religious discrimination and of requisitioning of Hindu property became more and more frequent in the Calcutta press. The general feeling of insecurity which minorities in both countries had inherited from pre-partition days became more severe. Memories of the Calcutta riots and their echoes in East Bengal and Bihar in the fall of 1946, and of the Punjab holocaust of 1947 were clearly in mind. And the minorities in each country felt dependent for their safety upon political leaders marked as hostile by decades of agitation. Such a feeling of insecurity, backed by real and imaginary petty discriminations, had set in motion the Hindus of Sind, the Muslims from United Provinces and Bombay, and now provided the inflammable fuel for events in the Bengals.

PRESS CAMPAIGN

The clearest way of depicting the gathering storm in Bengal is to examine the Calcutta press from about mid-November 1949. The Pakistan press was no less prone to rumor or vituperation, but the force of the storm was storing up in Calcutta. For the present purpose two English-language dailies of that city have been heavily drawn upon, the *Hindustan Standard* [HS] and

the *Amrita Bazar Patrika* [ABP], both generally pro-Government in their political outlook and claiming extensive circulation. On November 10 a story appeared with the by-line of "A Dacca Citizen" describing how 100 armed men had raided a merchant's house in Dacca for over an hour and had broken an image of a deity [HS]. The East Bengal Government, in a press note, officially denied the story on November 22. On November 14 a headline announced "Terming Hindus as Evacuees on Flimsy Pretexts—East Bengal Government Motive to Confiscate Properties" [HS]. This turned out to be a quote from a speech delivered in Calcutta. On the same day another headline announced "Forcible Occupation of Houses at Narainganj—Minority Community Put to Sorry Plight" [HS]. On the 18th the *Amrita Bazar Patrika* published a list of Hindu houses requisitioned. It was during this week in November that the debate on the East Bengal zamindari abolition bill was published in these papers. Reports of requisitioning continued to be featured under bold headlines throughout November and December. On November 25 the West Bengal Government was reported to have sent a note of protest to East Bengal [HS]. On December 14 the Government of India protested to the Pakistan Government [HS]. On December 22 interpellations in the Indian Parliament revealed that 5,025 houses had been requisitioned up to June 30, and of these 835 had belonged to Muslims; and since that time another 1,000 had been taken. On December 11 a Dacca correspondent reported that Hindus were asked to join Muslim prayers in schools and colleges of East Bengal [HS]. A "Dacca Citizen" reported on November 23 that a reign of terror and systematic harassment of the Hindu population was in progress in Dacca [HS]. On December 24 the Revenue Minister of East Bengal, on a visit to Calcutta, announced that the Pakistani Evacuee Property Ordinance was not to be applied in East Bengal; this denial was published in the foreign-owned *Statesman*. Prominently featured stories of requisitioning continued to appear.

Such a spiral of alarm must eventually turn to stories of molested women, a practice not too uncommon even in normal

times in some of the isolated areas. On December 10 "police excesses on women" were reported from a village in Barisal District of East Bengal [HS]. The story, however, referred to an event reported to have taken place in connection with a robbery of a Hindu house on November 25. The same story appeared two days later under the caption "Hindu Girls Kidnapped by Goondas" (criminals supposed to have the tacit support of the local government) [HS]. This time the period, however, covered from September to December and included five young Hindu unmarried girls. On December 25 the District Congress Committee of Barisal submitted a report to the Governor of East Bengal declaring that "the atmosphere in East Pakistan is full of suspicion and apprehension." The memorandum listed seven factors: detention without trial, house searches, house requisitioning, open slaughter of cows, mosques built on the roadside, communalism in administrative machinery, and Islamization of education.

HINDU ATTITUDES

In 1946-47, when the question of the division of the subcontinent was still being fought, the Congress Party accused the Muslim League of attempting to send a flood of Muslim migrants into Assam in an attempt to lay claim to a portion of that province. Partition had won for Pakistan the district of Sylhet out of Assam. Population pressure continued to force East Bengalis into the less densely populated fertile valleys of Assam. Again this was taken as a subversive Pakistan plot. A debate in the Indian Parliament described the influx as a "deep-seated conspiracy" by the Muslim League to convert Assam into a Muslim majority area.⁸ In August 1949 a series of communist-inspired incidents had set off sporadic agitation on both sides of the Sylhet-Cachar line.⁹ On January 7, 1950, the Governor-General of India promulgated an ordinance which gave power to the Central Government to expel any immigrants into Assam whom it deemed to be "detrimental to the interests of India."¹⁰ A bill

⁸ Speech of Sardar Bhupendra Singh Mann, *Statesman* (Calcutta), Feb. 10, 1950.

⁹ *Statesman* (Calcutta), Dec. 24, 1949.

¹⁰ *Hindustan Standard*, Jan. 8, 1950.

for the same purpose was introduced into the Indian Parliament on December 20 and another on February 10.

During the crucial closing months of 1949 there were several other factors indicating the rising reaction in West Bengal. The continued influx of Hindu refugees from the East was assuming alarming proportions, and several organizations arose to champion their cause. One of these, the Council for Protection of Rights of Minorities, on November 13 held a meeting on the central maidan in Calcutta and resurrected a demand that Deputy Prime Minister Sardar Patel had threatened in 1948: if the influx of refugees continued, India would demand several border districts from East Bengal in which to settle them. At Christmas time in Calcutta the Hindu Mahasabha, a frankly communal organization dedicated to "Hindustan for the Hindus," re-emerged into politics, after having fallen from view because of the strong suspicion of its part in the assassination of Mahatma Gandhi. The day of the arrival of its leader, Veer Savarkar, into Calcutta, the West Bengal Government imposed a ban on assemblies and processions in near-by Howrah where Savarkar was to detrain. In spite of the order, a procession which lasted for two hours escorted him from the station to his quarters, and the following day an assembly of about 40,000 people met to hear him speak under a huge tent in north Calcutta. At this session and at the working committee meetings the Mahasabha toyed with many planks for a platform in an attempt to make a strong re-entrance into the political scene, planks which varied from accusations of corruption in the Congress and a vote of friendship for the Hindu ruler of Nepal, to opposition to the Hindu Code Bill, which threatened orthodoxy with changes in the marriage and divorce laws. The press, by editorial and reporting, were almost unanimous in the opinion that the meetings had been weak and unsuccessful.¹¹ There were two platforms which were destined to gain notoriety. One claimed that the partition was illegal since it was negotiated by a political party (the Indian National Congress) which had been elected on its assurance that it would not permit such a division, and had

¹¹ E.g., *Statesman*, Dec. 28, 1949; *Times of India* (Bombay), Dec. 29, 1949; *Free Press Journal* (Bombay), Dec. 27, 1950; *Hindustan Standard*, Dec. 27, 1949.

not stood for election since.¹² The second echoed the claim for two or three border districts to be taken from East Bengal.¹³

With the exception of the period during and immediately after the Calcutta communal riots of August 1946, the Mahasabha had never been strong in Bengal. The large gathering which attended its Christmas session seemed to be drawn as a personal following of Savarkar, for when the Bengal section held a meeting without him on the maidan in Calcutta a little over a week later, the gathering was sparse and transient. Moreover, there were obvious signs of strain within the organization itself. The Punjab and Bengal branches seemed to be operating on different programs. The finances of the organization were seriously diminished. A struggle for power between the disciples of Savarkar occasioned another split.

A few days after the Calcutta meetings, Nehru, in a speech at Nagpur, condemned "irresponsible talk" of reunion of India and Pakistan. Shortly thereafter Patel also rebuked the Mahasabha. However, it was after the strong statement of the East Bengal Premier complaining of the Mahasabha's declarations and of the "weak rebuttal" of Nehru and Patel, that the Mahasabha pushed its other planks into the background, and concentrated on this one. Dr. Khare, the new Mahasabha president, issued several press communiqués elaborating the proposal. Khare had originally been Premier of Central Provinces under the first Congress ministries of 1937, and had resigned over a disagreement with the central committee on local versus central control. He had then appeared as the Prime Minister of the princely state of Alwar, a traditional Mahasabha stronghold, just before the Muslims were driven out of the state in the summer of 1947. While in the Indian Constituent Assembly as a representative of Alwar, he had been indicted in connection with the murder of Gandhi.

The Bengal Provincial Hindu Sabha subscribed to the belief that continued economic pressure would force East Bengal away from Pakistan. On January 8, 1950, Ashutosh Lahiri, head of

¹² Speech Dr. Khare, *Hindu* (Madras), Jan. 8, 1950; *Hindustan Standard*, Dec. 27, 1949.

¹³ Presidential Speech Dr. Khare, Mahasabha Session, Calcutta. Published by Ashutosh Lahri, 1949.

the Bengal branch, held a public meeting on the Calcutta maidan. The morning of the meeting he expressed hopes of finding some East Bengal Muslims who would stand on his platform and call for a reunion of the two Bengals. He found none. However, at this meeting he remarked, "We know, at least so far as East Pakistan is concerned, there is a growing realization even amongst Muslims of East Bengal that East Pakistan is an artificial, unnatural child. We claim that we are representing a large mass of Muslim opinion as well of East Bengal, when we make this demand for reunion of East and West Bengal."

A separate communal organization, but having identical aims, is the R.S.S. or Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (National Service Organization). Like the Mahasabha, the R.S.S. has never been strong in Bengal. At the Calcutta session of the Mahasabha, however, the R.S.S. loaned 2,000 uniformed volunteers to police the meeting and lead the cheering.

ONSLAUGHT OF COMMUNAL DISTURBANCE

Calcutta and its industrial suburb Howrah had been the scenes of violent communist demonstrations for a number of years. In mid-December 1949 an intensive campaign of bomb and acid bulb throwing and incendiarism began which lasted for three weeks. So serious did this threat become that Sardar Patel flew to Calcutta from New Delhi to rally Congress leaders to combat it. In the course of Patel's public address, he reviewed the communal riots and the events leading up to the partition of Bengal. The rest of the speech was devoted to denouncing communist terrorism.

Under a dateline from Calcutta on January 20, 1950, a report appeared in the *Amrita Bazar Patrika* telling of police atrocities on the Hindu population of several villages in Bagerhat, Khulna District of East Bengal. It later turned out that this event had taken place a month earlier, on December 20. It was this incident which West Bengal generally referred to as the beginning of the chain of communal rioting. A small police party went to Kalshira village in Bagerhat to arrest a Hindu, Joydeb Brahma, known to the Pakistani authorities as a communist. A fracas

arose, an armed constable was killed, and the police were forced to withdraw. Following a custom at least as old as the Mughul days, and preserved through the British rule, the village quickly vacated rather than face expected reprisals. As the Hindu village withdrew, surrounding Muslims moved into the area, took what was left, and harassed the departing evacuees. As the stories of the incident traveled with the evacuees, it grew in proportion, and the testimony of the refugees moving into West Bengal gave support to the newspaper stories. About January 18, sporadic communal incidents began to occur in the mill areas surrounding Calcutta and in Murshidabad district. The Pakistani account of the incident was published in a press note on February 3. The following day a series of stray communal incidents occurred in Calcutta, and on the 8th and 9th a serious disturbance broke out in northeastern Calcutta. Most of the trouble, as later in East Bengal, came in the form of arson and looting, but with some isolated stabbings. Panic spread in the Muslim tenement areas in the north of the city where the trouble was largely localized, and over 26,000 Muslims moved to other parts of Calcutta. The migrants gathered in an open space opposite the Pakistan High Commissioner's Office, located in the midst of the well-to-do Muslim residential district.¹⁴ Police fired on looters, the military was called in to quell the disturbance, strict curfew was imposed. From the 10th, the city quieted, but stray incidents persisted.

On February 9 a conference of Chief Secretaries of East and West Bengal Governments was held in Dacca. News of the rioting in Calcutta in a highly exaggerated form was agitating the city. On the second day of the conference a procession marched to a central park in Dacca where a meeting was held, dispersing shortly after noon. Immediately looting of Hindu shops broke out. One long main street in Dacca, Nawabpur Road, is lined with Hindu and Muslim shops side by side in about equal proportions. Practically every Hindu shop was looted. Behind this main street lie crowded alleyways on which residential houses face. About two hours after the original onslaught the riot invaded the residential areas, and not until then did concentrated

¹⁴ Nehru's statement in Indian Parliament, Feb. 23, 1950.

killing begin. The authorities were taken unawares, but once aroused almost the entire governmental force from Ministers down toured the city to stop the rioting. The principal disturbance lasted for about five hours, but stray assaults continued for two more days. The official figure of deaths was 198;¹⁵ local observers place it at almost 400.

Disturbances broke out in Feni, a subdivision of Noakhali District, and in Barisal town on February 13. In Barisal a rumor spread prior to the rioting that the popular Muslim leader Fazlul Haq had been killed in Calcutta, and that the Indian army had crossed the borders of East Bengal. On the evening of the 13th a government grain warehouse was destroyed by fire, and the ensuing disturbances lasted for about three days. The first two nights only fires appeared in the town. From local reports it appears that at no stage did disorder take the shape of riotous mobs, but usually appeared to be stray assaults by individuals or small groups. From the 16th to the 20th trouble spread into the rural areas, primarily as looting and arson. Chittagong and Sylhet had minor disturbances, and a series of incidents on the Assam border took on more serious proportions.

When news of events in East Bengal filtered back into West Bengal, the smouldering communal violence in Calcutta, Howrah, and the mill areas along the Hooghly River erupted into sporadic mob action and individual battles. As each refugee train arrived in Sealdah station, Calcutta, the tales of harassment set up eddies of animosity which made the Sealdah area one of the danger spots in the city.

The point of highest tension in Calcutta came upon the weekend of March 4, the Hindu festival of Holi, a holiday generally observed with considerable abandon, and a frequent source of friction between the two communities in the past. In anticipation of trouble the municipal authorities closed down the public transportation system and kept a police force fully armed and alerted at the central police stations. The feeling was that if this weekend passed off peaceably in Calcutta, the situation could be handled. The merrymakers did not appear until late in the day,

¹⁵ Statement in East Bengal Assembly read by Revenue Minister for Prime Minister on Mar. 10, 1950.

were kept off the main thoroughfares, and their efforts seemed peculiarly half-hearted. During the evening and night there were two or three minor disturbances in North Calcutta and in the area of the Muslim refugees, but in general the weekend passed strained but quiet. Meanwhile, in the province of Uttar Pradesh (formerly United Provinces) Holi had set off a series of disturbances which started the migration of Muslims from the cities of that area into West Punjab and through Jodhpur into Sind, a stream that was to continue at the rate of three to four thousand a day.

As the Hindu refugees moved across the boundaries they encountered two types of harassment which exacerbated feelings in West Bengal. Firstly, a series of customs restrictions had grown up between the two countries which, in normal times, cut down to a minimum the transfer of property and cash allowed to travelers between the two countries. Baggage restrictions allowed only a limited quantity of new clothing, household belongings, and gold and silver ornaments. Moreover the two countries had erected an elaborate permit system to control movements back and forth across the frontier. Certificates denoting that income tax had been paid were necessary for migration. When the tremendous flood of refugees propelled by panic hit these barriers, there was legally sufficient occasion for detaining them and removing most of their belongings. That this was actually done and carried to excess on both sides of the border cannot be doubted, sometimes executed by customs officials and sometimes by individuals taking this occasion for semi-legal loot. The second factor was the raids by organized gangs near the border in East Bengal who attacked refugees moving in trains. The Pakistan Government admits two such occasions.¹⁶

Meanwhile, the press on both sides continued to report as fresh news details of events which usually turned out to have occurred a month or more previously. For instance, a front page announcement in the *Amrita Bazar Patrika* in the second week of March proclaimed that two more train assaults had taken place. After vivid descriptions of the incidents, it turned out that

¹⁶ Statement in East Bengal Assembly, Mar. 10, 1950.

they were referring to two which had taken place a month earlier — two more than the Pakistanis would admit.

PARTISAN INTERPRETATIONS

The degree of suspicion which existed between the two countries may be readily seen in prevalent versions of Bengal events on either side of the border. The Indian version spoke of a "deep-laid plot" to kill off or drive out all the Hindus in East Bengal. This was claimed to be an extension of the concept of the theocratic state, and a continuance of the interrupted attempt begun in Noakhali in 1946 to drive out, forcibly convert, or slaughter the helpless Hindu minority. To this end the Ansars, an irregular militia 40,000 strong, had been raised and armed, and all the Hindus disarmed.

The Pakistani version, unlike the Indian version, was given official expression — by the Prime Ministers of Pakistan and of East Bengal. It was also in terms of a "master plan." Roughly, it claimed that when Sardar Patel came to Calcutta in early January to quiet the communist disturbances, he laid the groundwork in his public speech and in private for stirring up feelings against Pakistan as a force to combat the appeal of communism. The R.S.S., the Mahasabha, and the Council for Protection of Minorities were commissioned to spread the hatred. The press of West Bengal seized upon an incident more than a month old as a means of whipping up feeling. The existence of either the "deep-laid plot" or the "master plan" is extremely doubtful.

On the other hand, the official versions of what occurred on the same side of the border were considerably closer to the truth than the estimates that reached the other side either through official channels or the press. The Pakistan Radio announced that 10,000 Muslims had been killed in Calcutta;¹⁷ the official Indian version was 23 deaths and 123 injuries.¹⁸ "Official sources" in India were quoted as estimating 3,500 killings in East Bengal;¹⁹ Pakistani estimates are 229.²⁰

¹⁷ Pakistan Radio; *Civil & Military Gazette* (Lahore), Feb. 24, 1950.

¹⁸ Nehru's speech in Parliament, Feb. 23, 1950.

¹⁹ *Amrita Bazar Patrika*, Mar. 14, 1950.

²⁰ Statement in East Bengal Assembly, Mar. 10, 1950.

At the political level the two countries seemed to be moving dangerously close to war. Through the fall of 1949 Pandit Nehru made several offers to Pakistan for a joint declaration that all issues (except Kashmir) would be settled by other means than arms.²¹ However, in his statement in Parliament on February 23 he remarked, "If the methods we have suggested are not agreed to, it may be that we shall have to adopt other methods." An exchange of telegrams with Liaquat Ali Khan quickly indicated that he had not meant a threat of armed conflict, but the damage was done and the Pakistanis took this as a more or less direct threat.

The Mahasabha resolved the issue to a choice between exchange of population and armed intervention (euphemistically called "relief expeditions"), and the former alternative was quickly ruled out as impractical. Talk of Indian armed guards on trains bringing refugees was common. The Socialists were even more explicit in backing armed intervention.²²

At the same time, Liaquat Ali Khan stated that Pakistan wanted "peace but not at the cost of freedom." The head of the Azar Kashmir Government remarked that the "Bharat [Indian] Muslims were Pakistan's concern." The Governor of West Punjab spoke of Pakistan as growing stronger daily, and remarked that there would be no easing of taxation until Indo-Pakistani relations improved. Both countries were spending almost half of their current expenditures on defense.

NEGOTIATION OF AGREEMENT ON MINORITIES

After the Holi weekend, Pandit Nehru visited Calcutta and talked with Calcutta editors and a great variety of political and civic leaders. In spite of some aggressive placards in North Calcutta, there was an apparent readiness to give the Center a chance to handle the problem, and Nehru announced that he was making it the Center's responsibility. The pause thus effected broke the pace and the agitation quieted down. Toward the end of

²¹ Summary of proposals in *Statesman* (Calcutta), Jan. 7, 1950.

²² Resolution at Rewa, Mar. 4, 1950; statements by R. Lohia, Mar. 11, 1950, and J. P. Narain, Mar. 19, 1950.

March Liaquat Ali Khan toured East Bengal condemning the acts of violence, also with a quieting effect.

It was this lull that Pandit Nehru and Liaquat Ali Khan seized to negotiate, on April 8, the Delhi Pact, an agreement to "ensure to the minorities throughout their territory, complete equality of citizenship irrespective of religion, a full sense of security in respect of life, culture, property and personal honour, freedom of movement within each country, and freedom of occupation, speech and worship, subject to law and morality." The part of the agreement which applied to general relations between the two countries reiterated a principle which had been agreed to in a Calcutta conference in April 1948, that "the allegiance and loyalty of the minorities is to the State of which they are citizens, and that it is to the Government of their own State that they must look for redress of their grievances."

If this concept alone were followed it would do much to alleviate tension between the two countries, but it is a concept which seems alien to the experience of all but a few toplevel statesmen. The greater part of the Pact deals specifically with the situation in East and West Bengal, the adjoining state of Tripura, and Assam. Its provisions include freedom of movement, easing of customs regulations, continued ownership of property left behind by migrants, the setting up of an inquiry commission to investigate the causes and extent of the recent disturbances, the prevention of dissemination of information or opinion directed against the other country, and the appointment of two Central Ministers and two commissioners to ensure the enforcement of the Pact. Its two most telling provisions are the prevention of antagonistic propaganda and the guarantee of property left by emigrants.²³

Aside from the specific proposals — for there is little that is genuinely new among them — the psychological effect of the Pact has been almost miraculous. Pakistani newspaper editors sent a goodwill mission to Delhi, where a separate agreement was reached deprecating the publication of communal news. The refugee migration slowed down, and some Hindus who had

²³ For complete text, see pp. 344-46.

left their homes in East Bengal made well-publicized moves back. The two Governments concluded a temporary trade agreement in which 800,000 bales of jute have been released in barter for finished jute goods, cloth, mustard oil, tobacco, timber, and woolen manufactures. In general, both sides have displayed an eagerness to implement the Pact which is in sharp contrast to attitudes in the weeks before its promulgation.

So far there are few who have cared to point out that the king is scantily clothed. The one note of discord against the Pact itself was the resignation of the two Bengali members of the Indian Cabinet, Dr. Syama Prasad Mookherjee and Mr. K. C. Neogy, on April 15. The crux of their criticism was that other pacts had been readily violated by Pakistan, and thus there was no reason to trust this one; and secondly, that the Pact had not really solved any of the basic problems.²⁴ Mookherjee has been a strong figure in Bengal politics for more than a decade. Originally elected to the Bengal Legislative Assembly on a University constituency, from 1941 to 1942 he had been a Minister in a predominantly Muslim cabinet. During most of his public career he has been associated with the Mahasabha, as head of the Bengal branch, as General Secretary of the All-India organization, and finally as President. It was he who in 1941 organized the Hindustan National Guard, a Bengal organization which became an effective striking arm in the communal rioting five years later. Ironically, it was he who initiated the movement for dividing Bengal when it became evident that the country was to be partitioned.

Since the resignations, Neogy has temporarily withdrawn to Kalimpong in the mountains near Darjeeling, but Mookherjee has been actively touring the refugee camps in Bengal. In a speech on May 22, Mookherjee described the East Bengal situation as "still very serious," listing over 500 incidents which he alleged had occurred there since the agreement.²⁵ When Nurul Amin, the East Bengal Chief Minister, referred to the speech as "most unhelpful and unfortunate," Mookherjee demanded a tour of "selected" press correspondents.²⁶

²⁴ Speech by Mookherjee in the Indian Parliament, Apr. 19, 1950.

²⁵ *Amrita Bazar Patrika*, May 22, 1950.

²⁶ *Pioneer* (Lucknow), May 27, 1950.

There are other unhelpful and unfortunate signs. When the leader of the Pakistani delegation to the editors' conference in Delhi early in May committed the heresy of remarking, "Even after the geographical division of the subcontinent, the two countries culturally remained one," the Pakistan press condemned the reported speech (Rashidi later denied having said it) in strong terms, culminating in an attack on his public and private life of the past, present, and future.²⁷ The migration from the cities of the United Provinces continues in strength in spite of the fact that Pakistan has reimposed a permit system on the Sind-Jodhpur border. Liaquat Ali Khan has pressed the British Government for a joint Commonwealth declaration guaranteeing the present frontiers of Pakistan.²⁸ Close to a million refugees provide an inflammable fuel with an extremely low flash point.

Undeniably, however, the Delhi Pact has done a great deal to clear the atmosphere between the two countries. In spite of the feeling that the Pact is an agreement signed by two representatives who are not actually party to the immediate disputes, the hope is clear that this indication of good faith will last. So far it has worked remarkably well.

²⁷ See especially *Guardian* (Lahore), May 13 and 20, 1950.

²⁸ *Statesman* (Delhi), Apr. 15, 1950.

DEVELOPMENTS OF THE QUARTER: COMMENT AND CHRONOLOGY

THE CONTINUING moves and counter-moves among the states of the Arab League centered on Jordan's reported démarc'e for peace with Israel and its annexation of eastern (Arab) Palestine, voted by the newly-elected Jordan parliament on April 24. The lead in the opposition to Jordan was taken by Egypt, which resented any strengthening of Hashimite power or consolidation of "Greater Syria" territory. The early British recognition of the Jordan move, coupled with the announcement that British protection now extended over this part of Palestine increased Egypt's ire, for the Egyptian Government is currently demonstrating its nationalism by attempting to drive a hard bargain with Great Britain in the matter of a treaty revision. Saudi Arabia likewise opposed, as traditionally, any spread of Hashimite authority. Syria and Lebanon concurred, but with less enthusiasm. Iraq was between two fires — on the one hand, loyalty to a Hashimite cause, and on the other, reluctance to take any stand which would enable Egypt to strengthen its relations with Syria or further establish its leadership in the Arab League.

Jordan's tentative moves to conclude a final peace with Israel were called off because of this Arab opposition, and Jordan joined with the other members of the League in promising not to sign a separate peace. Nevertheless, the force of circumstances indicated that its annexation of eastern Palestine would stick. The 3-Power (U. S., British, and French) declaration of May 25, granting both Israel and the Arab states the right to purchase arms for defensive purposes, constituted in fact a guarantee of the current frontiers. It was equally clear that any move by either side toward signing a final peace by agreement would receive the blessing of these Powers.

Breakdown of Syrian-Lebanese Customs Union

On March 13 the customs union between Lebanon and Syria came to an end, negotiations for a revised customs policy having broken down. The Syrian Government, insisting upon a total economic and monetary union of the two countries, had handed the Lebanese Government a note demanding an unequivocal answer by March 20. This note requested the establishment of a Syrian-Lebanese economic board with wide powers over legislation, foreign trade, exchange, and other related matters. It also requested common legislation for the protection of national industries, a revised division of customs receipts and a larger share for Syria in the customs administration, the creation of a Bank of Industrial Credit, prohibition of the import of luxuries and goods capable of native manufacture, and quotas on the import of other products, the encouragement of exports, and closer economic cooperation with the other Arab states and foreign powers through the conclusion of commercial agreements. Lebanon rejected Syria's demands, accusing it of failing to observe the agreements already in force between the two countries. It opposed the principle of complete economic union, but still believed that a basis for cooperation could be reached which would be profitable to both parties.

The immediate beneficiary of the rupture thus forced by Syria was Lebanon, which now began to receive all of its customs revenue instead of only 44% as formerly. However, trade between the two countries was greatly restricted (even sealed off for a brief time), and since much of Lebanon's imports are destined for resale in Syria, both soon felt the effects of their failure to reach agreement.

The proposals put forward by Syria had

merit, but were obviously out of tune with the actual state of Syrian-Lebanese relations, for the disagreement had roots which were political as well as economic. Economically, the industrial and agricultural producers of Syria are at odds with the merchants of Lebanon, the former wanting high customs rates as protection against the import of competing goods, and the latter low rates for the stimulation of trade. Aside from this difference of opinion in regard to customs policy, there is much that is naturally complementary in the economies of the two countries, Lebanon being a heavy buyer of Syrian wheat, and in return providing Syria with all manner of entrepreneurial services. Moreover, Lebanese producers, who outnumber if they do not outweigh in influence the Lebanese merchant group, like the Syrians are sympathetic to higher, protective tariffs. All that is needed to reestablish close commercial relations (if not economic unity) is a realization of the mutual benefits to be gained, and the spirit of confidence necessary to the working out of an agreement.

Thus, while certain economic differences are the most apparent causes of the trouble, basically the problem is a growing lack of confidence between the two states. The series of political upsets and the instability which has characterized Syrian politics for over a year has made Lebanese businessmen suspicious of any close ties which might involve them in Syria's upheavals. Talk of union with Iraq, rumors of a Greater Syria under Hashimite leadership, the attempts of Egypt and Saudi Arabia to establish a liaison with Syria in opposition to the Hashimite bloc—all these political maneuvers, both domestic and inter-Arab, have added their weight to Lebanese suspicion.

The effects of a policy of economic nationalism are to be seen in Syria's attempt to become less dependent on Lebanese services through the construction of its own port at Latakia, and in moves in Lebanon to stimulate production for export, and to find sources abroad for goods previously purchased in Syria.

The Turkish Elections

The drastic character of the defeat which the Turkish Government suffered in the gen-

eral elections to the Grand National Assembly on May 14 came as a surprise to all parties. The Republican People's Party, under the leadership of President Inönü, had indeed been under severe and open criticism for the past five years, both for its conduct of the general elections in 1946 and for its record since then. President Inönü had also promised genuinely free balloting on this occasion, and the National Assembly, under Republican leadership, had put through a revised electoral law to give his promise effect. Nevertheless, the opposition Democratic Party hardly expected, even under optimum conditions, to win more than 200 of the 487 seats being contested. According to the latest tabulation available in the middle of June it was assured of 408 seats, or 84% of the total. The Democrats' popular vote, however, stood at only 54%, the discrepancy resulting from the absence of any provision in the Turkish electoral law for proportional representation.

It was the fact of the election rather than the Democrats' victory which carried the primary significance. True to its promise, the Government scrupulously observed the provisions of the revised electoral law.¹ The most important of these was the placing of controls in the hands of the courts instead of the Ministry of the Interior. The actual voting was managed, at different levels, by provincial and district electoral boards, presided over by the highest judges of the appropriate province or district, and made up of representatives from provincial and municipal councils and the competing political parties. Individual polling stations were placed in charge of committees drawn from leading local citizens, both neutral and representative of the parties. At the head of the whole electoral machinery was constituted a Supreme Electoral Board composed of the leading judges of the country and members of the Council of State (a body of elder statesmen with advisory functions provided for in the Turkish constitution). This Board was empowered to hear all complaints, to undertake investigations, and submit its findings to the Grand National Assembly. Final decision as to the validity of elections was reserved to the Assembly.

¹ Law #5545, *Resmi Gazete*, Feb. 21, 1950.

The new electoral law was explicit as to the limits placed on electioneering. Both open-air and indoor propaganda meetings were supervised by municipal authorities; each party was permitted free radio time up to 20 minutes a day from the 10th to the 3rd day before the election; complete secrecy of balloting was assured; party observers were authorized; the counting of ballots was immediate and in public; and the ballots were preserved for a prescribed length of time (instead of destroyed, as formerly).

This tightly-worded electoral law and its strict observance by both the party in power and the opposition did much to make a success of Turkey's first completely free election. But even so, a free expression of the electorate's wishes would not have been secured had it not been for the active efforts of the Government to convince the voters that they not only could but should vote as they wished. The reasons for the Government's policy were probably threefold. In view of the criticism which had followed the conduct of the 1946 election, the authorities did not feel that they could afford to tamper with the ballots again. Secondly, it was believed — with good reason — that the holding of a free election would be the best possible publicity for Turkey in the United States, whose continued support is vital to Turkey's national security. Finally, the People's Party probably did not believe it would lose the election in any case.

The reasons for the Government's defeat were likewise threefold: dissatisfaction with the continued high cost of living; growing irritation at the Government's monopolistic and restrictive policy toward business; and finally, the general feeling that one group had been in power too long for the good of the country. The vote was largely a protest vote, and not for any particular Democratic leader or principle. Nevertheless, the very fact that the Turkish people, some 80 percent of whom are rural in character, have learned that their government derives its authority from them, and can be peacefully changed by their will, will surely mark an important step in Turkey's political evolution.

The new government promised more efficient and economical administration, the restriction of state enterprises largely to public

services, and the promotion of private business by affording it greater security and stimulating the flow of capital. It promised, also, that workers would be granted the right to strike. For farmers, the Government hoped to increase production without bringing about a fall in the price of agricultural goods; at the same time, efforts would be made to reduce the general cost of living. The Democrats were insistent that there would be no shift in Turkey's foreign policy, nor was there any evidence of a division of opinion, either before or after the election, on this topic. The only development forecast was to be found in renewed expressions of interest in the formation of a Mediterranean Pact as an extension of European security, and in closer relations generally with the states of the eastern Mediterranean.

A large proportion of the success of the Democrats' administration would depend on their leadership, which had indeed shown itself competent in opposition but still had to stand the test of political responsibility. The few at the top had had practical experience in government. Celal Bayar, the new president of Turkey and founder of the Party, served as Minister of Economy in 1924 and again during the depression in 1932, and as Prime Minister in 1937-39, under both President Atatürk and President İnönü. As Director General of the Is Bank he played an important part in Turkey's industrialization and the development of *étatism*. It was on the interpretation of this policy that he broke with the government in 1946 to found the Democratic Party. His economic "liberalism" is in terms of freer scope for private business, not in terms of progressive socialism.

Whereas Celal Bayar represents commercial and banking interests, Adnan Menderes, the new Prime Minister and now head of the Party, is a landowner from the vicinity of Izmir, a strong supporter of modern agricultural methods and a liberalized land policy. He served as a deputy in the National Assembly from 1930 until his resignation in 1945 to assist in the organization of the Democratic Party; he has had no other governmental experience. Refik Koraltan has likewise served as a deputy since the early days of the republic, and has had administrative experience as governor of three different provinces between the

years 1936 and 1942. Fuad Köprülü, the new Foreign Minister, is of an academic background. He was Under-Secretary of Education in the early days of the Republic, founder of the Institute of Turkish Literature, President of the Turkish Historical Society, and for a number of years Professor of History and Civilization at Istanbul University. His research into early Ottoman and pre-Ottoman history, and into Turkish folklore has brought him an international reputation as a scholar. Since 1943 he has devoted his entire time to politics and was one of the founders, together with Celal Bayar and Adnan Menderes, of the Democratic Party. A fifth leader in the Party is Samed Ağaoglu, appointed Minister of State and Vice Prime Minister. A lawyer, he has had experience in the Ministries of Economy and Commerce, and has drawn attention as one of the more promising of the younger intellectuals.

With only a handful of experienced personnel, the Democratic Party, as would be any government, is faced with a major task in changing the current of Turkish domestic policies.

Economic Crisis in Iran

Since the Shah-in-Shah of Iran, Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlavi, arrived in the United States on November 16, 1949, the attention of the American public has been more strongly centered on Iran than at any other time in that nation's history except, perhaps, during the days of World War II. Fundamentally, the Shah's visit accomplished two results: it aroused an interest in Iran which succeeding events have sustained; and it emphasized Iran's desire for material aid from the United States.

On the surface it would seem that Iran most urgently requires this aid. While Iran's economists repeatedly insist that their country's currency is solidly backed by foreign exchange gold and the crown jewels, 10-12% of the gold is tied up in the USSR as a result of wartime purchases made in Iran which the Soviets have not repaid; and the crown jewels, though appearing to be fabulous, are of limited market value. The country has undergone a major economic crisis within the past two years as a result of both natural and artificial causes: on the

one hand, a year of crop failures and meager harvests, resulting in a scarcity of seed for the next year's planting; and on the other, the ultraconservative monetary principles on which the country's currency is managed. In cautiously avoiding inflation by issuing a limited amount of currency, the country has reached a deflationary economic stalemate—with insufficient funds available to purchase new and lower priced goods. Iran has consistently encouraged imports, with the result that warehouses are bulging with an accumulation of merchandise that is never brought to market because merchants do not have cash to pay for its transportation. Factories and even handcraft marts have shut down, or are operating on a part-time basis. Unemployment is increasing steadily, and each week more bankruptcies are reported. Many in the small but powerful wealthy class have fearfully transferred their capital to banks abroad, further debilitating confidence in the national currency. Another factor indirectly weakening Iran's economy is the prevailing tax system which burdens the poor and almost entirely exempts the rich.

While the cities are thus suffering, the farming districts, which constitute 80% of the population, are trying to pull through the crop failure. After butchering their lean cattle and eating what was left of the feed, hundreds of peasants marched to cities ill equipped to offer them a livelihood. Many areas were swept with disease and famine. Strikes, riots, and general unrest have ensued.

The Seven-Year Plan² undertaken by the Government in 1949 as a means of raising the national standard of living and developing the country industrially has had to divert some of its funds, as well as its creative plans, for emergency relief and "make work" programs. Aside from the economic crisis, implementation of the Plan has progressed slowly for a variety of reasons: lack of initiative by Government executives of the Plan, lack of organization within the country, an industrially untrained population, and the problem of rehabilitating existing State industries which were obsolescent and overstaffed.

² See S. Rezazadeh Shafaq, "The Iranian Seven Year Development Plan," *Middle East Journal*, IV (Jan. 1950), pp. 100-5.

This economic deterioration has naturally placed Iran in a more vulnerable position vis-à-vis the Soviets. The USSR has long been eyeing Iran as a potential satellite, and has been expressing its intentions in various ways. The illegal Tudeh Party within Iran continues to function on a clandestine but effective basis. It is generally agreed that the Party is gaining strength, probably owing to the straitened conditions in which the majority of the population finds itself. The Soviet economic boycott had, until some weeks ago, succeeded in halting all imports from Iran, though Iran has had to buy wheat and other products from the USSR. Physical infiltration is surreptitiously but constantly attempted by the Soviets. Direct territorial expansion is also taking place: in one area on the northern frontier of Iran the border is marked only by a plow furrow, and each year, as the nomadic tribes of the region decamp for their southward trek, the Soviet border patrol moves the plow furrow and the guard posts a few hundred yards to the south, thus acquiring new land for the USSR in the direction of the north Caspian littoral.

Iran's internal politics have attempted to keep pace with its various problems. On March 19 Prime Minister Mohammed Sa'ed Maraghehi resigned, probably prompted by the Shah, because of his lack of success in putting the country on a sounder economic basis. Ali Mansur, his successor and Chairman of the Board of the Seven-Year Plan, was recognized

as a leader of the old vested-interest type, and was probably appointed in the hope that he would bring economic stability to Iran's perilous condition. He, in turn, was succeeded on June 26 by Gen. Ali Razmara, Chief of the General Staff, who completely reconstituted the Cabinet in an effort to bring firmer hands to the guidance of Iran's affairs, both foreign and domestic.

Two recent events initiated by the United States may help to bring about a change for the better. On May 23 the U. S. agreed to furnish Iran with arms and military supplies under the terms of the Mutual Defense Assistance Program. Although the exact amount allocated to Iran has not been announced, it is estimated as in excess of \$10 million. After signing the agreement, the Iranian chargé d'affaires in Washington, Gholam Abbas Aram, stated that Iran wanted "nothing but peace to enable her to carry out her plans for economic and social development"—plans which depend to a large extent on internal security and national defense. On June 5 President Truman appointed Henry F. Grady as Ambassador to Iran, succeeding John C. Wiley. The appointment of a man of Grady's background and experience in dealing with economically straitened countries is an indication of U. S. concern for the future rehabilitation of Iran.

Chronology¹

MARCH 1—MAY 31, 1950

General

1950

Mar. 7: 17 American diplomats in the Middle East met in Cairo at the first session of a conference to discuss conditions and policy in the area.
May 11: A special UN committee, consisting of the world's principle opium-producing countries, proposed the creation of an international monopoly to buy and sell agreed quotas of opium for medi-

cal and scientific use. The proposal had been drafted at Ankara in 1949 and agreed upon by India, Iran, Turkey, and Yugoslavia.

May 25: The U. S., Great Britain, and France agreed on a unified policy to supply arms to the Arab states and Israel only for "legitimate self-defense." Israel and the Arab states (Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon) gave assurances that arms would not be used for aggressive purposes. President Truman said that the 3-Power arms pact "emphasizes this country's desire to promote the maintenance of peace in the Near East." The three Powers pledged to take immediate action against any state planning aggression in the area.

¹ In general, items in the Chronology are drawn from the *New York Times* unless otherwise indicated.

Afghanistan

1950

Mar. 7: King Mohammed Zahir Shah arrived in Alexandria, Egypt, for a 5-day stay.

Apr. 19: King Mohammed Zahir Shah stated that his country intended to request a loan from the International Bank to help exploit and develop the country's petroleum industry.

May 16: The Soviet press charged the United States with building military roads and making maps in Afghanistan under the guise of constructing an irrigation system through the Morrison-Knudsen Company.

May 26: The Government demanded the recall of a Pakistani Embassy staff member in Kabul on charges that the individual, who directed the Embassy dispensary, was "acting in contravention of the internal laws of Afghanistan."

Pakistan's Governor-General Khwaja Nazimuddin sent felicitations to King Zahir Shah on the second anniversary of the independence of Afghanistan.

Arab League

(See also Jordan, Palestine Problem.)

1950

Mar. 25: The first 1950 session of the Arab League General Council opened in Cairo.

Mar. 27: King Abdallah of the Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan sent a note to the Arab League Council stating that Jordan was boycotting the Council's meeting. Following a request by Egyptian Prime Minister al-Nahhas Pasha expressed in his opening address, the Political Committee of the League invited Ahmad Hilmi Pasha, Prime Minister of the All-Palestine (Gaza) Government, to attend the meeting.

Mar. 28: Jordan dropped its boycott of the Arab League Council, although no delegation would attend. The Jordanian Minister to Cairo, Baha' al-Din Bey Tuqan, said that he had been instructed by his Government to attend Council meetings, but not to engage in any discussions that Amman had stated should not be discussed by the Council.

Apr. 1: All the Arab League States, including Jordan, voted to expel from the Arab League any Arab state making a separate peace with Israel, and empowered the League to take punitive measures against such a state.

Apr. 9: The Political Committee of the Arab League unanimously approved an inter-Arab collective security pact. An Arab League source reported that the pact contained the following provisions: 1.) The parties asserted their determination to seek peaceful solutions for international disputes. 2.) Aggression against any of the signatories would be regarded as aggression against all. The signatories would then take all measures to repulse aggression by armed forces, first notifying the UN Security Council and the Arab League Council. 3.) A permanent Joint Defense Council

would be established to coordinate inter-Arab defense. This Council would consist of the Defense and Foreign Ministers of the member states. Its decisions, reached by simple majority vote, would be binding on all members. 4.) A permanent committee would be formed, composed of the chiefs of staff of the member countries. This committee would be responsible to an economic committee formed by the member nations' Ministers of National Economy.

Apr. 12: The Political Committee of the Arab League passed a resolution forbidding any member to conclude a separate peace with Israel.

May 13: Jordan's Foreign Minister, Muhammad Shurayqi Pasha, walked out of the Arab League's Political Committee meeting, which was discussing the recent annexation of Arab Palestine by Jordan.

May 15: The Political Committee of the Arab League agreed that Jordan's annexation of Arab Palestine was a violation of its April 12 resolution. A meeting was to be held on June 12 to decide what sort of action was to be taken. Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Lebanon voted to expel Jordan, while the Iraqi and Yemeni delegates asked for time in which to consult their governments.

Egypt

1950

Mar. 1: Richard Courtney Fennell, United States pilot working for Saudi Arabian airways, was expelled from Egypt after four days of arrest on charges of having verbally insulted the Egyptian nation. The U. S. Consulate made no protest on the grounds that Egypt was acting according to the normal rights of a sovereign state.

Mar. 25: An official spokesman of the Egyptian Foreign Office said that Egypt had made several requests for permission to purchase arms in the United States.

Apr. 1: Mahmud Bey Fawzi, Egyptian delegate to the UN, became chairman of the Security Council in accordance with the principle of alphabetic rotation.

Apr. 3: Husayn Sirri Pasha, chief of the Royal Cabinet, resigned.

Apr. 4: Princess Faykal, one of the four sisters of King Farouq, was married to Fu'ad Sadiq of Cairo in San Francisco.

Apr. 7: Minister of the Interior Fu'ad Sirag al-Din Pasha stated that the Government was relaxing its censorship to the point where it would be "the exception and not the rule." Censorship was maintained on three classes of news: military secrets, communism, and the royal family.

Apr. 10: The Embassy complained to the U. S. Department of State concerning an "objectionable" article on King Farouq in *Life* magazine.

Apr. 19: Sir Ralph Stevenson, former Ambassador to China, was named British Ambassador to Egypt, succeeding Sir Ronald Campbell.

Apr. 25: Abd al-Majid Ahmad Hasan was executed

for the assassination of Prime Minister Mahmud Fahmi Nugrashi Pasha in December 1948.

May 10: The Council of Ministers banned *Life* magazine from Egypt forever. All issues then on sale were confiscated.

May 16: King Faruq's Royal Council declared the California civil marriage of Princess Fathiya and an Egyptian Coptic Christian commoner invalid in Egypt. Princess Fathiya stated that the couple intended to go through with a Muslim ceremony.

May 20: The trustees of the American Research Center in Cairo announced that a teaching and research center of the study of the past and present civilizations of the Nile River area would be opened in Cairo early in 1951. William S. Smith, of the Boston Museum of Fine Arts, would be director of the research center in Egypt for 1950-51.

May 26: Prime Minister Mustafa al-Nahhas Pasha told reporters that Egypt "was anxious to sign a collective security pact with the Arab states irrespective of her attitude to Jordan."

Ethiopia

1950

Mar. 18: The Ethiopian Embassy in Washington issued a statement denying that the recent riot in Eritrea had been between Christians and Muslims, and charging that it had been precipitated by "certain minority groups deceived by foreign bribery and propaganda."

Apr. 21: Ethiopia warned the UN that it would not be responsible for any "incidents" arising out of the presence of Italian troops in Somaliland.

India

1950

Mar. 1: The Press Trust accused Pakistan of surrounding East Bengal with "virtually an iron curtain" of censorship and news restrictions.

Mar. 4: The Government announced that new outbursts of Hindu-Muslim fighting in West (Indian) Bengal had resulted in 18 killed, at least 10 wounded, and the arrest of 95 persons.

Mar. 5: The Government protested against the "forcible restricting of thousands of homeless, penniless, terror stricken" Hindus seeking to flee from East (Pakistani) Bengal.

The former Prime Minister of Hyderabad, Mir Laik Ali, who had been held under house arrest for 18 months for anti-Indian activities in 1948, escaped from prison.

Mar. 6: The Government accused Pakistan of violating the India-Pakistan agreement of December 1948 forbidding inflammatory propaganda, following press and radio reports in Pakistan about the Hindu and Muslim riots in West Bengal.

Mar. 11: Four persons were killed and more than 12 injured in a clash between the police and a group of Communist terrorists near Bombay.

Mar. 15: The Government declined an invitation of Philippine President Elpidio Quirino to a conference of South and Southeast Asian countries on measures to meet the Communist menace in Asia.

Three persons were wounded in renewed Hindu-Muslim rioting in Bombay. The total since March 12 was 9 killed and 24 wounded. Police arrested 334.

Mar. 19: In a brief communal riot in New Delhi, 2 persons were killed and 19 injured.

Mar. 27: The General Secretary of the All-Hindu Mahasabha called for war against Pakistan.

Martial law was declared in Howrah, across the Hoogly River from Calcutta.

Mar. 28: The Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan agreed to meet in New Delhi to discuss the Hindu-Muslim communal problem.

Mar. 29: India bought \$60,000 worth of coupons supplied by UNESCO in order to purchase scientific equipment and films, thus becoming the first country to take advantage of the new plan whereby institutions in soft currency countries might purchase teaching and research equipment and publications in hard currency countries.

Apr. 1: The Government formally assumed control over the currency and communications of the former princely states, with a population of almost 90 million. For the first time the inhabitants of these states would be subject to an income tax.

Gen. Yuan Chung-Hsien of Communist China was formally accepted by the Government as Chinese Ambassador. The Government in Peiping accepted Sardar K. M. Pannikar as Indian Ambassador.

Five leaders of the All-India Hindu Mahasabha were arrested and taken out of Delhi to ensure "a healthy atmosphere" for the conference between Prime Minister Nehru and the Pakistani Prime Minister, Liaquat Ali Khan.

Apr. 2: Pakistani Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan arrived in New Delhi.

Apr. 6: Bombay followed the example of Madras and went "dry."

Apr. 8: Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan of Pakistan and Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru signed an agreement pledging protection to the religious minorities of both countries. (For text, see pp. 344-46.)

Apr. 10: Prime Minister Nehru presented the pact on minorities to the Indian Parliament, while Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan presented it to the Pakistani Constituent Assembly.

The Government asked Pakistan to extradite Mir Laik Ali, former Prime Minister of Hyderabad, who escaped to Karachi. (*India Today*, May, p. 3.)

Apr. 12: The Government of India issued instructions to the state governments of West Bengal and Assam and to other authorities to carry out strictly the provisions of the Indian-Pakistani agreement on minorities.

An express train crash caused by sabotage resulted in the death of 32 people and the injury of 76 near Bitroi station in the United Provinces.
Apr. 13: 30 persons were trampled to death in a rush toward the Ganges at the Hindu festival of Kumbh Mela, when it is believed that bathing in the river will wash away sins and assure one of eternal salvation.

Apr. 18: An epidemic of cholera broke out in Calcutta.

Apr. 19: Dr. Shyama Prasad Mukherjee, Minister of Industry and Supply, resigned, telling Parliament that the recent pact between India and Pakistan was no real solution of the basic problem. Minister of Commerce K. C. Neogy also resigned.

Apr. 21: The Government of India and the Government of the United States entered into an agreement for the exchange of official publications. Two copies of each official publication would be transmitted through the Smithsonian Institution, Washington, and the Central Secretariat Library, New Delhi. (*India Today*, May, p. 4.)

Apr. 24: Maj. Gen. Bijaya Shamsher Jang Bahadur Rana, Director General of Foreign Affairs in the Government of Nepal, announced that talks between India and Nepal for a new peace treaty had ended successfully.

Apr. 25: A trade agreement between India and Pakistan for the exchange of a limited range of commodities was published. The agreement broke a 7-month economic deadlock between the two countries.

Apr. 27: According to a joint statement, Prime Ministers Liaquat Ali Khan and Jawaharlal Nehru would continue regular meetings on problems between their countries after the Pakistani Prime Minister returned from a visit to the United States.

Apr. 30: President Rasendra Prasad stated that he believed that by the end of 1951 India would be self-sufficient in its food supply.

May 1: 19 members of the Uttar Pradesh State Legislature, were expelled from the Congress Party because of opposition on policy. Other rifts within the party were reported.

600 New Delhi businessmen, followers of the religious leader Acharya Tulsji, took an oath to abstain for one year from black-marketing, accepting bribes, counterfeiting, and generally reprehensible business practices.

Dr. B. R. Ambedkar, Law Minister in the Indian Cabinet and a famous "untouchable," and his wife became Buddhists in a temple ceremony.

May 5: Prime Minister Nehru formally reconstituted his Cabinet. Hare Krishna Mahtab replaced Dr. Shyama Prasad Mukherjee as Minister of Industry and Supply, and Kanialal Manegal Munshi replaced Mr. K. C. Neogy as Minister of Commerce. It was announced that Dr. John Matthai, Finance Minister, and Mr. Jairamdas Daulatram, Minister of Food and Agriculture,

also wished to resign, but had agreed to remain in office temporarily.

May 6: Representatives of Indian and Pakistan newspaper editors associations pledged cooperation in a meeting in New Delhi.

May 7: 81 persons were killed and 60 injured when the Punjab mail train crashed at Lahabun, west of Calcutta. Investigation confirmed suspicions that the cause was sabotage.

May 9: Rajkumari Armit Kaur, Minister of Health, was elected chairman of the World Health Organization's third annual assembly.

May 23: Officials of the Ministries of Railways of India and Pakistan reached an agreement on many issues concerning the development of normal rail traffic between the two countries, Pakistan agreeing to return to India 1,000 freight cars. The two governments also concluded a wheat deal by which Pakistan would sell to India 300,000 tons of wheat.

May 27: The Indian Supreme Court ended its first term as the highest body of judicial appeal under the new constitution. Among its most important pronouncements were affirmation of freedom of the press to comment against the government, and abolition of prepublication censorship.

About 2,500 Muslim refugees crossed the Indo-Pakistan border into Sind Province.

Iran

1950

Mar. 1: Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi arrived in Karachi for two weeks of conferences with Pakistan Government officials. (*N. Y. Herald Tribune*, Mar. 2.)

Mar. 10: A high Government source reported that martial law had been declared in one area (Gundabi Qavis) on the Iranian-Soviet border, where 50 Turkomans and Iranians had been arrested for espionage and "subversive activities."

Mar. 15: Iran formally announced *de facto* recognition of the state of Israel.

India and Iran signed a friendship treaty.

Mar. 17: The elections to the Majlis were completed.

Mar. 19: Prime Minister Mohammad Sa'ed Maraghehi resigned after seventeen months in office. The Shah instructed him to remain in office with his Cabinet until a new Prime Minister was appointed.

Mar. 23: Ali Mansur was named Prime Minister.

Mar. 25: An official Iranian mission left for Iraq to take custody of the 60 supporters of the former pro-Soviet regime in Azerbaijan who fled to Russia after the abdication of Azerbaijan Prime Minister Jaafar Pishvari, then left the Soviet Union for Iraq, where they asked the Government to negotiate an amnesty for their safe return.

Mar. 26: The Government indicated that approximately 7,000 unemployed had been put to work

on road building projects. 35 major bankruptcies were reported in Tehran during the past few months.

Apr. 1: There was a demonstration of unemployed before the Roads Building in Tehran.

Apr. 4: A new Iranian Cabinet was appointed as follows:

Ali Mansur — Prime Minister
 Husayn Ala — Foreign Affairs
 Gen. Morteza Yazdan-Panah — War
 Ibrahim Zand — Interior
 Muhammad Nakha'i — Labor
 Dr. Manuchehr Iqbal — Roads and Communications
 Assadullah Alam — Agriculture
 Mirza Ali Hayat — Justice
 Muhammad Ali Varasteh — Health
 Jalaleddin Tehrani — Posts and Telegraphs
 Mas'ud Kayhan — Education
 Dr. Ali Amini — National Economy

Apr. 9: The Majlis opened.

Apr. 10: The Senate met for the first time in Iranian history.

Apr. 13: 1,700 workers were unemployed as a result of the shutting down of 7 carpet weaving factories in Tabriz.

Apr. 18: Prime Minister Ali Mansur declared that he had not given up hope of obtaining American financial aid. (*N. Y. Herald Tribune*, Apr. 19.)

Apr. 19: Mehrnush Siassi, leader of the Communist-directed Tudeh Party, was arrested in Tehran. (*N. Y. Herald Tribune*, Apr. 20.)

Apr. 24: Prime Minister Ali Mansur made the following changes in the Cabinet, probably because of the economic crisis:

Amanollah Ardalan — Interior
 Mohammad Ali Varasteh — Finance

Apr. 28: A new UN information center would open in Tehran in May, it was announced. Abdollah Faryar, former teacher and editor, would be the director.

May 1: Ambassador to the U. S. Husayn Ala, before his return to Iran as Foreign Minister, stated after a visit with President Truman that he had requested "urgent American assistance" for his country.

300 Jewish refugees in Tehran stated that 12 Jews had been murdered in a violent wave of persecution in Iranian Kurdistan.

May 2: 2,500 Tehran University students struck in sympathy with 1,500 medical students who had struck two weeks before, seeking increased facilities for work as internes.

May 7: The remains of the late Reza Shah Pahlavi, who died in 1944, were interred in Tehran in a marble mausoleum. The body had been buried in Cairo after the Shah died in Johannesburg in exile. (*London Times*, May 8.)

May 12: It was reported that the Government protested to the Soviet Union for ignoring the reburial services for the late Shah.

May 15: The Soviet Union protested in a note to the Iranian Government that American experts were being used to take aerial photographs along the Iranian-Soviet frontier. The note said that these photographs, made during oil prospecting operations, were of "military significance."

May 18: The Government replied to the Soviet Union that "no activities are being carried out in the northern areas or anywhere else in Iran contrary to good neighborly relations." The note said that no aerial photographs had been taken, but that "to remove Soviet misunderstanding and anxiety" in the future only land photographing would be done in areas near the Russian border.

May 20: The Tehran radio announced that close-range news broadcasts would be made to the Soviet Union with \$56,000 worth of Voice of America equipment, in order to curb Soviet jamming of local stations.

May 23: The U. S. agreed to ship arms and supplies to Iran in order to strengthen that country against Soviet communism. Iran would receive assistance under the general provisions of the \$1,314,010,000 Mutual Defense Assistance Program, which included a fund of \$27,640,000 for Iran, the Philippines, and Korea.

The French General Confederation of Labor, in a note to the UN, accused the Government of having deported trade unionists to "unhealthy islands" in the Persian Gulf in order to get rid of them.

May 27: Ahmed Dehghan, editor of the anti-Russian, anti-British weekly *Tehran-i-Mosavvar*, was shot fatally in his office. The assassin was identified as an Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. employee named Mahmud Jaafari.

Iraq

(See also Iran.)

1950

Mar. 3: The Chamber of Deputies approved an emergency bill permitting Iraqi Jews to renounce their nationality and leave the country.

Mar. 7: 36 opposition members of the Majlis resigned, protesting that the Government had denied them the right of expressing their views.

Apr. 10: The High Court of Justice sentenced Ali Khalid, former chief of police, to life imprisonment on the charge of trying to overthrow the Government by force.

May 8: A spokesman for the Iraq Petroleum Company announced a plan for a 556-mile pipeline from the Kirkuk oil fields to the Syrian port of Banyas.

May 13: The Government granted permission to Near East Transport, Inc., to fly more than 50,000 Jews to Israel.

May 17: Engineers blasted anti-flood dikes along the Tigris River to release heavy waters above Baghdad which were threatening the city. 3,000

houses collapsed from the heavy floods, and about 18 million square yards of cultivated land were covered by water.

Israel

(See also Iraq, Palestine Problem.)

1950

Mar. 7: The Parliamentary Finance Committee approved the plan of Finance Minister Eliezer Kaplan to offer to extend the British-registered concession of Palestine Potash, Ltd., for the exploitation of Dead Sea mineral resources on the condition that the company be recognized and converted almost virtually into an Israel enterprise, with the seat of the Board of Directors in Israel, and at least half of the voting shares and seats in the Board of Directors vested in Israelis by the end of 1950.

Arthur Lourie, Consul General of Israel in New York, announced plans for the establishment, by the Kaiser-Frazer Corporation, of the first passenger automobile assembly plant in Israel. It was scheduled to begin operations in August.

Mar. 8: The Knesset passed a law enabling the Government to obtain legal title to property abandoned by Arab refugees.

Mar. 9: An official Swedish report stated that Israel police had been so negligent in investigating the assassination of Count Folke Bernadotte that "doubt must exist as to whether the Israeli authorities really tried to bring the inquiry to a positive result."

Mar. 12: The Israel Defense Ministry ordered registration for the army reserve of all physicians between the ages of 29 and 49. (*N. Y. Herald Tribune*, Mar. 13)

Mar. 14: Dr. Serge Koussevitsky donated his entire library of music to the Hebrew University.

Dr. Walter Clay Lowdermilk, expert on soil erosion, was appointed adviser to the Government. Dr. John L. Savage would also advise the Government on irrigation problems, at the invitation of the Ministry of Agriculture.

Mar. 20: The Government signed a one-year trade agreement with Czechoslovakia calling for an exchange of goods valued at about \$12 million.

Mar. 22: The Cabinet appointed a committee of 3 officials to study the report of Sweden's chief public prosecutor accusing Israel of "astonishing negligence" in the search for the assassins of Count Folke Bernadotte.

Mar. 24: A 44-man delegation of Israel laborers left Haifa for the United States to study production methods and organizational efficiency.

Mar. 29: The Knesset, by a vote of 47 to 15, passed a legislative act providing for special privileges for private investors in Israel.

Apr. 5: Supply Minister Dov Joseph announced stiffer food rationing.

Apr. 6: The United States tentatively rejected the Government's request for heavy American weapons, such as tanks and artillery.

Apr. 17: Twelve persons were killed and 30 injured when a 4-story building collapsed in Jaffa.

Apr. 21: Argentina and Israel signed a trade treaty.

Apr. 22: Israel celebrated its second anniversary.

Apr. 25: Prime Minister Ben-Gurion told world Zionist leaders attending the meeting of the Zionist General Council in Jerusalem that their financial support of Israel did not entitle them to a voice in the affairs of the country.

A Foreign Office spokesman stated that Great Britain was "provoking an arms race which is creating an explosive situation in the Middle East."

Apr. 27: The British Government announced its *de jure* recognition of Israel.

Apr. 30: Thirteen Americans were elected to the Board of Governors of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, as follows: Jacob Blaustein, Professor Albert Einstein, Dr. Israel Goldstein, Frank Goldman, Samuel Hausman, Dr. Julius Jarcho, Joseph M. Mazer, Henry Morgenthau, Jr., Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer, Rabbi Abba Hillel Silver, Mark Sugerman, Edward M. Warburg, Philip G. Whitman.

May 1: Prime Minister Ben-Gurion's attempt to broaden his coalition cabinet failed when the executive committee of the General Zionist Party decided against joining.

May Day festivities were interrupted by clashes between pro-Soviet and pro-Government workers.

May 2: A UN plane flying southward over Israel territory was forced down at Lydda airport after Israel fighters had fired across its nose. It was permitted to continue on to an Arab field at Kallandia in Jordan after an official check.

May 3: Israel forces, using mortars and automatic weapons, drove 12,000 Arabs from 2 villages and 55,000 acres ready to be harvested in Hebron. Jordan agreed that the Israelis were within their rights according to the demarcation lines of the armistice agreement of April 1949. The Israelis occupied the territory.

May 11: Following a decision made by the executive committee of the General Federation of Jewish Labor, Histadrut announced its withdrawal from the World Federation of Trade Unions, and its decision not to become a member of the International Confederation.

May 12: The Swiss Federal Council decided to establish diplomatic relations with Israel.

An Israeli Government spokesman denied that armed troops had driven Arabs from their farmland, saying that "we are occupying our own territory," and "nothing special has occurred." He also stated that the communal settlements around Hebron had "merely extended their cultivation of lands."

May 13: Eliahu Elath, Israel Ambassador to the

United States, was named Minister to Great Britain.

May 15: Prime Minister Ben-Gurion informed the Knesset that the Government had reached an agreement with the world Zionist movement for joint planning and execution of immigrant absorption and land settlement.

May 16: 300 physicians employed by the Government called a 24-hour strike for a raise in their monthly pay to £1 8s (\$225) and recognition of their physicians' organization by the Government.

The Ministry of Religion allocated \$14,000 as a first installment toward the repair of Notre Dame convent, damaged by the fighting in Jerusalem. \$980 was allocated for restoration and protection of the mosaics at al-Tabighah on the shores of Lake Galilee.

May 17: The Cabinet received the report of a special committee reinvestigating the assassination of Count Bernadotte.

A 4-motored British Air Force Sunderland flying boat was forced down by Israel fighter planes.

May 23: Prime Minister Ben-Gurion appealed to Russia to allow Russian Jews to emigrate to Israel.

May 25: The Government agreed to make a formal apology to the UN for the assassination of Count Folke Bernadotte, to pay \$54,628 as reparation, and to intensify its search for the assassins.

May 26: Aubrey S. Eban, the Government's permanent delegate to the UN, was appointed Ambassador to the United States. Mr. Eban would continue to head the UN delegation.

May 30: Yugoslavia's Minister to Israel, Nikola Milicevitch, paid a formal call on Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion in Jerusalem, the first diplomatic representative to recognize that city as capital.

May 31: Prime Minister Ben-Gurion rejected a Communist demand for a statement that Israel would not join a Middle Eastern bloc for a "cold war" against the Soviet Union. Ben-Gurion reaffirmed Israel's declaration that it was seeking peace with all nations and would remain neutral.

Italian Colonies

(See also Ethiopia.)

1950

Mar. 10: Amir Idris al-Sanusi of Cyrenaica requested the resignation of his 9-month old Cabinet headed by Prime Minister Omar Pasha Kikbia.

Mar. 17: The UN received a memorandum from Col. Valentino Vecchi, representing "Eritrea's Bloc for Independence," urging immediate independence for Eritrea and opposing partition or annexation of any part of the former Italian Colony by Ethiopia or the Sudan.

Apr. 1: Italy formally resumed administration of its former African colony of Somaliland. (N. Y. Herald Tribune, Apr. 2.)

Apr. 28: In a communication to the UN Commission for Eritrea, the British Government stated that under no consideration would it agree to Italian administration of the former Italian colony of Eritrea now under British occupation. R. H. Stafford, British representative, urged partitioning the area between Ethiopia and the Sudan.

Jordan

(See also Arab League, Palestine Problem.)

1950

Mar. 2: Prime Minister Tawfiq Abu al-Huda Pasha resigned. King Abdallah asked Samir Rifai Pasha to form a new Jordanian Cabinet.

Mar. 5: King Abdallah asked Tawfiq Abu al-Huda Pasha to withdraw his resignation following the failure of Samir Rifai Pasha to form a Government.

Mar. 14: King Abdallah told Arab states of a new agreement between Israel and Jordan.

Mar. 19: Col. Abdallah al-Tall, former Arab Legion Commander, now a political exile in Egypt, proposed that the Arab League should ask King Abdallah to abdicate if he refused to become a constitutional monarch. He asked permission to testify before the Arab League Council, stating that he had proof of Abdallah's intrigues with Israel during the Palestine war.

Mar. 26: Muhammad Fahmi Hashim, Minister to Saudi Arabia, went into exile in protest against alleged negotiations for peace between Israel and Jordan.

Mar. 27: King Abdallah sent a note to the Arab League Council stating that Jordan was boycotting the Council's meeting. The Political Committee of the League then invited Ahmad Hilmi Pasha, Prime Minister of the All-Palestine (Gaza) Government, to attend the meeting.

Mar. 28: The Jordanian Minister to Cairo, Baha' al-Din Bey Tuqan, said that he had been instructed to attend the Arab League Council meetings, but not to engage in any discussions of topics that Amman had stated should not be discussed.

Apr. 2: Prime Minister Tawfiq Abu al-Huda Pasha announced that he and his entire Cabinet had resigned. King Abdallah appointed him president of the Chamber of Notables, effective April 11.

Apr. 11: Jordan's elections for Parliament took place.

Apr. 13: Sa'id Pasha Mufti became Prime Minister with an 11-man Cabinet including 5 Palestinians, as follows:

Sa'id al-Mufti — Prime Minister
Falah al-Madadiyah — Interior
Fawzi al-Mulqi — Defense
Sulayman al-Sukkar — Finance
Shaykh Muhammad al-Shanqiti — Education
and Chief of Muslim Courts
Muhammad Pasha Shurayqi — Exterior

Raghib Pasha Nashashibi—Agriculture
 Ruhi Pasha 'Abd al-Hadi—Justice
 Ahmad Tuqan—Public Works and Construction
 Sa'id 'Ala' al-Din—Commerce
 Anastas Hananiya—Posts and Telegraphs

Apr. 17: 20 senators were appointed by royal decree to replace the old Senate made up entirely of Jordanians. Seven members of the new Parliament were Palestinians.

Apr. 22: King Abdallah said that Jordan would welcome expulsion from the Arab League if the League attempted to prevent unification of the east and west banks of the Jordan River.

Apr. 24: The two houses of the Parliament, at their opening session, voted for the unification of Arab Palestine and Jordan into the single Kingdom of Hashimite Jordan.

Israel refused to recognize the annexation by Jordan of Arab Palestine.

Apr. 25: Muhammad Pasha Shurayqi, Minister of the Exterior, formally notified the UN that Jordan had annexed eastern Palestine and the old walled city of Jerusalem.

Apr. 27: The British Government announced *de jure* recognition of the unification of Arab Palestine and Jordan and *de facto* recognition of Jordanian rule in the Old City of Jerusalem.

May 2: The legal department of the Arab League stated that Jordan's annexation of Arab Palestine provided no ground for League sanctions against it.

May 31: Jordan officially notified its Arab neighbors and the Arab League that it considered the annexation of Arab Palestine "irrevocable and not open for further discussion."

Kashmir Problem

(See also India.)

1950

Mar. 14: The UN Security Council voted to appoint a mediator to deal with the demilitarization of Kashmir and prepare for a plebiscite to decide whether the state should join India or Pakistan.

Mar. 19: Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah, Prime Minister of the Indian-dominated section of Jammu and Kashmir, said that his Government would cooperate with the UN mediator, but not with the plan of Gen. A. G. L. McNaughton of Canada for the demilitarization of Kashmir, because, he said, this plan "completely disregarded the basic issues of the whole dispute."

Apr. 4: The 4-member "Kashmir Committee" of the UN Security Council officially approved the appointment of Sir Owen Dixon, Australian jurist, as UN Kashmir mediator. (*N. Y. Herald Tribune*, Apr. 5.)

Apr. 12: The UN Security Council officially ap-

pointed Sir Owen Dixon the mediator for Kashmir.

May 5: Pakistan For. Min. Sir Zafrullah Khan stated that only through a plebiscite could it be determined whether Kashmir should be a part of India or Pakistan.

Lebanon

1950

Mar. 9: A young Syrian attempted to assassinate Prime Minister Riad al-Sulh, killing 2 bystanders and wounding 3 others. The assailant, who was wounded and arrested by the police, was identified as a member of the outlawed Syrian Nationalist Party, of which Anton Saadeh, executed in Lebanon last July 8, was the leader.

Mar. 13: Syria renounced its 7-year old customs' union with Lebanon.

Mar. 25: Lebanon closed its borders to all trade with Syria, thus causing a complete break in economic relations between the two countries.

May 6: Lebanon and Spain signed a pact to arbitrate any dispute arising between the two nations.

Pakistan

(See also Afghanistan, India, Kashmir Problem.)

1950

Mar. 12: 238 tribal leaders of 3,000,000 people of the North-West Frontier Province held an all-tribes council on the lawn of Government House in Peshawar to greet the Shah of Iran.

Mar. 13: Finance Minister Ghulam Mohammed announced the revenue for 1950-51 as approximately Rs. 1,136,400,000 (about \$345 million), and expenditures at Rs. 1,155,400,000. Defense spending would total Rs. 500 million (about \$152 million), nearly half the annual national budget.

Mar. 15: Mr. Alexander Stesenko, the first Soviet Ambassador to Pakistan, arrived in Peshawar. (*London Times*, Mar. 16.)

Apr. 12: The Constituent Assembly adopted a bill abolishing the jurisprudence of the British Privy Council as the last court of appeal. The Pakistani Federal Court assumed position as the highest tribunal.

Apr. 15: United States drainage experts were invited by Pakistan to advise it on a system of drains to clear water-logged and salt-soaked land.

May 3: Prime Minister and Begum Liaquat Ali Khan arrived in Washington for a state visit and a tour of the major American cities.

May 4: Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan stated in addresses before the Senate, the House, and the National Press Club in Washington, that Pakistan needed arms and technical aid.

May 8: Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan, in a visit to the UN at Lake Success, stated that Pakistan

stood firmly against the principle of excluding communist countries from the UN.

May 15: Pakistan agreed to join other South Asian countries in talks on economic and social problems scheduled for May 26 at Baguio in the Philippines.

Palestine Problem

(See also Jordan.)

1950

Mar. 2: The UN Trusteeship Council adopted, without vote, the article in the draft Jerusalem statute declaring that the boundaries of the internationalized city would be those specified in the General Assembly resolution of Dec. 9, 1949. *Mar. 5:* 'Abd al-Rahman Azzam Pasha, Secretary General of the Arab League, declared that Israel was preparing for "new aggression which may come at any time."

Mar. 14: In a vote of 54 to 29, the Israel Knesset adjourned the motion to debate Israel's peace negotiations with Jordan.

Mar. 16: Israel warned the UN that its present proposals for separating Jerusalem from Israel would turn Jerusalem into an "economically backward area—a kind of Point Four in reverse."

Mar. 19: Prime Minister Ben-Gurion stated that Israel wanted to negotiate formal peace with the Arab states as quickly as possible.

Mar. 20: Israel Foreign Minister Moshe Sharett asked the 7 member states of the Arab League to make peace with Israel by direct negotiations. He said that Israel wanted only to consolidate its present position.

Mar. 25: An Israel Government source said that Hashimite Jordan had broken off negotiations on a 5-year nonaggression pact. However, peace negotiations were expected to be continued after Jordan's elections on April 11.

Mar. 27: The Israel-Jordan Mixed Armistice Commission ruled that Israel had committed a breach of the Palestine armistice early in March when an army patrol crossed the demarcation line. Israel members said that the patrol crossed the line only after being attacked in Israel territory.

Mar. 31: The UN Trusteeship Council completed its vote on 43 articles on a new statute for the internationalization of Jerusalem, but the date for making the statute effective was left indefinite.

Apr. 4: The UN Trusteeship Council gave final approval to a statute for the internationalization of Jerusalem, 9 votes to 1, with 2 abstentions (Great Britain and the United States).

Apr. 13: The Government of Israel notified the UN Palestine Conciliation Commission that it could not accept the Arabs' terms for negotiations. This was in reply to the resolution of the Arab League Political Committee requiring a return to the par-

tition boundaries of 1947 as the basis for peace talks.

The Government of Israel received an invitation from M. Garreau, Chairman of the UN Trusteeship Council, to send a delegation to Athens to confer with him on the fulfillment of the terms of the Jerusalem statute. (*London Times*, April 14.)

Apr. 15: Claude de Boisanger, of France, Chairman of the UN Palestine Conciliation Commission, said that Egypt, Syria, and Lebanon had assured him that they would consent to direct peace talks with Israel if repatriation of Palestine Arab refugees were made the first item on the agenda. (*N. Y. Herald Tribune*, Apr. 16.)

Apr. 17: The UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine refugees held its first formal meeting in Geneva in joint session with the UN Palestine Conciliation Commission. It was headed by Maj. Gen. Howard Kennedy and would attempt to resettle about 900,000 Arab refugees.

Apr. 19: The Israel Government's request for permission to purchase arms from Great Britain was rejected. Great Britain would continue to supply arms in moderate quantities to Arab states under treaty arrangements. (*N. Y. Herald Tribune*, Apr. 20.)

The Soviet Union announced that it was abandoning its support of the complete internationalization of Jerusalem.

Apr. 29: Three former high commanders of the Irgun Zvai Leumi told a throng of 10,000 in Tel Aviv's main square that Israel would never permit Jordan to hold the annexed territory of eastern Palestine, and stated also (in a message to Sir Alexander Knox Helm, British Minister in Tel Aviv) that the Irgun would take up arms if the British moved into the annexed regions.

May 3: Israel forces, using mortar and automatic weapons, drove 12,000 Arabs from 2 villages and 55,000 acres ready to be harvested in Hebron. Jordan agreed that the Israelis were within their rights according to the demarcation lines of the armistice agreement of April 1949. The Israelis occupied the territory.

May 8: Israel accepted the proposal of the UN Conciliation Commission for Palestine that further negotiations proceed directly with the several Arab states. However, the Arab states had previously agreed to direct negotiation only on the condition that Israel accept the right of refugees to return to Israel territory.

The UN sent out a plea to member states to contribute to the Relief and Works Agency for Palestine refugees in the Middle East. This request was for funds to enable the agency to continue the relief program beyond May 30, 1950.

May 12: An Israel Government spokesman denied that armed troops had driven Arabs from their farmland and said that "we are occupying our own territory," and "nothing special had occurred." He also stated that the communal settle-

ments around Hebron had "merely extended their cultivation of lands."

May 15: The UN Palestine Conciliation Commission asked the Arab states and Israel to send delegates "fully empowered to act on their behalf" to begin negotiations on outstanding Palestine issues.

May 21: The Israel Government sent a note to the UN Conciliation Commission for Palestine charging that the Arab states were making peace negotiations impossible by insisting that before any discussion of the problem, Israel agree to a solution of the refugee situation. Israel refused to commit itself in advance of negotiations.

May 28: Israel formally rejected the UN plan for strict internationalization of Jerusalem, and proposed a substitute suggestion offering to accept a UN-imposed authority over Holy Places. (*N. Y. Herald Tribune*, May 29, 1950.)

Saudi Arabia

1950

Mar. 4: The Government issued a statement that any non-Muslim found inside the sacred areas of Mecca and Medina would be subject to a prison sentence of up to 5 years and a fine of 5,000 Saudi Arabian rials (about \$1,300). After serving the sentence he would be deported from the country.

Mar. 22: The Government decreed that passengers on international planes using the airfield at Dhahran would be issued visas for transit and entry on the basis of a "certificate of religion" from a United States consul, which must either state the carrier's religion or contain a certificate that the person was not Jewish.

Sudan

1950

Mar. 5: The General Workers' Congress called a 3-day sympathy walk-out following a decision of the railway workers to strike because the government refused to grant them a 75% increase in basic wages, shorter hours, and more overtime.

Syria

1950

Mar. 6: Prime Minister Khalid al-'Azm declared that the Government was considering closing Syria's frontier with the Kingdom of Jordan if the alleged 5-year agreement between Jordan and Israel became effective.

Mar. 13: 19 Damascus newspapers went on strike in protest against a new press control law.

Syria renounced the 7-year old custom's agreement with Lebanon.

Mar. 25: Lebanon closed its borders to all trade

with Syria, thus causing a complete break in economic relations between the two countries.

Apr. 28: Akram al-Hawrani, Minister of Defense, resigned, but the resignation was not accepted by the Prime Minister.

Apr. 29: Mustafa Siba'i, representative of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Constituent Assembly, proposed that the Arabs turn toward the Soviet Union for diplomatic support.

May 2: Three Damascus newspapers charged that the U. S. Legation was trying to limit freedom of the press by protesting to the Government against articles which had appeared in newspapers. The articles were regarding a bomb which recently exploded in the garden of the American Legation, the number of American employees at the Legation, and the American Embassy's interference in the recent Arab League meeting in Cairo.

May 8: Prime Minister Khalid al-'Azm's Cabinet resigned, possibly as a result of the threat made by Defense Minister Akram al-Hawrani, leader of the Republican bloc, to boycott the meetings of the Constituent Assembly unless the Government was reorganized. Hawrani stated that he would not rejoin the Government unless a coalition was formed by the People's Party and the Republican bloc or either of these two groups.

May 15: A state of alert was ordered in the Army, and all officers' leaves were cancelled.

May 22: Minister of Defense Akram al-Hawrani stated that the Arabs were friends of the Soviet Union in the same way that they were friends of Germany during the last war.

May 23: Faydi al-Atasi, Minister of Justice, resigned.

May 29: Prime Minister Khalid al-'Azm's Cabinet resigned, and he was asked by President Hashim al-Atasi to form another. The resignation was announced after a small time bomb exploded in the building that housed the Prime Minister's office.

1,800 tax collectors and officials in the Finance Department struck. They declared that they were the hardest working and worst paid of all Government employees.

Turkey

1950

Mar. 2: Retired General Mustafa Muğlali was sentenced to 20 years imprisonment for illegally executing, without trial, 33 villagers in 1943.

Mar. 12: Final agreement was made on the statutes for a Turkish Industrial Development Bank to promote private industry in cooperation with the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Representatives of leading Turkish Banks and business groups selected an all-Turkish Board of Directors and subscribed in Turkish lira a capital equivalent to \$4,500,000. The Central Bank of Turkey pledged credits up to the

same amount, while the International Bank promised to match both those figures with a \$9 million foreign credit to be available in other non-dollar currencies for projects which it approved. (For fuller details, see pp. 349-52.)

Mar. 23: Foreign Minister Necmeddin Sadak said that as the North Atlantic Pact was necessary for European defense, a Mediterranean alliance was also necessary for mutual protection in that part of the world.

Mar. 24: Italy and Turkey signed a 5-year treaty of friendship.

Apr. 10: Marshall Fevzi Çakmak, Turkish defender of the Dardanelles in World War I, died. *Apr. 13:* 91 persons were jailed between the death and burial of Marshal Çakmak for disorderly conduct — 25 for having recited the Koran in Arabic.

Apr. 27: Turkey rejected "finally and conclusively" Moscow proposals for joint Russian and Turkish control of the Turkish Straits. (*N. Y. Herald Tribune*, Apr. 28.)

May 14: The general election for the 487 seats of the National Assembly resulted in a large majority for the Democratic Party. Results were as follows:

Democratic	408
Republican Peoples	69
Nation	1
Independents	9

(*News from Turkey*, June 15.)

All members of the Cabinet except Prime Minister Semettin Gunaltay were defeated.

May 22: Celal Bayar, founder and leader of the Democratic Party, was elected President of Turkey by the National Assembly, succeeding President Ismet Inönü. The new Cabinet was as follows:

Adnan Menderes — Prime Minister
Fuad Köprülü — Foreign Affairs
Refik Şevket İnce — Defense
Halil Özyörük — Justice
Ruknnettin Nasuhoglu — Interior
Halil Ayan — Finance
Fahri Belen — Public Works
Zühtü Velibese — Economy and Commerce
Nihat Reşat Belger — Health
Nuri Ozsan — Customs
Nihat Egriboz — Agriculture
Tevfik İlerli — Communications
Hasan Polatkan — Labor
Muhris Ete — Industrial Development
Avni Basman — Education

May 25: An official of the Ministry of Justice gave the final figures of the popular vote in the Turkish elections as follows:

Democratic	4,242,831
Republican Peoples	3,165,096

7,916,091 out of an eligible 8,905,576 went to the polls.

May 29: Prime Minister Adnan Menderes said that his government would enforce a drastic reduction of expenditure in every department, including Defense.

DOCUMENTS

Agreement Between India and Pakistan on Minorities (Text)

A

THE GOVERNMENTS of India and Pakistan solemnly agree that each shall ensure, to the minorities throughout its territory, complete equality of citizenship, irrespective of religion, a full sense of security in respect of life, culture, property and personal honour, freedom of movement within each country and freedom of occupation, speech and worship, subject to law and morality. Members of the minorities shall have equal opportunity with members of the majority community to participate in the public life of their country, to hold political or other office, and to serve in their country's civil and armed forces. Both Governments declare these rights to be fundamental and undertake to enforce them effectively. The Prime Minister of India has drawn attention to the fact that these rights are guaranteed to all minorities in India by its Constitution. The Prime Minister of Pakistan has pointed out that similar provision exists in the Objectives Resolution adopted by the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan. It is the policy of both Governments that the enjoyment of these democratic rights shall be assured to all their nationals without distinction.

Both Governments wish to emphasise that the allegiance and loyalty of the minorities is to the State of which they are citizens, and that it is to the Government of their own State that they should look for the redress of their grievances.

B

In respect of migrants from East Bengal, West Bengal, Assam and Tripura, where communal disturbances have recently occurred, it is agreed between the two Governments:

(i) That there shall be freedom of movement and protection in transit;

(ii) That there shall be freedom to remove as much of his moveable personal effects and household goods as a migrant may wish to take with him. Moveable property shall include personal jewellery. The maximum cash allowed to each adult migrant will be Rs. 150/- and to each migrant child Rs. 75/-;

(iii) That a migrant may deposit such of his personal jewellery or cash as he does not wish to take with him with a bank. A proper receipt shall be furnished to him by the bank for cash or jewellery thus deposited and facilities shall be provided, as and when required, for their transfer to him, subject, as regards cash to the exchange regulations of the Government concerned;

(iv) That there shall be no harassment by the Customs authorities. At each Customs post agreed upon by the Governments concerned, liaison officers of the other Government shall be posted to ensure this in practice;

(v) Rights of ownership in or occupancy of the immoveable property of a migrant shall not be disturbed. If, during his absence, such property is occupied by another person, it shall be returned to him, provided that he comes back by the 31st December, 1950. Where the migrant was a cultivating owner or tenant, the land shall be restored to him, provided that he returns not later than the 31st December, 1950. In exceptional cases, if a Government considers that a migrant's immoveable property cannot be returned to him, the matter shall be referred to the appropriate Minority Commission for advice.

Where restoration of immoveable property to the migrant who returns within the specified period is found not possible the Government concerned shall take steps to rehabilitate him.

(vi) That in the case of a migrant who decides not to return, ownership of all his immoveable property shall continue to vest

in him and he shall have unrestricted right to dispose of it by sale, by exchange with an evacuee in the other country, or otherwise. A Committee consisting of three representatives of the minority and presided over by a representative of Government shall act as trustees of the owner. The Committee shall be empowered to recover rent for such immoveable property according to law.

The Governments of East Bengal, West Bengal, Assam and Tripura shall enact the necessary legislation to set up these Committees.

The Provincial or State Government, as the case may be, will instruct the District or other appropriate authority to give all possible assistance for the discharge of the Committee's functions.

The provisions of this sub-paragraph shall also apply to migrants who may have left East Bengal for any part of India, or West Bengal, Assam or Tripura for any part of Pakistan, prior to the recent disturbances but after the 15th August, 1947. The arrangement in this sub-paragraph will apply also to migrants who have left Bihar for East Bengal owing to communal disturbances or fear thereof.

C

As regards the Province of East Bengal and each of the States of West Bengal, Assam and Tripura respectively, the two Governments further agree that they shall:

(1) Continue their efforts to restore normal conditions and shall take suitable measures to prevent recurrence of disorder.

(2) Punish all those who are found guilty of offences against persons and property and of other criminal offences. In view of their deterrent effect, collective fines shall be imposed, where necessary. Special Courts will, where necessary, be appointed to ensure that wrong-doers are promptly punished.

(3) Make every possible effort to recover looted property.

(4) Set up immediately an agency, with which representatives of the minority shall be associated, to assist in the recovery of abducted women.

(5) NOT recognise forced conversions. Any conversion effected during a period of

communal disturbance shall be deemed to be a forced conversion. Those found guilty of converting people forcibly shall be punished.

(6) Set up a Commission of Enquiry at once to enquire into and report on the causes and extent of the recent disturbances and to make recommendations with a view to preventing recrudescence of similar trouble in future. The personnel of the Commission, which shall be presided over by a Judge of the High Court, shall be such as to inspire confidence among the minority.

(7) Take prompt and effective steps to prevent the dissemination of news and mischievous opinion calculated to rouse communal passion by press or radio or by any individual or organisation. Those guilty of such activity shall be rigorously dealt with.

(8) Not permit propaganda in either country directed against the territorial integrity of the other or purporting to incite war between them and shall take prompt and effective action against any individual or organisation guilty of such propaganda.

D

Sub-paragraphs (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (7) and (8) of C of the Agreement are of general scope and applicable, according to exigency, to any part of India or Pakistan.

E

In order to help restore confidence, so that refugees may return to their homes, the two Governments have decided (i) to depute two Ministers, one from each Government to remain in the affected areas for such period as may be necessary; (ii) to include in the Cabinets of East Bengal, West Bengal and Assam a representative of the minority community. In Assam the minority community is already represented in the Cabinet. Appointments to the Cabinets of East Bengal and West Bengal shall be made immediately.

F

In order to assist in the implementation of this Agreement, the two Governments have decided, apart from the deputation of their Ministers referred to in E, to set up Minority

Commissions, one for East Bengal, one for West Bengal and one for Assam. These Commissions will be constituted and will have the functions described below.

(i) Each Commission will consist of one Minister of the Provincial or State Governments concerned, who will be Chairman, and one representative each of the majority and minority communities from East Bengal, West Bengal and Assam, chosen by and from among their respective representatives in the Provincial or State Legislatures, as the case may be.

(ii) The two Ministers of the Governments of India and Pakistan may attend and participate in any meeting of any Commission. A Minority Commission or any two Minority Commissions jointly shall meet when so required by either Central Minister for the satisfactory implementation of this Agreement.

(iii) Each Commission shall appoint such staff as it deems necessary for the proper discharge of its functions and shall determine its own procedure.

(iv) Each Commission shall maintain contact with the minorities in Districts and small administrative headquarters through Minority Boards formed in accordance with the Inter-Dominion Agreement of December, 1948.

(v) The Minority Commissions in East Bengal and West Bengal shall replace the Provincial Minorities Boards set up under the Inter-Dominion Agreement of December, 1948.

(vi) The two Ministers of the Central Governments will from time to time consult such persons or organisations as they may consider necessary.

(vii) The functions of the Minority Commission shall be:

- (a) To observe and to report on the implementation of this Agreement and, for this purpose, to take cognizance of breaches or neglect.
- (b) To advise on action to be taken on their recommendations.

(viii) Each Commission shall submit reports, as and when necessary, to the Provincial and State Governments concerned. Copies of such reports will be submitted simultaneously

to the two Central Ministers during the period referred to in E.

(ix) The Governments of India and Pakistan, and the State and Provincial Governments, will normally give effect to recommendations that concern them when such recommendations are supported by both the Central Ministers. In the event of disagreement between the two Central Ministers, the matter shall be referred to the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan who shall either resolve it themselves or determine the agency and procedure by which it will be resolved.

(x) In respect of Tripura, the two Central Ministers shall constitute a Commission and shall discharge the functions that are assigned under the Agreement to the Minority Commissions for East Bengal, West Bengal and Assam. Before the expiration of the period referred to in E, the two Central Ministers shall make recommendations for the establishment in Tripura of appropriate machinery to discharge the functions of the Minority Commissions envisaged in respect of East Bengal, West Bengal and Assam.

G

Except where modified by this Agreement, the Inter-Dominion Agreement of December, 1948, shall remain in force.

JAWAHARLAL NEHRU.
Prime Minister of India.

LIAQUAT ALI KHAN.
Prime Minister of Pakistan.

NEW DELHI.
April 8th, 1950.

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ECONOMIC REVIEW

The Industrial Development Bank of Turkey

William Diamond

TURKEY has just become the scene of an experiment which promises, not only to stimulate the economic development of that country, but also to be a model for other underdeveloped countries facing similar problems of industrialization. It is one of the first concrete applications of the Point Four idea, and has been instigated by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

Speaking to the Investment Dealers' Association of Canada, on February 23, 1950, Eugene R. Black, President of the International Bank, pointed out that: "Underdevelopment normally means, almost by definition, that well-established private enterprises are lacking, that local capital is scanty and poorly organized, that technical data and plans are deficient, and that the governmental administration is inadequate. It is precisely because these conditions prevail that outside help is necessary to stimulate and assist in the development process. Yet the existence of these conditions often makes it very difficult to assure that the projects put forward are economically sound, that adequate technical studies and plans are made, and that they are put into execution competently and efficiently." The Turkish experiment is one way of meeting this problem.

In late April a consortium of 18 private banks, industrialists, and business groups signed the statutes of the Industrial Development Bank of Turkey. One of President Inönü's last acts before retiring from office on May 22 was to sign the ministerial decision approving the statutes (an act required for

legal incorporation in Turkey). This new bank, now Turkey's most highly capitalized private bank, will be devoted exclusively to the financing of private industry. It will be the only bank in Turkey prepared to make long-term loans; the only one ready to lend at moderate rates of interest; and the only one with foreign exchange resources at its disposal. Owned and managed exclusively by private capital, the bank will be prepared, not only to provide financing, but also to make technical and managerial assistance available to its clients. As a matter of fact, the latter may well prove to be its lasting influence on the growth of the Turkish economy.

Foreign observers agree that the stimulation of private capital investment in Turkey is essential to the development of the Turkish economy. Considerable private capital exists in Turkey; but its owners prefer to invest in real estate, inventory, or gold, or to engage in short-term but highly lucrative commercial business rather than to invest in industry. One reason for this attitude has been the policy of the Turkish Government, which for the past twenty years has hedged private business about with a variety of legal and administrative restrictions, and has established State monopolies and State-owned and -operated enterprises which live under artificially favorable conditions and with which no private enterprise could hope to compete on fair terms. Aside from suspicion of the Government, other factors have inhibited private investment: the lack of medium- or long-term money; excessive interest rates; lack of knowledge of and

© WILLIAM DIAMOND accompanied the International Bank consultant, Harold F. Johnson, to Turkey in February and March 1950 for the discussions with Turkish government and private interests which led to the establishment of the Industrial Bank. Mr. Diamond was co-author of the article "TVA's in the Middle East" which appeared in the January issue of *The Middle East Journal*.

experience with capital organization; lack of administrative and technical experience; and lack of foreign exchange with which to import equipment and supplies.

During the past few years the Turkish Government, for a variety of political and economic reasons, became acutely aware of this situation, indicated a wish to veer away from its traditional policy of *étatism*, and in frequent public statements declared a policy to encourage private efforts and to restrict the entrepreneurial activities of the State.

In the fall of 1949 both the Turkish Government and private interests in Turkey joined in asking the assistance of the International Bank in working out a plan to stimulate the productive investment of private capital. Both groups apparently felt, Mr. Black reported, "that our participation in such a program, as an independent party friendly to both, would help allay the distrust that each tends to feel for the other." Accordingly, the International Bank sent a consultant to Turkey in October and November to explore, in discussion with all concerned, the means of bringing private capital into useful investment and of marrying the funds thus released with the technical skill needed for efficient industrial investment. The upshot of that mission was the project for an industrial bank whose share capital would be private, but which would receive assistance in the form of loans from both the Turkish Central Bank and the International Bank and would have a technical staff to study loan applications and to aid the bank's clients in carrying out their projects. The outline of the plan generated a considerable amount of enthusiasm, particularly among private interests. In February and March of this year, the International Bank's representative returned to Turkey to help work out the details of the plan. The result was the establishment of the Industrial Development Bank.

The new bank is capitalized at TL 12.5 million, the equivalent of \$4.5 million. The shares (in units of TL 100 each) have been subscribed by 18 groups, including 13 private banks, 2 textile enterprises, and 3 commercial and industrial organizations. This subscription is widely representative of Turkish business. The banks include the country's largest,

and account for 82 percent of the total capital of Turkey's private banks; the most important foreign banks operating in Turkey are also members of the consortium. The business organizations are the Union of Industrialists of Adana and the Chamber of Commerce and Bourse of Istanbul.

It is understood that the shares held by the participating banks will soon be put on public sale, so as to disperse ownership and foster the development of a securities market in Turkey. There is reason to believe that a fair portion of the capital will be taken up by the public, for interest in the Industrial Bank has been widespread.

The share capital of the Industrial Bank will earn a maximum dividend of 12 percent, which is considerably less than capital can now earn in Turkey. The purpose of limiting dividends is to assure that a growing volume of business will be reflected, not in excessive profits to the shareholders, but in the building up of reserves and in the gradual lowering of the Bank's interest rate, and thus to give the Bank something of the character of a public service corporation. Observers in Turkey feel that the relatively low rate of interest to be charged by the Bank and its gradual downward trend will have a depressing effect on all interest rates — and will thus indirectly stimulate business activity generally.

To balance this ceiling on dividends, the Turkish Government, by a law enacted in mid-March, has guaranteed a minimum dividend of 6 percent for a period of five years. It is unlikely that shareholders will, in the initial years, get much more than this guaranteed minimum. Advances made by the Government to pay such dividends will not be a gift to the Industrial Bank but a loan to be repaid out of net profits in later years.

The Bank's share capital will be supplemented by additional local currency and by foreign exchange. The Central Bank of Turkey has undertaken to purchase the bonds of the Industrial Bank up to the limit of the latter's share capital; and Mr. Black has stated that if all arrangements are satisfactory, the International Bank will be prepared to lend the new Bank at least part of the foreign exchange cost of the projects it finances. The total resources of the Industrial Bank, in

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foreign exchange and local currency, are thus expected to reach about the equivalent of TL 50 million.

The purposes of the Industrial Bank are to aid in the establishment of new and in the expansion or modernization of existing private industrial enterprises, to stimulate the investment of private foreign and domestic capital in Turkish industry, and to help develop a market in Turkey for industrial securities. To accomplish these ends, its statutes empower the Bank to grant medium- and long-term loans, to take equity participations, and, if desirable, to establish and operate enterprises of its own. In the latter two cases, however, the Bank will sell its holdings as quickly as practicable in order to disperse ownership and to recover its funds for additional operations. (Earnings from the Bank's participations will in the long run also help it reduce its interest rate.) The Bank will thus tap private hoards of capital twice: once in the sale of its own shares, and again by offering inducements to private capitalists to invest in productive enterprises.

The ownership of the Bank is entirely private and its funds will be used only to aid private industry. Its management will also be entirely private, without representation of the Turkish Government. Full authority over policy and operations is vested in a 7-man Board of Directors chosen from among the shareholders. The first Board, already selected, is a combination of able, active, and independent men rarely found in Turkish corporate boards, which all too frequently consist of inactive pensioners under the domination of a vigorous General Manager. The quality of this Board is one of the keys to the success of the new bank.

The second key lies in the nature of the Bank's management, one of the heads of which will be a foreigner experienced in industrial management and investment banking. Under his direction will be a staff of technicians, some of whom will also be recruited abroad. This technical staff is expected to act in several ways, all essential in a country with so little industrial experience as Turkey. It will aid prospective clients to prepare their plans and make their loan applications. It will carefully screen these loan applications, and the Board

of Directors will rely on its recommendations. After a loan is made, the technical staff will check on the projects for which the Bank's funds have been used throughout the life of the loan. Finally, in appropriate cases, clients may be required to accept the assistance and advice of the staff in such fields as engineering, management, and accounting. In this way the Industrial Bank will be assured of effective use of its funds; at the same time, with a proper sugar-coating of money, know-how will be injected into Turkish industry.

Not least among the advantages expected of the Bank is the aid it will be able to give to foreign capital wishing to invest in Turkey. The Bank will have a large store of information on local conditions and regulations to place at the disposal of foreign investors; it will be in a good position to match local opportunities with foreign capital and to bring local and foreign capital together; and its strength and unique character in Turkey may permit it to intercede with the Government in clearing away obstacles that might still lie in the way of private investment, both domestic and foreign, in Turkey.

The success of this experiment will prove a great boon to Turkey; for aside from bringing significant quantities of idle capital into productive use, it will provide the knowledge and experience necessary to make that capital effective. Great interest has already been shown in borrowing for textile, food-processing, cement, and other industrial enterprises. Such enterprises would give a new impetus to Turkey's economic development.

The progress of the new bank is also being watched carefully outside Turkey, in other similarly situated countries. The International Bank is interested in the project, not only for its impact on Turkey, but also for its possibilities as a model that might be followed or adapted in other countries. The Industrial Development Bank is a rare instance in which private capital, Government, and an international agency are acting in unison to encourage private capital investment, and the resources and incentives thus created are being combined with expert technical and managerial skills.

As Mr. Black put it, "Technical advice alone is not sufficient to bring about economic

development, nor is financial assistance. What is needed is a combination of the two, so that the granting of development loans is coupled with the provision of acceptable technical help and advice over a long enough period to assure

that the improved pattern is firmly established." The Industrial Development Bank may prove to be the kind of combination of money and technique so urgently needed in underdeveloped countries.

A Summary of Activities of the Food and Agriculture Organization in the Middle East

Norris E. Dodd

IT IS A LONG-RANGE AIM of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) to assist the Middle East to raise more than enough food to keep pace with its population growth. To accomplish this, it will be necessary to concentrate first on changing inefficient methods of cultivation by simple and fairly quick improvements. The next step will be to give attention to large-scale developments in irrigation, land rehabilitation, hydroelectric power and the like; and finally to work toward the improvement of trade and the overcoming of currency difficulties.

The agricultural system in the Middle East is deeply influenced by tradition, and still maintains basically the pattern developed by the earliest civilizations. An even greater obstacle to rapid change is the physical environment—the climate and the character of the land. It is difficult to appraise what sort of agriculture may come out of the economic transformation the Middle East will certainly go through during the next generation. FAO, in its work in the region, thus comes with the feeling that the Middle East is a place of challenging possibilities.

Active technical work by FAO in its 11 Middle East member countries¹ began in De-

cember 1947. In all, until the first of 1950, more than 40 FAO officers and technical experts had visited one or more of these countries; 4 regional conferences had been held; and 2 statistical training centers had been conducted, one in Baghdad and the other in Cairo.

ACTIVITIES OF FAO SPECIALISTS

The first four specialists sent to the region by FAO travelled through Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq, surveying and advising on problems of irrigation, drainage, animal husbandry, and crop production under irrigation conditions. Mr. S. Easter, an FAO entomologist, made an extensive study of grain storage in Egypt, summarizing his observations in a report to the Egyptian Government. FAO sent another entomologist, Dr. C. Logothetis, to carry out preliminary studies on locust control: he visited Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Turkey, and prepared a summary on plant protection studies in the Middle East which was basic to the International Conference on the Moroccan Locust held in September 1949 in Beirut, Lebanon. In March 1949, FAO sent Mr. J. H. Stover, an engi-

(on behalf of Somaliland). The Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan has applied for FAO membership. Turkey is under the European office. FAO's work in the Middle East is centered in its Near East Regional Office in Cairo. His Excellency M. T. Hefnawy Pasha of Egypt is Regional Representative for the Director-General and heads the work of the office.

¹ Afghanistan, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, United Kingdom (on behalf of Aden and Aden Protectorate, Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, Cyprus, Cyrenaica, Eritrea, Somaliland, and Tripolitania), and France

© NORRIS E. DODD is Director General of the UN's Food and Agriculture Organization, having been named to that post in April 1948. For the two years previous to his appointment he served as Under Secretary of Agriculture, and attended, as head of the U. S. delegation, a number of FAO conferences. In January 1948 he was named chairman of the U. S. delegation to the International Wheat Council.

neering specialist in fertilizer plants, to Egypt, Lebanon, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia to make investigations and proposals for the erection of nitrogen plants in places where the necessary power is close at hand, with a view to making the Middle East self-supporting in this important agricultural requisite. Technical specialists have also studied such particular problems as combating cotton leaf worm, finding methods of processing and preserving agricultural products, and improving grasslands. Strains of hybrid corn and other seeds of plants and trees have been made available to some of the governments and are now being tested.

In the current year, FAO has sent technical specialists to Iran and Afghanistan to assist against outbreaks of rinderpest. Directors of the forestry, fisheries, and nutrition divisions have also visited the region to advise on specialized problems. A statistics expert is spending three months in the field to help the Middle East governments formulate targets of production, trade, and consumption for 1952-53. As a follow-up of the international locust conference, an entomologist will spend several months in the region to assist governments on locust and other entomological problems.

FAO activity in Ethiopia has been extensive. In 1947 it received a request from the Ethiopian Government to continue the agricultural services formerly carried on by the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA). In compliance, FAO has engaged in rinderpest control, cotton development, and other advisory services. Three veterinarians have taken part in the anti-rinderpest program, and a biologics specialist is now also going there to assist in the development of a pleuro-pneumonia vaccine. Thus far, close to 100,000 cattle have been vaccinated. The importance of the cotton development program, in which a tropical agriculturalist and a cotton specialist are engaged, is suggested by the fact that cotton now represents about 60 percent of the value of all Ethiopia's imports. An FAO small industries specialist was sent to make recommendations for improving the processing of agricultural products. Advisory service in agricultural education has also been

given — Ethiopia is now planning to establish an agricultural college in Addis Ababa.

REGIONAL CONFERENCES

First of the FAO meetings held in the area was the Near East Regional Conference in Cairo, February 2-14, 1948. Delegates emphasized regional needs for nutrition education, better food distribution, improved food preservation and storage, feeding programs for schools, cleaner and sufficient water supplies, better control of livestock diseases and pests, and better feeding and breeding methods. Recognizing that the basic factor of increased production in the region is irrigation, Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq presented plans for irrigation and drainage projects.

By recommendation of this conference, FAO proceeded in March 1948 to open a statistical school in Baghdad, directed by Mr. T. C. M. Robinson of the U. S. Department of Agriculture. Classes were held for five weeks, with 39 students (all government employees) attending from Iraq, Egypt, Syria, and Lebanon. In October 1949 another statistical training center was opened in Cairo under the joint sponsorship of FAO, the Egyptian Government, and the United Nations, for a two-month course. This center was attended by 29 trainees from Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Ethiopia, and Cyprus, also all employees of their governments. The purpose of these centers was to improve the statistical information concerning Middle East countries by instructing in census and statistics techniques. The Cairo center, in particular, stressed information on the international recommendations for agricultural and population censuses to be taken by many countries in or around 1950.

The Cairo Regional Conference also recognized the threat which the Moroccan locust posed, and recommended that FAO call a special regional conference on this subject. The Conference was accordingly called in the fall of 1949, and came to the conclusion that emphasis should be on measures to prevent outbreaks of the plague rather than on details concerning direct control measures. The Conference advised the early establishment of a permanent regional organization to implement its technical recommendations.

In April 1949 FAO convened an informal meeting of representatives of Middle East countries in Cairo for discussions on nutrition problems, a proposal for a nutrition school, and plans for the 1950 world census of agriculture. This meeting produced a better understanding among Middle East member nations of the aims and capabilities of FAO, opening the way for more frequent use of the facilities and assistance offered by the Organization.

Middle East countries of FAO assembled again in the fall of 1949 at Beirut, Lebanon, for the first of the regional pre-conference meetings. Forthcoming recommendations included those to improve quarantine regulations; establish national nutrition organizations; establish stations for testing and increasing production of improved seeds; and make surveys of soil and water resources available for irrigation development. The importance of arrangements for giving Middle East students advanced training abroad in basic aspects of agriculture was emphasized.

REQUESTS FOR ASSISTANCE

A number of Middle East countries have approached FAO individually on agricultural projects for the proposed expanded program of technical assistance. These form a good guide to the development now taking place in the region, or in early prospect, and a summary of them follows:

Egypt: assistance in planning grain storage facilities; and in finding specialists for direct employment to assist in combating cotton leaf worm and in improving irrigation and drainage facilities.

Iran: help in controlling a rinderpest outbreak, a request which has been met by FAO on a temporary basis.

Iraq: help in finding specialists whom it can hire directly for planned agricultural programs. Requests may be forthcoming for assistance in production of rinderpest vaccines, and in obtaining seeds for experimental purposes.

Lebanon: need for outside specialists to develop various aspects of a proposed agricultural experiment station and its extension service. A fisheries survey may also be requested.

Syria: help in obtaining seeds for experiments and in setting up tests of grasses and legumes for range improvement.

Turkey: technical assistance in the production of rinderpest vaccines, and, tentatively, help in other animal diseases. The government has also shown interest in getting assistance in improving animal fodder crops, and it has formally asked for the services of a nutrition officer to advise on national food policies and nutrition services.

Ethiopia: tentatively, a specialist for preliminary work in testing the feasibility of dry land cotton production. A preliminary request has also been made for study of possibilities of developing the wild coffee of Western Ethiopia.

A need for aid in forest development and reforestation plans has been indicated by Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, and Israel. Advice is also sought on the industrial aspects of forest development.

Egypt, Syria, and Lebanon have shown interest in receiving advice on extension work in home economics, and the development of handicrafts for rural women.

Arrangements have been made with Syria and Lebanon for their officials to study co-operatives in Cyprus this year, and later for their countries to be visited by consultants on cooperative plans and developments.

DEVELOPMENT NEEDS

Nearly all countries of the Middle East region have announced plans for their future development, showing specific amounts of money estimated as needed for investment. The projected total investment for the Middle East, as tabulated by FAO for the Fifth Session of the Conference in Washington, D. C., November-December 1949, was the equivalent of \$2,136 million (before sterling devaluation). Of this, projected agricultural investment amounted to \$598 million for the entire region, the larger investment requirements being as follows:

Iran	\$215 million
Israel	105 "
Turkey	101 "
Lebanon	70 "
Saudi Arabia	50 "
Egypt	23 "

These projects cover many specific developments, but in general can be lumped under water control projects, improvement of trans-

port and communications, food processing, storage and marketing, and related industrial development.

Quite apart from this planned investment, technical experts have made estimates of the investments needed for feasible agricultural development projects in the Middle East. These estimates are as follows:

Irrigation and drainage.....	\$117 million
Farm machinery	200 "
Fertilizer plants	147 "
Wheat milling equipment.....	6 "
Rice milling equipment.....	900,000
Grain storage	43 million
Development of fisheries.....	20 "
Development of forest operation and protection	14 "

All of these estimates are based on a development period of ten years, and although tentative, they show clearly the challenge facing Middle East countries and the investment prospects for agricultural work.

ARAB REFUGEE PROBLEM

FAO has only indirectly played a part in the Arab refugee question which has disrupted food conditions and agricultural development in parts of the region for several years. In September 1948 FAO was asked by the UN Relief for Palestine Refugees to make a survey of the food position in Middle East countries in view of this particular need. The mission was carried out by Dr. L. E. Kirk of the FAO agriculture division, and Dr. A. Abbasy, FAO's Middle East nutrition officer. Dr. Abbasy was later assigned temporarily to work with the American Friends Service Committee as an adviser in relief work the organization was rendering Palestine Arab refugees. In September 1949 Dr. Kirk was sent again to the refugee area as a member of the UN Economic Survey Mission for the Middle East, to advise on agronomic and related agricultural matters.

BOOK REVIEWS

Recent Trends in Turkish Historical Writing

Sherif Mardin

THERE ARE FEW better indexes to the world outlook of a nation than its historical literature. In keeping with this dictum, Turkish historical writing tends to reflect the changes in political philosophy that have occurred in Turkey during the last twenty years. This tendency is particularly marked because political changes have been associated with a strong cultural revolution, certain aspects of which prospered as the result of official encouragement.

The immediate effect of the establishment of the Turkish Republic, insofar as general cultural activity is concerned, was a negative one: an estrangement from the ideals of Ottomanism and Ottoman culture. This was not a new trend but the culmination of a movement that had started early in the 20th century. At that time cultural Turkism, the more serious twin of utopian pan-Turkism, had successfully edged out cultural Ottomanism. The emphasis on the uniqueness and high cultural development of early Turkic societies was an intellectual current strong enough to emerge as the outstanding trend after the fate of the Ottoman Empire had been sealed. The new government had no objections to this movement so long as it remained purely cultural. On the contrary, it was encouraged in the belief that Turkism as an ideology would give the people that sense of purpose necessary to the period of reconstruction that lay ahead.

The momentum of this encouragement reached its maximum expression in the early 'thirties, when the policy of autarchy on which the Turkish Government had embarked heightened the need — or so it was believed in official quarters — to infuse the Turkish people with an ideology. Several steps were consequently

taken to emphasize the study of the history of non-Ottoman Turks in general, and in particular the study of the Turanian basin and the cultures that originated therein. In 1931 the Turkish Historical Society was created, and in 1932 the first Turkish Historical Congress was held. By 1937 the bulk of Turkish historical literature dealt with the early history of the Turks, and scholars like Semettin Günaltay (defeated as Prime Minister in the May 1950 general elections) had elaborated a theory which traced the oldest civilizations of the world to the people who had lived in the Turanian basin of Central Asia, supposed to be the original home of the Turks. A so-called Sun Theory of the origin of languages (*Günes Dil Teorisi*) was appended to this Turanian view of history, and numerous philological-historical investigations were initiated to define the nature of "pure" Turkish. A national language reform was started which involved the elimination of Persian and Arabic words and their replacement by Turkish terms.

It is only fair to point out that these activities, by opening up the little explored field of Turkish folklore, had their genuine aspects; also that serious scholars did not lose their interest in Ottoman history. The positive influence of a few brilliant linguists could be seen as a vague shadow behind the more stereotyped, although often useful, activities of the Türk Dil Kurumu (Turkish Language Foundation). Moreover, several accomplished authors, of whom Fuat Köprülü (the present Foreign Minister) is an outstanding example, had a sufficiently secure and independent position of their own not to be forced to identify themselves with the "party line."

With this perspective one can account for

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the flowering of studies on Ottoman history that came about in the 'forties, following the death of Atatürk. Its first manifestation was the publication of works investigating political developments in the 19th century. In this class are such books as Ibnulein Mahmud Kemal, *Son Sadrazamlar (The Last Grand Viziers)* (6 vols., Istanbul, 1940-45); M. Zeki Pakalın, *Son Sadrazamlar ve Basvekiller (The Last Grand Viziers and Prime Ministers)* (5 vols., Istanbul, 1940-45) and a compendium of studies about the Tanzimat (*Tanzimat: Yüzüncü Yıldönümü Münasebetile [The Tanzimat: On the Occasion of Its Hundredth Anniversary]*, Istanbul, 1940). This last volume, based on primary material, brought together for the first time many of the facets of the Turkish reform movement of the 19th century. These were followed by Recai Okandan, *Amme Hukuku Tarihimizde Birinci Mesrutiyet Devri ve Karakteristik Vasiyatlari [The Period and Characteristics of the First Constitution in the History of Turkish Constitutional Law]* (Istanbul, 1941), which in 1948 was expanded into a treatise on Turkish constitutional history: *Umumi Amme Hukukumuza Giriş [An Introduction to General Turkish Constitutional Law]* (Istanbul, 1948). Although repetitive in parts, this book is unique for its wealth of information about 19th century Turkish politics.

Complementary to this concern with the 19th century was a renewed interest in the history of the Committee of Union and Progress. By 1939 Turkey had changed so much that what was actually only recent history seemed an altogether different era to the new generation. The historical material that dealt with the rise to power of the Committee had had a chance to cool, and issues that had not been approached by scholars upon the founding of the Republic because they involved personalities who were still in the limelight were no longer explosive. Under these circumstances it was both necessary and possible to investigate this field. The two most interesting contributions have been the rather unscholarly but informative books by A. Bedevi Kur'an, *Inkilap Tarihimiz ve Jön Türkler [The History of the Turkish Revolution and the Young Turks]* (Istanbul, 1945), and *Inkilap Tarihimiz ve İttalat ve Terakki [The History of the Turk-*

ish Revolution and the Committee of Union and Progress] (Istanbul, 1948). The author had his own political axe to grind, but from someone who had been personally involved in the Young Turkish movement, the presentation was certainly as fair as could be expected. Ahmet Bedevi was a member of that ill-fated minority group within the ranks of the Young Turks led by Prince Sabahettin, whose role is seldom mentioned by Turkish publicists and who is almost completely ignored by current books on Turkey published in Europe or the U. S. Inspired by the Anglo-Saxon model of a decentralized constitutional government, Prince Sabahettin waged a one man war against the centralizing tendencies of the Young Turks and lost. In 1911 he was exiled. Later, after the end of World War I, his participation in the government of the Sultan at a time when the civil war was going on cast a shadow on his personality. To erase this shadow and bring out the truly democratic currents that existed among the Young Turks was Bedevi's purpose in writing his histories.

To this interest in recent Ottoman history was added a further interest in the early Ottoman Empire. There is little doubt that the recent publications of Ismail Hakkı Uzuncarsılı in this field—his *Osmanlı Devlet Teskilatına Methâl [Introduction to the Political Organization of the Ottoman State]* (Istanbul, 1941), and his *Osmanlı Devletinin Saray Teskilatı [The Organization of the Palace in the Ottoman State]* (Ankara, 1945)—bring forth a great deal of information in a comparatively unexplored area. In this line is also Ismail Hamdi Danismend, *İsaaklı Osmanlı Tarihi Kronolojisi [An Annotated Chronology of Ottoman History]* (Istanbul, 1947), which concentrates on one of the least studied periods of Ottoman history: that between the first appearance of the Ottomans and the death of Sultan Bayazid I in 1403. This book is the first in a series planned by the publishers to include histories of the Ottoman Empire hitherto unavailable to the Turkish student, either because they were printed in Arabic characters or because they only exist in manuscript form.

During both the 'thirties and the 'forties not a single scholarly study of the origins of the Turkish Republic was undertaken. The Insti-

tute for the Study of the Turkish Revolution did good work collecting documents relating to the Turkish War of Independence and published several monographs of limited scope, but no appreciable contribution to the study of the era as a whole appeared. The famous six-day speech of Ataturk (*A Speech Delivered by Ghazi Mustapha Kemal, President of the Turkish Republic, October 1927* [Leipzig, 1929]), in which he gave a history of the nationalist movement, still stands out as a work of synthesis which has no competitors. The difficulty here—that of treading on political toes—kept the publications on the history of the Turkish Republic at the level of panegyrics. It is only recently that an informal study by Samet Ağaoglu, *Kuvayi Milliye Ruhu* [Forces of the National Spirit] (Istanbul, 1944) brought back to the reading public the forgotten spirit of the Turkish nationalist movement. This spirit is to a certain degree recaptured also by one of the more interesting books on Turkish diplomatic history: Ali Naci Karacan, *Lozan Konferansi ve Ismet Pasa* [The Lausanne Conference and Ismet Pasha] (Istanbul, 1943). This book, which does not boast to be anything beyond a "factual reporting" of the Lausanne Conference, certainly exceeds its modest mark, for it is an entertaining as well as complete guide to the negotiations.

The problem of the Straits, which stood out as one of the more important questions at Lausanne, is placed in historical perspective by a more recent publication based on rich documentation drawn from both Turkish and foreign sources: Cemal Tukin, *Osmansı İmparatorluğu Devrinde Boğazlar Meselesi* [The Question of the Straits during the Period of the Ottoman Empire] (Istanbul, 1947). Here is a book which for once achieves a high standard in terms of organization and presentation of material; it is as easy to use for reference as to read. It is indeed unfortunate that

more of even the best Turkish publications in the field of history do not pay sufficient attention to this question of organization.

It is interesting to note that one of the more complete studies of the history of the Turks of Central Asia was also published during this last decade: Zeki Velidi Togan, *Büyük Türkili (Turkistan) ve yakın Tarihi* [The Present Land of the Turks and Its Recent History] (Istanbul, 1942-47). This contribution was not the result of official encouragement (the manuscript had been written in 1929); on the contrary, it was written by a scholar who disagreed with the policy of the Historical Congress of 1932. While concentrating heavily on the early history of Turkestan, the book brings the story up to 1929. One of its main contributions is its study of an important problem in Central Asian history: the relation between city dwellers and nomads, and its bearing on the sociological phenomenon of semi-nomadism. Another interesting contribution is the book's discussion of the shifting pattern of trade routes in Central Asia.

Even a superficial survey of Turkish historical literature would not be complete without mention being made of an extremely useful manual published by Ibrahim Alaettin Gövsa, *Türk Meshurları Ansiklopedisi* [An Encyclopedia of Famous Turks] (Istanbul, 1946). This biographical dictionary of famous Turks covers the entire span of Turkish history and includes famous Seljuk and Ottoman Turks as well as Turks from Iran and Central Asia. Emphasis is placed on contemporary Turkish personalities, the bulk of the biographies being on individuals of the 19th and 20th centuries. Final mention must also be made of the still continuing Turkish translation of the *Encyclopedia of Islam*, under the able editorship of Abdulhak Adnan Adivar, in which articles on Turkish personalities or involving Turkish affairs are being rewritten and expanded by Turkish scholars.

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GENERAL

Final Report of the United Nations Economic Survey Mission for the Middle East: An Approach to Economic Development in the Middle East. Lake Success: United Nations, 1949. 2 vols., 103+74 pages. Vol. 1: \$1.00. Vol. 2: \$8.0.

The document under review incorporates both the final and interim reports of the UN Economic Survey Mission for the Middle East (Clapp Mission) and a series of Appendices dealing with a range of financial, economic, and technical matters affecting the Middle East countries.

For the research worker, the Appendices are especially valuable because they include a considerable amount of information otherwise not readily available in a concise and readable form. That entitled "Financial Survey" presents in summary form a most interesting and readable résumé of the difficulties which are faced in the development of backward areas. In this short space of some 25 pages, this Appendix incorporates statistical data and analyses on budgets, fiscal policies, banking facilities, sources of investment funds and other financial aspects of the development problem. The scope of the analysis is necessarily limited but it is comprehensive enough at least to give the reader a reasonable sense of proportion concerning the magnitude of the job. The Appendix dealing with the nature and character of technical surveys certainly raises a lot of questions, and shows how extensive and thorough the aggregate surveys must be. The Engineering and Agricultural reports also incorporate extremely valuable documentation with respect to the Middle East.

The whole problem of the development of backward areas, which is the underlying objective of the United States Government's Point Four Program, is inherently part and parcel of the contents of the final report of the Economic Survey Mission. Generally, it is agreed that there are two requirements essential for initiating and accelerating modern economic development in the less advanced countries. The first requirement is that of technical assistance, which involves skills and know-how and the general ability of the community to orient itself to 20th century eco-

nomic conditions and take full advantage of 20th century opportunities stemming from the great technological developments of recent years. The second requirement is that of an adequate supply of capital, or the productive equipment and man-made resources essential for increased productivity and production.

The role of technical assistance in development programs is too often passed over or given superficial consideration. Yet it is obvious that the pouring of the most modern complicated industrial plant into a backward area would be absurd without appropriate training of employees, employers, and government personnel, not only for running the machines but for handling all of the complicated financial, accounting, transportation, and administrative matters necessarily incidental to operations which commonly characterize industrial activities in the more advanced communities of the world.

The Economic Survey Mission's final Report emphasizes again and again both the obstacles and limitations related to this matter of technical and scientific knowledge, and the great need for such knowledge. It is certainly one of the most intelligent and meaningful discussions of this subject yet to appear. However, the real issue lies not so much in questioning the competence on the part of the people to develop their countries, but rather on the question of the rate at which this competence and skill can be developed.

It has been my good fortune to travel in considerable parts of the world in recent years. I have been depressed by the backwardness in many areas, but also greatly impressed by the capacities which almost all peoples demonstrate when given an opportunity and an environment within which to learn and gain experience. It is my feeling that the Economic Survey Mission, while properly and thoroughly recognizing the role of personal competence, has been overly pessimistic in its underlying views on the length of time required to achieve this competence. It is appropriate to be entirely realistic and give utmost emphasis to the limitations and obstacles which will be encountered, but it is equally essential to concentrate on the techniques and the devices which will minimize the time interval required for appropriate training and needed experience. The Survey

Mission had to do a big job in a short space of time, and the magnitude of its task must have been almost overwhelming. The environment in which the Mission worked, especially the political atmosphere, seems to have had a somewhat depressive effect, perhaps unduly.

It was the deep concern with this matter of technical ability which led the Mission to submit a list of very limited pilot projects for demonstration purposes as the starting point for economic development in the Middle East countries. The *Report* is completely consistent, but if a bit more hope and optimism had emerged it would have led to more and perhaps increasingly diversified projects. If the *Report* represents only a scheme for a year or so, then it is appropriate and valuable. However, the whole approach in this general area must be one which looks ahead for a decade or so, and relative to such a goal there are serious limitations to its scope and program.

With respect to the second major requirement for the economic development of the backward areas, namely, capital, the *Report* is modest in its proposals and properly so, in view of its emphasis on the technical deficiencies. There is no point in making money available for the procurement of modern industrial equipment when this equipment cannot be used. However, not all fields of economic activity fall into the same category and I am confident that for irrigation developments, road building and improvements, health and educational facilities, some agricultural equipment and the like, the capital requirements may be pushed even a little faster than one can foresee the emergence of personal capacity to take the fullest advantage of these facilities. The less-developed nations do not have sufficient production and income to divert a large amount of output to capital formation. They require an excess of imports over exports. They require investment from abroad, whether private or public. It is not just a matter of more foreign trade. It is a matter of excess exports by the more developed nations and excess imports by the less developed nations.

We are faced with a daring objective in the whole Point Four Program. Therefore, we must be daring in projecting the rate at which

both personal abilities can be developed and capital resources effectively utilized. On the whole, the *Report* of the Economic Survey Mission is an extremely valuable document not only for what it contains but even more for the questions and the issues that it poses on which others may ponder and move ahead.

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Going to Jerusalem, by Willie Snow Ethridge.
New York: The Vanguard Press, 1950.
313 pages. \$3.50.

Mrs. Ethridge's contribution to the literature on the Palestine question has one unique virtue: in describing her ignorance of the Palestine situation at the outset of her travels, she illustrates a failing common — though not admittedly — to most of her fellow citizens. Despite a very active role the United States has assumed in determining the fate of this area, the majority of Americans are operating on the "thimbleful of knowledge" which Mrs. Ethridge professed to be her own: a vague, charitable satisfaction that at long last the Jews have a place to call their home; and a vision of the Arabs as mysterious nomads with no particular claim to the land of Palestine.

Having arrived in the Middle East in this state of ignorance, Mrs. Ethridge energetically set about to remedy it. She evidently read considerably about the area, and travelled widely with her husband, Mark Ethridge, United States representative on the UN Palestine Conciliation Commission. Despite her air of frivolity, she was painstaking in noting the essential background of peoples and situations as she found them.

The resulting narrative is one of the few appearing currently in America even to concede that there is an Arab side to the Palestine question. While others, at best, go off into misty musings about the "complexity" of the problem, Mrs. Ethridge seems to react quickly to certain basic facts: hundreds of thousands of Palestinian Arabs have been thrown out of their rightful home; various nations, including the United States, having helped to bring this about, are accomplishing little for the hapless

victims. In trying to correct one wrong, they have created another.

Mrs. Ethridge was introduced to the plight of the Arab refugees in the camps housing some 6,000 of them at Baalbek in Lebanon. Anyone who has seen the utter misery and helplessness of the refugees crowded in and around these dismal barracks can appreciate the shock she felt. On that occasion, Mrs. Ethridge overheard a Red Cross worker decline to view some refugees living in caves with the comment, "No, I have seen plenty of refugees living in caves and my time is short." The complete hopelessness of the situation causes a kind of bitter resignation.

Even during her travels in Israel, Mrs. Ethridge could not dismiss from her mind the spectre of the Arab refugees. She visited much in the new state of Israel, liked and admired the people, had great respect for the devoted efforts of the collective farm workers, and applauded the remarkable energy of the pioneers. Yet she commented: "No matter how enthusiastic I waxed over the accomplishments of the Israelis, let someone mention the Arab refugees and I did a flip-flop."

In view of her consistent concern for the Arabs, the final chapter of her book shows a curious switch of emphasis. Here she dismisses them with the brief remark that peace is vitally important to both sides, then turns her attention exclusively to the Israelis. The last chapter is wholly devoted to an outline of the economic problems facing Israel, with its hugely expanding population of indigent immigrants, its tremendous expenses for defense and development, and its precarious balance of payments situation. She makes no further reference to the still unsolved problem of providing compensation for the Arabs, or of resettling the 700,000 refugees in some sort of homes. This final chapter seems much more a deviation from the pattern of the narrative than a conclusion to it.

Going to Jerusalem will attract many readers who wish merely to be beguiled by Mrs. Ethridge's latest travelogue. A large portion of the book is given over to brisk, personalized descriptions and uninhibited comments on per-

sons, places, and institutions which she discovered in the world of the Middle East.

ANNE KNIGHT
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Mediterranean Background, by Bernard Newman. London: Robert Hale, 1949. 286 pages. 16s.

Reading Newman's *Mediterranean Background* is a painful experience from which, it is to be hoped, other readers will be mercifully spared. It can be of no possible use to the student of the Mediterranean scene, as the author himself seems to have suspected, and it is to be doubted that it will contribute anything worthwhile to "the ordinary man and woman," whom Mr. Newman professes to have had in mind. Superficial to a degree seldom encountered, it is distinguished chiefly for "travelogish," gossipy inanities appearing under such edifying sub-titles as "Snippets from Spain," "Trifles from Tunisia," "Items from Italy," "Limnings from Libya," "Gleanings from Greece," "Cuttings from Cyprus," "Excerpts from Egypt," and "Points from Palestine." One suspects that only the limitations of alliteration can explain the absence of similar sections for Yugoslavia, France, Gibraltar, Malta, and Turkey, which are likewise included in the text. There are so many minor errors of fact and so many faulty generalizations on major questions that it would be literally impossible to deal with them in a review. It may well be that the uninstructed tourist visiting the Mediterranean for the first time will find something here to stimulate his interest, but if he seeks knowledge and understanding at the same time, *Mediterranean Background* will be found wanting.

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ARABIA

Arabian Journey: And Other Desert Travels,
by Gerald de Gaury. London: George Har-

rap and Co., Ltd., 1950. 190 pages. 58 photographs, maps. 12s.

When Colonel de Gaury's *A Saudi Arabian Notebook* was printed in Cairo in 1943, it was hoped that students of Arabia would soon reap further benefits from his authority on this part of the Middle East. Three years later his *Arabian Phoenix* was published in London. Now his *Arabian Journey* has come close to fulfilling that hope.

The object of the book, which includes chapters on Iraq and Kufra, is to recapture some light from the Arabian past. If the Bedouin remained a stranger to the idea of progress, it was because he had no wish to change his lot. His pride assured him that he embodied the consummate pattern of created beings; he believed himself much happier than civilized man. Colonel de Gaury has "caught and painted the days that are gone." The old way of life first began to fade quickly between the two world wars — the beginning may be dated from the oil concessions of 1935.

During the early days of World War II Colonel de Gaury held a British Government appointment in Saudi Arabia. Fortunately he was not too busy to record his impressions of life in the towns and deserts of the Hijaz and Najd. The first part of the book gives details of his life as a guest of King Ibn Saud. His former customs of drinking, smoking, newspaper-reading and telephoning were soon forgotten and he found himself taking easily to the innumerable cups of coffee, the audiences with the King, riding, hawking, and shooting gazelles. He found time to study Arabian saddlery, and the habitats of the oryx and the ostrich, and to comment on the observations of earlier explorers. The Bedouin character to which he devotes a good deal of space, he found unbelievably patient under physical hardship; but he found the volatile Arabian a child of the climate, giving way to sudden rages and excesses.

From Riyad the author moved with the King's camp out to the edge of the Dahana sands near Hafr al-Ats. Life here was simpler than in the Wahabi capital and de Gaury's interests turned to the Bedouin folk tales sometimes rendered more romantic when chanted to

the strains of the *rababa*. Later he explored the mountains west of the King's camp and afterwards went down to al-Karj. He then travelled with the King's retinue, to the limits of the holy area around Mecca, and thence to Jedda.

In this easily readable book, Colonel de Gaury has kept his narrative free from politics, choosing rather to emphasize economic and social problems. It is obvious that he has, as many do who come into close contact with the Saudi monarch, a high regard for the character of Ibn Saud, who once smilingly said to him: "In reality I abhor all foreigners. I would have none of them. The best of them are the British and they — I would that they were on the far shore of a sea of flame and fire."

De Gaury's efforts to enter the Yemen were unsuccessful, and from Jidda, where "the lapping of the tide does not clean the stinking coral reefs or scour the shallow lagoons," he travelled overland through Lith, Qunfida, al-Birk, and Jizan, whence he took ship to Kamaran. His journey, reminiscent of those of Alan Villiers, was no easy one, for the dhow in which he sailed capsized and his arrival at Kamaran was somewhat unorthodox. The second part of *Arabian Journey* describes this coastal expedition and gives some interesting observations on the slave and pearl trades of the Red Sea.

The "other desert travels" of the subtitle were made in Iraq and Southern Libya. The last two parts of the book contain an account of the author's experiences in Iraq during the revolt of 1941, and a disappointing description of Kufra. Somehow de Gaury does not seem to have caught the true spirit of that sweltering oasis after its recapture by Colonel Leclerc's handful of men; neither does he do justice to its charm and fascination. He might well have included in this section a "bird's eye view" map of Southern Cyrenaica, similar in form to those in the chapters on Arabia and Iraq. It is indeed surprising that whilst he makes honorable mention of Hasanayn Pasha, he does not include the latter's intrepid lady companion on his famous journey in the early twenties. Neither does he mention others like Bagnold and Kennedy Shaw who pioneered the Great

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Sand Sea and the Kufra Oases between the wars; their works, however, are mentioned in the bibliography.

There is little new in this excellent book, but it will provide a valuable addition to the increasing number of serious works on Arabia and the Arabs.

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INDIA AND PAKISTAN

India, by C. H. Philips. London: Hutchinson's University Library, 1949. 167 pages. 7s.6d.

Authors, like other mortals, are subject to bad luck; and surely it is an ill fortune in the publishing field to write, on request, a handbook on Indian affairs in 1946 which reaches the public only long after partition and independence. In the meantime the work had, indeed, been patched here and there to take account of something, at least, of India's intervening metamorphosis (metempsychosis, rather? — the old India had meanwhile died, and its soul was setting forth in *two* new bodies, Pakistan and Bharat . . .). Could the book, then, be regarded, if not as an introduction to modern India rather as a background study? Let us so consider it.

Clearly, to write on "India" in eight score pages means to leave out much. Professor Philip's attention is avowedly on politics and economics; and although the first chapter goes briefly into India's ancient and medieval history, the bulk of the book is a political outline of British rule. Here the author is competent (*vide* his previous detailed study of the East India Company, 1940). Reluctantly, however, one realizes that no more than that can be said. Not that the book is dull; in fact, the style is very readable. Yet it in no way gives a "feel" of the country. One does not ask for elephants or rope-tricks; but one misses any sense of what all this history meant to Indians. Might it stand, then, frankly as a statement of India from the viewpoint of the British raj? Indeed, the book is published in a series on British Empire history. Not that it is apologia

— it would be interesting to have, now, a review of British rule from that point of view, providing it were done grandly. The basic trouble with this study is that the author conveys no inkling of the greatness of his theme.

Whether one be for or against, surely the conquest in the early modern era of the world's most venerable civilization by the creative restlessness of upsurging Europe, and India's subsequent subordination to that masterful alien, is one of the reverberating happenings in the whole story of our race. Of a brief account justice cannot be demanded for all the implications, or even fully of any one. It seems disappointing, however, to read an account apparently unaware that the implications are there.

Perhaps there lies part of what went wrong with the whole enterprise: that so many of the British, even when intelligently interested, had not begun to realize what a momentous venture they had in hand.

However, if one is content to leave out the human passions, if one does not feel that outline sketches must be also works of art (at any rate in appropriateness of expression and emphasis to the quality of the subject), then here, in slight compass, is a judicious selection of information, well presented, on the main course of events of British rule and the Indian nationalist response.

WILFRED CANTWELL SMITH
McGill University

India, Pakistan and the West, by Percival Spear. New York: Oxford University Press, 1949. 232 pages. \$2.00.

In this volume of the Home University Library of Modern Knowledge, the author discusses racial, geographical, religious, historical, political, and social aspects of India and Pakistan, as well as his conception of the impact of the West on the peoples of this region of Asia. It is his basic belief that European conflicts are group, and not cultural, conflicts, whereas conflicts in India are deeply rooted in cultural differences — "fundamental attitudes of life," as he calls them.

This reviewer, for one, regards the Hindu-Muslim conflict in India as primarily political, religious and cultural differences being used as a weapon by politicians. He would like to differ with Mr. Spear on another of his beliefs — the idea that Indians are "a people of alien history, traditions, climate and habits, with differing modes of thought, fundamental assumptions and standards of values . . ." from the West. Mr. Spear insists that there may be some common ground between the Western peoples and the Chinese and Muslims, but Hindus are totally different from westerners. He sums it up in an astonishing series of *obiter dicta*:

Apply democratic principles to India and the result is surprising, because the Hindu doctrine of man is different from European concepts; apply Western science and the results are surprising again, because the Hindu theory of nature and the world is quite other than the European; apply philanthropic notions and the results vary more, because the Hindu idea of man and his duty is different from that of the West. (page 25)

The reviewer cannot accept the validity of these generalizations, which are definitely unsound and historically groundless. Sir Henry Maine, Baden-Powell in his studies of the Indian Village Community, and Lord Ronaldshay are only several of the witnesses to the contrary.

Sir George Sansom, in his study of *The Western Powers and Japan*, makes it clear that a nation may adopt certain phases of a different civilization without giving up the fundamental aspects of its own. It seems that Mr. Spear does not believe in the possibility of such a synthesis in the near future so far as Hindu India is concerned. "The penalty of worldly success may be the end of Hinduism," he states flatly (page 216). Historians know very well that material prosperity was not unknown in Hindu India. In fact in the more than one thousand years between Chandra Gupta and Harsha, Hindu India enjoyed great material prosperity, including political and cultural expansion to advance India. It is historically true that even Western civilization has been changing through the impact of internal and external forces. The same will happen inevitably to the future of civilization in Hindu India.

At this time, when we are so sorely in need of international understanding, this book will, it is to be feared, help to create an even greater cleavage between India and the West.

TARAKNATH DAS
Columbia University

The World Is A Bridge, by Christine Weston, New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1950. 276 pages. \$3.00.

Confronted with the turmoil of present-day India, one can at least reflect that there once was a time of peace and understanding between Hindus and Muslims. In the 16th century the Mughul emperor, Akbar, by his own attitude and effort, achieved this harmony within his realm. During his life Hindus and Muslims lived contentedly side by side, and throughout his cities craftsmen of both religions labored to erect buildings of Hindu and Muslim architecture. When Akbar built the great redstone city of Fatehpur-Sikri (City of Victory), he inscribed on the portals of the central mosque, perhaps as a warning to those who cherished tradition beyond tolerance, "Said Jesus — on whom be peace! 'The world is a bridge. Pass over it and build no house!'"

Christine Weston writes of the same part of India four centuries later, when the work of Akbar was undone by the greatest schism India has known. She has set the stage for *The World Is A Bridge* with all the props and characters necessary to represent India as it was in 1947 — unified in its desire for independence, yet torn apart by the impending partition. For the most part the story takes place in a setting of traditional Indian wealth and glamor, in the mythical state of Katakpur, where the boundary between India and Pakistan is to be drawn. The British are packing up to leave and rumblings of Hindu-Muslim dissonance are heard throughout the land, now and then spouting into violent clashes, auguring evil for the future. In the palace of the Rani of Katakpur is gathered a group of young Indians, each having his own particular interest in the crisis developing outside the sheltering walls of the estate. The Rani, a beautiful and seductive matriarch, has catered to the British because they happened to be on

top. Her son, Vikram, made selfish and soft by her dominance, sees in the chaos of India only his own downfall. The nationalist Hindus are represented by the sensitive young artist Anand, who eventually turns militant, and his wife Kiran, who remains temperate and tolerant. Firoze, friend of Anand and Kiran, is a Muslim intellectual who, when confronted with the Hindu-Muslim conflict, said, "I am an Indian. Let it go at that." His parents, followers of the All India Congress, have led a life of sacrifice and insecurity for the cause of Indian independence and are strongly against partition. Kipps, the American pilot of Prince Vikram's private plane, watches the events around him as a bystander, and it is through him that the author injects her own sympathetic criticisms of India — of its cruelty, paradoxes and immaturity, as well as of its resignation which, to Western eyes, amounts almost to apathy.

Subordinate characters are woven into the story, each representing a faction in the tangled maze of Indian problems. There is Javni, the young Pahari girl who loves Anand and the bangles he brings her, and who tends her goats in a brilliant red skirt. Eventually she becomes a victim of the destructive hysteria that overwhelms both Hindus and Muslims. There is the American, Miss Thompson, who looks on the happenings and the people around her as good subjects for snapshots. There is Ram Das, the fat, benign Hindu teacher, often jailed for his contributions to the fight for freedom. Many others are placed purposefully on the scene, and though they are obviously symbols, the author has managed to create through them a penetrating and convincing story.

Indeed, every element in the whole chaotic situation has been carefully included. Perhaps in comparison with *Indigo*, in which the author writes of the same problem as it was brewing several years ago, *The World Is A Bridge* smacks faintly of documentary writing. But because of the author's gift for creating dialogue that gives life to her characters, and for putting them in situations which she describes with beauty and perception, the book moves smoothly and logically through to its conclu-

sion. Born and reared in India, Christine Weston writes from her heart. One can read between the lines her indignation that India, in becoming independent, was forced to face yet another crisis, this one cleaving the country into two nations.

PATRICIA B. NATIRBOV
Washington, D. C.

NORTH AFRICA

Essai sur l'Esprit du Berbère Marocain, by P. Ange Koller, O. F. M. Fribourg: Éditions Franciscaines, 1949. 604 pages. \$3.00.

Father Ange Koller, a Franciscan missionary, lived twelve years among certain Berber tribes in Morocco, notably in the Middle Atlas. His book, *Essai sur l'Esprit du Berbère Marocain*, the fruit of this experience, won him the first Maréchal Lyautey prize in 1948. It consists of 33 pages of introductory matter, including the details of its clearance for publication through the Catholic hierarchy, 16 chapters of text, a conclusion, a bibliography of over 1,000 titles, an index, and a tribal distribution map.

The list of chapter headings reveals the subject matter in some detail: the Berber's love for his country; his preference for rural life; his great regard for his language; his attachment to his oral literature; his affection for family life; his concern for his system of government; his natural good taste in his productive efforts; his population distribution in Morocco; his struggles, and his friction with the peoples who have come in contact with him; his respect toward his religious rites; his psychology; his temperament, his character, and his racial type; his morals; and his cultural dynamics (*dynamisme*).

The book begins and ends with an expression of Father Koller's concern for his main interest in life — his church. Most of the pages in between, however, have been written in a far more objective manner than one who glanced only at the start and finish would suspect. Chapters 1 through 9, and Chapter 11,

constitute a fairly extensive ethnography of the Berbers of Morocco, with some regional details. Methodologically this is standard stuff, and well done. The author shows a proper regard for geographical determination ("... no big rivers, no large fertile plains to unify the population"), and for history as a cultural dimension. In Chapter 10 he produces a nutshell history of Morocco in which the story of the various Christian missions, especially the Franciscan, is revealed in interesting detail. This chapter nears its end with praise for the French colonial effort: "This fine action on the part of France in Morocco recalls this pretty phrase of Pégy: 'When France undertakes a colonial war, it undertakes a war of freedom.' It is these Arab and Berber freedoms which, in Morocco, it has consecrated inside the national unity." In conclusion Father Koller prays for divine help, as follows: "May He then aid us, in our daily task, to improve ourselves in order to make our dear Moroccan brothers more perfect." It is not clear to the reviewer whether this prayer refers to political or to missionary activities. Comment seems superfluous.

Returning to the ethnographic aspect of the book, one notices that the author is not content with a static description of methods of preparing fields, sowing grain, circumcising babies, and cooking *kuskus*. He is also concerned with the role of the Berber when he leaves home and takes on a special task in some Arab or European cultural milieu, as, for example, the Sussi housekeepers, the water carriers and well diggers from the Dra'a, and the Filali harvesters. This attention to an ethnic division of labor is valuable to the student of Middle Eastern culture as a whole, since it is exactly what one finds all the way across the Muslim world from Algeria to India, where it crystallizes into a caste system. The point is that the reverend father not only describes this system brilliantly, but he shows how it comes into being, and it is this latter demonstration that the student of Middle Eastern cultures as a whole can well use.

Chapters 12 through 16 mark a departure in methodology. Here the Father delves into the subject of ethnic personality, and the psy-

chology of peoples. He does this, however, without benefit of comparative material. In his otherwise extensive bibliography one looks in vain for the names of Benedict, Mead, Bateson, and Gorer, and in the text no mention is made of nursing or toilet training. Father Koller's beloved Berbers seem never to have squinted at Rohrschach ink-blots, nor to have scratched their pigtailed heads over thematic aperception pictures. What Father Koller does, in effect, is to make a series of generalizations. Without documentation these results would seem suspect to a reviewer new to the Berber field. To an old hand they make sense. His picture of the behavior characteristics of Berbers is familiar in every detail, and generally correct.

According to this characterization, the Berber is brought up out of doors. His oral traditions, fed him with his first comprehension of speech, are detailed and positive. His father fondles him in the presence of honored guests, and makes jokes with and about him. His father also mounts him on the paternal horse, and lets him carry the paternal rifle. "With this gun," says he, "you will shoot those so-and-so's over the mountain, who most foully murdered your uncle."

Everything is yes and no, open and shut, with Father Koller's Berber. He spends little time in philosophical contemplation, yet he is no simple child of nature, for he can hide his emotions manfully and lie to a stranger with verisimilitude and imagination. He can laugh uproariously at a stranger's discomfiture, but at the same time may take a fancy to a foreigner of uncertain credentials and defend him to the death.

The Berber is a great hand at making rapid decisions and going immediately into action. He has a violent temper and loves bloodshed. He must have his revenge, but if he has done wrong his conscience bothers him. He quarrels violently with his neighbors, with whom he may start a shooting feud on what looks like a sudden impulse. Berbers are constantly watching and guarding against each other. They watch and guard crops, trees, orchards, irrigation ditches, and paths, and the watchman is often both armed and hidden. Each

man watches his kin, his kin watches the people at the other end of the valley, and tribes watch tribe. When a man sits down outside his own home he so arranges his legs and his rifle that he can spring to his feet fully armed in a few seconds. His loyalty is to both kin and soil, but it is extremely fragmented.

Although he may belong to a Sufi sect, the Berber is no mystic. His holy men are more interested in leadership than in problems of morality, at least in the sense in which Father Koller uses the latter word. His religion is local, being concerned with saints resident near sacred rocks and springs, and his women are full of magic. The success of the crops, health, fecundity and attractiveness to their husbands, and other intimate matters, lead them to seek supernatural intervention. In the Berber's way of thinking, as expressed in his language, everything is concrete. He makes limited use of abstraction, generalization, or metaphysical contemplation. In his everyday behavior he appears to be spontaneous, intuitive, and a great joker, with keen powers of observation and a long and capacious memory.

All Berbers are far from alike. Individual Berbers differ as do individuals in any culture. The various kinds of Berbers also differ in recognizable ways. However, Berber culture as a whole does follow certain trends, which Father Koller has described faithfully. Whether heredity or environment causes them is beside the point. Love, which in his capacity as a profoundly religious man Father Koller considers as the highest of virtues, has enabled him to see his African friends sympathetically and clearly. This is a well-written book into which a sensitive and intuitively brilliant man has poured his life effort. It well deserves the honors which it has won, and it is a document which no student of Morocco or of Middle Eastern civilization as a whole can afford to let pass.

CARLETON S. COON
University of Pennsylvania

TURKEY

Foundations of Turkish Nationalism: The Life and Teachings of Ziya Gökalp, by

Uriel Heyd. London: The Harvell Press, 1949. 174 pages, 10s. 6d.

The name of this important book was evidently suggested by the salesmanship of the publishers rather than by its contents. The more correct name would be that of the subtitle: *The Life and Teachings of Ziya Gökalp*. As a study of the beginnings and development of Turkish nationalism its author would probably be the first to recognize its inadequacy. But as an interpretation of the most famous of Turkish sociologists and the most influential of Turkey's political and social theorists, it is an excellent book and one to be recommended to students of Turkish affairs.

In every respect this study deserves praise. The author was fortunate in having access to most — although by no means all — of the published writings of Ziya Gökalp, including the rare *Genç Kalemler* [Young Pens], published in Saloniki, and the wretchedly printed and hard-to-find *Küçük Mecmuâ* [Small Journal], edited by Gökalp in his later years at Diyarbekir. This extensive material the author has been able to digest thoroughly, not only because of his accurate use of Turkish, but also by virtue of a good understanding of the philosophical ideas of the European writers, especially Durkheim, who so greatly colored the thinking of Ziya Gökalp. The author has comprehensively analyzed the ideas of his subject and described Gökalp's contributions to general sociological concepts, westernization, and national theory. Well brought out is the element of change evolution, culminating in Gökalp's final contribution to Turkish thought of the triune doctrine of Turkification, Islamization, and Modernization. Throughout, the author shows that he has a good general background knowledge of Turkish philosophy, and that he knows he is oversimplifying the total picture in confining his comments to an exposition of Ziya Gökalp's contribution.

The adverse criticisms which might be made are not substantial. The absence of an index is, of course, greatly to be regretted. Describing Halidé Edip's book, *Yeni Turan* [New Turan], as a political novel (p. 109), and referring to her dream of a great Turanian empire (p. 127) is probably not fair, for her

novel is really a Quaker-inspired exhortation to simple living and social service of all mankind. Ziya Gökalp's thought is, in general, pictured as being an original and creative influence, whereas it was rather a systematizing of the current conflict of doctrines into theories which made their wider acceptance possible.

The twenty-fifth anniversary of Ziya Gökalp's death on October 25, 1924, led to a tremendous revival of Turkish interest in this great national sociologist. The fall months of 1949 saw the publication of a considerable number of articles, pamphlets, and full-sized books on Ziya Gökalp, among the more important of which were Kâzim Nâmi's *Ziya Gökalp*; Osman Tolgan's *Ziya Gökalpın İktisadi Fikirleri* [Ziya Gökalp's Economic Concepts]; a new edition of Ali Nûzhet's *Ziya Gökalp ve Hayati* [Ziya Gökalp and His Life], and a preliminary attempt at a complete bibliography — Cavid Orhan Tütengil's *Ziya Gökalp Hakkında bir Bibliyografya Denemesi* [Introductory Bibliography on Ziya Gökalp]. These, of course, all appeared too late to be used by Dr. Heyd.

In Kâzim Nâmi's important book an interesting theory is suggested which may go far toward explaining Gökalp's underlying thought motivation. The Kuranic principle of *te'aruf* and *tenakur*, according to which God commands those who enjoin what is familiar and socially accepted and forbid what is abhorrent to the social conscience, is claimed to be the basic guide to Gökalp's attitude toward social questions in general. This, if true, would help explain his affinity for Durkheim, and his acceptance of Islam as a social force, while disbelieving in any doctrine of an absolute God. It would clarify the change and development and even contradictions in Gökalp's theory as he adapted his doctrine to changing circumstances. It would also explain the apparent fact that instead of being a pioneer, Gökalp's function was rather to work out a theory which put into understandable form a statement of the social attitude currently accepted by one group or another of the progressive thinkers of his time. His task was to reconcile differences in theory, and to bring some measure of unity by appealing to the basic

elements generally acceptable in apparently differing doctrines.

Heyd's book comes near being a definitive study of Ziya Gökalp's social and political theories. It still remains, however, to fit these into the general picture of the development of Turkish thought. Earlier thinkers laid the foundation of Turkish nationalism. Ziya Gökalp helped build the superstructure, and the historic importance of what he did will probably ensure him a same and permanent place in the gallery of creative Turkish thinkers.

J. KINSLEY BIRGE
Istanbul, Turkey

Turkish Foreign Policy, 1918–1948, by Edward Reginald Vere-Hodge. Ambilly-Annenmasse: Imprimerie Franco Suisse. 191 pages.¹

Edward Reginald Vere-Hodge's *Turkish Foreign Policy, 1918–1948* is a summary of the history of the period rather than a detailed study. Yet it is a useful guide for anyone who is seeking to understand the principles which direct Turkey's foreign policy.

The author begins his introduction with the defeat of the Ottoman Empire and the perilous political situation in which the Turks then found themselves, and continues with the rise of the new Turkish Republic. He then explains Turkey's internal and external difficulties — the economically hard ten years; the regeneration of Turkey's internal potentialities, followed by its participation in international politics; the good relations with its immediate neighbors, and the coronation of its efforts with its entry into the League of Nations; Turkey's success at Montreux and the peaceful resolution of the Alexandretta question. Then follows the dramatic period of World War II, when Turkey's policy was guided by its alliances and harmonious relations with the democracies, and its fear of Russian intentions and expansion.

The book has acquired much value and veracity by the author's references to Turkish material and to a variety of other sources in

¹ A revised edition is to be published by the Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, in the fall of 1950. [Ed.]

different languages. Here is proof that Mr. Vere-Hodge possesses a scientist's objective mind. Books on Turkey's diplomatic history in foreign languages written by Turkish authors are indeed rare. That is why studies so often reflect many points of view other than Turkish, and why, therefore, few are reliable. Throughout the book one can find only a single unfortunate word: *pazarlık* (haggling) (page 46). When one considers that the reference is to so important a matter as the future of the Straits, a question vital to the peace of the world and close to the heart of the Turkish Republic, it is evident that the Turkish point of view could never be construed as *pazarlık*. However, the misuse of this word does not alter the wonderful spirit and general atmosphere in which the thesis was written. The only regret one can advance is that the book is too short.

In conclusion, the reader is left with the general feeling that the Turkish Republic since its birth, played, and continues to play, in the crossroads of different political currents, the role of the "backbone of the Middle East" and the "sentinel of democracy."

REFIK ILERI
Washington, D. C.

TURKISTAN

Escape to Adventure, by Fitzroy Maclean. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1950. 419 pages. \$4.00.

Although the old-time gentleman adventurer is undoubtedly a vanishing breed, Fitzroy Maclean is living proof that it is not yet extinct. Despite the unfavorable climate of modern times — hardly like that enjoyed by Queen Bess's buccaneers, or the khaki-clad younger sons of the Victorian era shouldering the white man's burden — Mr. Maclean's book bears witness to the fact that there is still a place for the type that made Great Britain great.

In typical fashion, Mr. Maclean was educated at Eton and Cambridge — he even got a "First" in classics — and then entered the Foreign Office, which eventually sent him to the British Embassy in Paris. From this point

he might have gone on to a fine, if undistinguished, career in the diplomatic service, had he not come to a realization that this was exactly where he was tending, and recoiled. To the consternation of his colleagues, he abandoned the pleasant life of a diplomat in Paris for the Road to Samarkand.

The first stop on the Road was Moscow, where, despite his colleagues' warning that this was a dead end street, he joined the staff of the British Embassy. Mr. Maclean gives a brief but pointed sketch of his first few months of apprenticeship in the Russian capital, closing on a particularly striking note — a description of his astonishing discovery that the deafening cheers greeting the troops parading through the Red Square came, not from enthusiastic crowds of Soviet citizens, but from canned recordings over loudspeakers!

But even the NKVD could not long restrict such a man to Moscow, and soon he was off on his safaris to the Soviet part of the Muslim world. True to his promise to himself, he saw Bokhara and Samarkand, and a good deal else seen by few Westerners of our generation. The second half of the book tells of his experiences as a behind-the-lines soldier in the war, first in Libya as a desert raider, then, after a brief interlude in Iran (where he successfully accomplished his mission of kidnapping an Iranian general) as liaison officer with Tito.

War memoirs tend to be badly organized, badly written, and tedious in their sameness, but Mr. Maclean tells a good story and tells it well. Nevertheless, his story here is not new, while that of the Soviet colonial areas is one so rarely told that even the baldest account — which Mr. Maclean's definitely is not — would find interested readers. Soviet Central Asia has become what Central Africa once was — a huge dark blotch on the map of our knowledge of our planet. As such it presents too strong an attraction for an adventurer of the 20th century to ignore. The world that Mr. Maclean allows us to glimpse in his lucid pages is a weird combination of dying Islamic culture and dynamic Soviet semi-civilization of the Neanderthaloid type so well portrayed in Koestler's *Darkness at Noon*. It is an area which the rest of the world, witnessing the

gradual rise of nationalism among its subject peoples and their final emancipation, would do well to study.

Escape to Adventure is an unusual book when compared to most contemporary productions of travellers and explorers. If one wishes to read about a country like Turkestan, one can draw in general upon three categories of books. The first is that written by the sportsman, with his monotonous accounts of the chase and interminable conversations with the guides and bearers who make up the majority of the author's acquaintance among the natives. The second is the work of the itinerant journalist who is somehow able to survey vast spaces and encompass their myriad aspects in a few days, then solve their age-old problems and ancient mysteries in a few catchy sentences. The third type of book is that written by the specialist, the direct opposite of the journalist. The specialist keeps his field small, and covers every square millimeter of it with such exactness and detail that only his own particular rare subspecies will care to accompany him, even in spirit, on his bleak journey. With his terrorization of the layman bold enough to discourse on a subject in which he does not hold a doctor's degree, the specialist has all but erased the universal man of olden times from the earth.

Mr. Maclean's book is almost in a class by itself. It makes little display of the erudition of those universal men of old who once covered the Muslim world with their wanderings, and carefully and accurately, but with wit and even brilliance, discussed every facet of the fantastic world they found, be it an antique ruin, a manifestation of human behavior, an outlandish animal, a strange geological formation, or an aberrant form of political organization. Yet there is an echo of these universal men in Mr. Maclean (which arises in part, perhaps, from his classical education), rarely found today in books of travel and adventure.

Perhaps the best word to describe this quality is "balance." Although obviously of strong character and forceful personality, Mr. Maclean refrains from forcing himself or his opinions on the reader. Instead, he is allowed to see everything just as the author saw it, with-

out editorial comment, and one can never be quite sure that one's own conclusions correspond with his. Yet, despite his refusal to preach, Mr. Maclean — through his capacity for emphasis by understatement and his quiet humor — succeeds in supplying his readers not only with much knowledge, but also with many conclusions about the lands and the peoples he writes of. His appreciation of human beings and of the fantastic situations into which a confused world has thrust them, makes *Escape to Adventure* a thoroughly enjoyable book.

ARCHIE ROOSEVELT, JR.
New York, N. Y.

BOOKS ALSO NOTED

General

Across the Great Deserts, by P. T. Etherton. New York: Whittlesey House, 1948. 183 pages. \$3.50.

Assignment Near East, by James Batal. New York: Friendship Press, 1950. 119 pages. \$1.75. The story of Protestant missionary work in the Muslim countries of the Middle East.

Good Food from the Near East, by Joan Rowland. New York: M. Barrows and Co., 1950. 274 pages. \$2.75. 370 recipes from twelve Middle East countries: Albania, Armenia, Bulgaria, Egypt, Greece, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Lebanon, and Turkey.

The Middle East: A Political and Economic Survey. London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1950. 516 pages. 35s. An analysis of the basic problems of the Middle East and the facts and figures concerning the region. The cultural life of each country is discussed by a group of experts: Arabia, Cyprus, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Palestine, Israel, the Sudan, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and Turkey.

Oil in the Modern World, by Raj Narain Gupta. Allahabad: Kitab Mahal, 1950. 170 pages. Rs. 8; \$2.00. The history and present-day importance of oil. Survey of the oil resources of the most important oil-producing countries, and their economic and political significance.

The United States and the Near East, by E. A. Speiser. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1950. 263 pages. \$3.75. A revised edition of the book first published in 1947, with a new chapter on the major events of the intervening years.

Arab World

An Arab Philosophy of History, ed. by Charles Issawi. London: John Murray, 1950. Selections

from the *Prolegomena of Ibn Khaldun of Tunis* (1332-1406).

Du Panarabisme à la Ligue Arabe, by Michel Liassy. Paris: G. P. Maisonneuve, 1949. 248 pages.

Gadhiyat al-Hizb al-Qawmi. [The Problem of the Syrian National Party]. Beirut: Ministry of Information, 1949. 303 pages. An official account of the Syrian National Party based on documentary information.

India

Die Indische Welt, by Helmuth von Glasenapp. Baden-Baden: Buhler's Publishers, 1950.

Experiences de Vérité, ou Autobiographie, by M. K. Gandhi. Translated by Georges Belmont. Paris: Pierre Meile, 1950.

Health, Nutrition and Physical Education Problems of India, K. C. K. E. Raja, V. N. Patwardhan, and P. M. Joseph. New Delhi: Indian Council of World Affairs, 1950. 53 pages. Rs. 1/12.

Independence and After, by Jawaharlal Nehru. New York: The John Day Company, 1950. 411 pages. \$4.00.

India and the United States, by Lawrence K. Rosinger. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1950. 146 pages. \$2.75. Background and present facts concerning Indian-American relations; India's foreign policy and economic philosophy; American trade and investment in India, and the comparative policies of Washington and New Delhi on various problems of foreign relations.

The Indian Press Book for 1949, by K. P. Viswanatha Ayyar, V. K. Narasimhan, Pothen Philip, editors. Madras: Indian Press Publications, 1949. 338 pages. Who's Who in Indian journalism and comprehensive guide to publishing in the new state.

Mahatma Gandhi, by Gotthilf Schenkel. Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1949. 348 pages. Dm. 9.80. The life and work of the great Indian leader.

Mahatma Gandhi: An Interpretation, by E. Stanley Jones. New York: Abington-Cokesbury, 1948. 160 pages. \$2.00. Gandhi through the eyes of a missionary-evangelist who has been closely associated with India for forty years.

Report on Economic and Commercial Conditions in India. Commercial Relations and Exports Department of the Board of Trade. London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1949. 233 pages. 4s.

Toward Freedom from Want, by D. Spencer Hatch. Bombay: Oxford University Press, 1949. 303 pages. Rs. 8/8.

Uttarasatyagrahagita, by Pandita Kshama Row. Bombay: Hind Kitabs, 1948. xvi+157 pages. Rs. 6/12. Biographical poem on the life of Gandhi. Sanskrit with English translation.

Iran

Drömandlaren, by Jascha Golonwanjuk. Stockholm: Wahlstrom och Widstrand, 1948. 366 pages. 16.50. Kr. The stories of the Persian "dream merchant," Jussuf, and his experiences in Bokhara with his Afghan friend, Ismail.

Inquisitions de Kaboul au Golfe Persique, by François Balsan. Paris: Peyronnet, 1949. 285 pages. 360 Fr.

Israel

The Army of Israel, by Lt. Col. Moshe Pearlman. New York: The Philosophical Library, 1950. 250 pages. \$5.00. A participant relates the history of the war between the Jews and the Arabs.

I Saw the Battle of Jerusalem, by Harry Levin. New York: Schocken Books, 1950. 288 pages. \$3.00. A first-hand account of the siege of Jerusalem, by a former journalist, now Israel Consul General in Australia.

Israel Dairy, by Bernard M. Bloomfield. New York: Crown Publishers, 1950. 182 pages. \$2.50. Account of a visit to Israel by a sympathetic observer.

The Land and the People of Israel, by Gail Hoffman. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1950. 119 pages. \$2.50.

Report on Israel, by Irwin Shaw and Robert Capa. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1950. 144 pages. Paper \$1.50. Hard-bound \$3.00. Text and 94 excellent photographs describe life in Israel today.

The Republic of Israel: Its History and Its Promise, by Joseph Dunner. New York: Whittlesey House, 1950. 269 pages. \$4.75. An account of the Zionist movement from its beginnings to the foundation of the state of Israel.

Theodore Herzl: The Jew and Man, by Oscar Benjamin Frankl. New York: Storm Publishers, 1949. 190 pages. \$2.50. Biography of the Zionist leader by one who knew him well.

Young Hearts, by David Maletz. New York: Schocken Books, 1950. 237 pages. \$3.00. A novel about modern Israel.

North Africa

L'Algérie dans l'Impasse: Démission de la France? by Sylvain Wisner. Paris: Spartacus, 1948. 158 pages. 150 Fr.

Géographie du Maroc, by Fernand Joly and others. Paris: Delagrave, 1949. 168 pages. 320 Fr.

L'Organisation Régionale du Maroc, by Frédéric Brémard. Paris: Librairie Générale de Droit et de Jurisprudence, 1949. 397 pages. 800 Fr.

Pakistan

Economic Survey of Pakistan. Karachi: The International Economic Conference, 1949. 84 pages. Official statistical information on Pakistan: the fundamentals of Pakistan's economy, the industrial policy of the government, and conditions under which foreign capital would be welcome.

Religion

The Faith of Islam: A Synopsis, by Dr. Mirza Abul Fazl. Hyderabad: Deccan, 1949. 53 pages. Rs. 4.

Forgotten Religions, ed. by Vergilius Ferm. New York: The Philosophical Library, 1950. 378 pages. \$7.50.

Linguistics

Introduction à l'Arabe Marocain, by L. Brunot. 288 pages. 810 Fr. From a collection: "Les Langues de l'Orient."

Padumavati, by Laksimi Dhar. London: Luzac and Company, 1949. 341 pages. A linguistic study of 16th century Hindi (Avadhi).

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BIBLIOGRAPHY OF PERIODICAL LITERATURE

Prepared by Sidney Glazer, Consultant in Near East Bibliography, Library of Congress

With contributions from: Elizabeth Bacon, Richard Ettinghausen, Abdollah Faryar, Sidney Glazer, Harold W. Glidden, Harvey P. Hall, George C. Miles, Leon Nemoy, M. Perlmann, William D. Preston, C. Rabin, Dorothy Shepherd, and Andreas Tietze.

Note: It is the aim of the Bibliography to present a selective and annotated listing of periodical material dealing with the Middle East generally since the rise of Islam. In order to avoid unwarranted duplication of bibliographies already dealing with certain aspects and portions of the area, the material included will cover only North Africa and Muslim Spain, the Arab world, Ethiopia and Eritrea, Turkey, the Transcaucasian states of Soviet Russia, Iran, Afghanistan, and Turkestan. An attempt is made to survey all periodicals of importance in these fields. The ancient Near East and Byzantium are excluded; so also Zionism, Palestine, and Israel in view of the current, cumulative bibliography on this field: *Zionism and Palestine*, a publication of the Zionist Archives and Library in New York.

For list of abbreviations, see page 383.

GEOGRAPHY

(General, description, travel and exploration, natural history, geology)

- 3460 AUDEOUD, M. "Le Chott ech Chergui." *Houille Blanche* (Grenoble) 4 (S-O '49) 651-2. The hydrological features of this saline lake region in Oran Department, northwest Algeria, are described.

See also: 3467, 3483, 3520.

HISTORY

(Medieval)

- 3461 AKTEPE, M. MÜNİR. "Notes on the manuscripts of Naimâ's history." (in Turkish) *Tarih Dergisi* (Istanbul) 1 (S '49) 35-52. The author states that there are three different groups of redactions which have not yet been compared with each other. Two of these groups are 18 years earlier than the printed text. There are also other important variations.

- 3462 'ALI, MAULANA MUHAMMAD. "'Umar the great." *Islamic Rev.* (Woking) 37 (N '49) 7-12. A study of the character and achievements of the second caliph of Islam, the "conqueror of two empires [who] yet built no palaces for himself."

- 3463 ANDREASYAN, HRAND D. "The Armenian sources on Turkish history." (in Turkish) *Tarih Dergisi* 1 (S '49) 95-118. A survey of the Armenian historians, their lives and works, insofar as they concern Turkish (Seljuk) history, from the 11th to the 13th century. (To be cont.)

- 3464 ANHEGGER, ROBERT. "Eyyûbi's Menâkıb-i Süleyman Han." (in Turkish) *Tarih Dergisi* (Istanbul) 1 (S '49) 119-38. Eyyûbi's long poem relates with full detail the reconstruction of parts of an aqueduct near Istanbul which was destroyed by a great storm in 1563 and rebuilt a year later. It contains interesting information about the organization of these works.

- 3465 ANHEGGER, ROBERT. "Mu'âlî's Hünkârnâmè." (in Turkish) *Tarih Dergisi* 1 (S '49) 145-66. A Persian history of Mahomet II written in the years 1472-1474 and treating chiefly his wars with Uzun Hasan. It contains also the interesting story of the author's travels in Persia, Syria, Egypt, and Anatolia. The importance of this work lies in its being one of the most ancient Ottoman histories and in the valuable information it yields about the Timurids, the Akkoyunlus, and the Karakoyunlus.

- 3466 BAYSUN, M. CAVID. "Emir Sultan's life and personality." (in Turkish) *Tarih Dergisi* 1 (S '49) 77-94. The famous mystic

- al-Sayyid Shams al-din 'Ali al-Husayni al-Bukhārī came from his home town Bukhara to Bursa about the end of the 14th century where he lived until his death in 1429. He and his wife Khundī Khatun, the daughter of Bayezid I, are buried in a mausoleum near the mosque which still carries his name. The article is richly documented.
- 3467 BECKINGHAM, C. F. "Some early travels in Arabia." *J. Royal Asiatic Soc.* (1949) 155-76. Discusses journeys or alleged journeys of Cabot, Covilhā, Von Harff, and Portuguese exploits, in particular those of Da Quadra, Paez and Montserrat, and João Melo.
- 3468 DUNLOP, D. M. "Zeki Validi's Ibn Faḍlān." *Welt des Orients* No. 4 (Ag '49) 307-12. An extensive review of the text published in 1939 with notes on Ibn Hassūl's *Tafđil al-Ātrāk* on the Khazars and their Turkish origin.
- 3469 GOITEIN, S. D. "An Arab on Arabs." (in Hebrew) *Hamizrah Ḥehadash* (Tel Aviv) 1 (Ja '50) 115-21. Begins an analysis of Ibn Khaldūn's views on his own people which are striking in their realistic pessimism.
- 3470 GOITEIN, S. D. "A turning point in the history of the Muslim state (Apropos of Ibn al-Muqaffa's *Kitāb az-Ṣahāba*)." *Islamic Culture* (Hyderabad) 23 (Jl '49) 120-35. A penetrating analysis of Ibn al-Muqaffa's (d. 142/759) tract on army, court, and taxes. The author thinks that the Abbasid state followed Sasanid models less than is generally believed.
- 3471 HINZ, WALTHER. "Ein orientalisches Handelsunternehmen im 15 Jahrhundert." *Welt des Orients* No. 4 (Ag '49) 313-340. The economic and social history of the medieval Near East has not yet been approached on the basis of the oriental sources (Heyd's standard work is based chiefly on occidental sources). An Arabic manuscript in Istanbul shows the book-keeping of an international trading firm in 15th century Iran.
- 3472 KAHLÉ, PAUL. "Eine wichtige quelle zur geschichte des Sultans Saladin." *Welt des Orients* No. 4 (Ag '49) 299-301. 'Imādeddin al-Kātib al-Isfahānī's *al-Barq al-Shāmī* was a major source of Abū Shāma. Two of the 6-7 volumes are unica of the Bodleian Library. They contain numerous documents omitted by the later compiler.
- 3473 KURDIAN, H. "Waziric dynasty of Badr al-Jamali the Armenian, during the Fatimid caliphate. Pt. II." *Armenian Rev.* (Boston) 3 (Mr '50) 115-20. Based on Arab sources, chiefly al-Maqrizi.
- 3474 LEWIS, BERNARD. "An apocalyptic vision of Islamic history." *Bull. of School of Orient. and African Stud.* 13 (1950) 308-38. Translation, comparison with related versions, and historical interpretation of the Prayer of Rabbi Simon ben Yōhay. The author thinks that part of the material was written in early Abbasid times.
- 3475 MEIBOHM, ANATOLE DE. "Un prétendu khatchérif de Sélim Ier." *Cahiers d'Histoire Égyptienne* (Cairo) 1 (Ag '49) 343-52. Translation and discussion of the history of a *hattisherif*, of doubtful authenticity, said to have been granted by Sultan Selim I to the Greek monastery of Xeropotamos.
- 3476 MUŞTAFĀ KHĀN, GHULĀM. "A history of Bahrām Shāh of Ghaznīn, III." *Islamic Culture* 23 (Jl '49) 199-235. The story is carried on from A.D. 1148 to his death in 1157, followed by notices about his character, activities as maecenas of literature, viziers, sons and daughters.
- 3477 ORGUN, ZARIF. "The Tughra." (in Turkish) *Türk Tarih, Arkeolojya ve Etnografya Dergisi* No. 5 (1949) 203-20. A historical, diplomatic and paleographic study on the development of the tughra, the formal signature of the Ottoman Sultans and princes. Many illustrations.
- 3478 PERLMANN, M. "Eleventh century Andalusian authors on the Jews of Granada." *Proceedings of the Amer. Acad. for Jewish Research* 18 (1948-9) 269-90. The rise of Jewish courtiers intensified the antagonism toward the Jews. Ibn Ḥazm and the poet Abū Ishāq al-Elbiri gave expression to the various motifs, theological and social, used against them.
- 3479 SCHIMMEL, ANNEMARIE. "Einsetzungsurkunden mamlukischer Emire." *Welt des Orients* No. 4 (Ag '49) 302-6. Notes on the office procedure, and translation of a document as given in Qalqashandi's *Subh*.
- 3480 SERJEANT, R. B. "Materials for south Arabian history: Notes on new manuscripts from Hadramawt." *Bull. of School of Orient. and African Stud.* 13 (1950) 281-307. Notes on 23 works, with description of libraries and of the general situation with regard to MSS.
- 3481 STERN, S. M. "The epistle of the Fatimid Caliph al-Āmir [*al-Hidāya al-Āmiriyā*] — its date and its purpose." *J. Royal Asiatic Soc.* (1950) 20-31. The occasion of the issue of the Epistle is identified with the public demonstration of legitimacy of the rule of Musta'li, held in 516/1122 and described by Ibn al-Muyassar.
- 3482 TEKİNDĀĞ, C. ŞEHABEDDİN. "The Seljuk-Little Armenian border at the time of Alāuddin Keykubad and his successors." (in Turkish) *Tarih Dergisi* 1 (S '49) 29-34. Historical and historico-geographical

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- investigation of the border region of northern Cilicia in the 13th century.
- 3483 TOGAN, ZEKİ VELİDİ. "Notes on some manuscripts at Kayseri and Bursa." (in Turkish) *Tarih Dergisi* 1 (S '49) 67-76. Lists and describes several important Arabic, Persian, and Turkish works, most of them on history and geography, which the author was able to study in the City Libraries of Kayseri and Bursa.
See also: 3510, 3530, 3531, 3532, 3537, 3549, 3550.
- ### HISTORY AND POLITICS (Modern)
- 3484 "Kurdistan." *New Statesman and Nation* 39 (Ap 22, '50) 452. Russian wireless propaganda to the Kurds. Kurdish bitterness against the West.
- 3485 ALTINDAĞ, ŞİNASI. "Namık Paşa as ambassador in London." (in Turkish) *Tarih Vesikalari* (Ankara) 3 (My '49) 200-5. Documents concerning Namik Pasha's mission to England in 1832. He was sent there to ask for help in the struggle against rebellious Mohammed Ali Pasha of Egypt.
- 3486 BAYSUN, CAVİD. "Ambassador Mustafa Reşid Pasha's political reports from Paris and London." (in Turkish) *Tarih Vesikalari* 3 (My '49) 206-21. This section of his correspondence covers the months of August, September, and October, 1836. (To be cont.)
- 3487 BEE, JOHN M. "Persia through the centuries." *Gt. Brit. and the East* 66 (Mr '50) 30-2. A good summary of Iranian history since 1800.
- 3488 BERKER, AZİZ. "Teşrifatı Naim effendi's chronicle." (in Turkish) *Tarih Vesikalari* 3 (My '49) 230-40. This section of Naim Effendi's chronicle of the years 1789 through 1792 records the events of the summer of 1789. (To be cont.)
- 3489 BISBEE, ELEANOR. "Test of democracy in Turkey." *Middle East J.* 4 (Ap '50) 170-82. The development of political democracy in Turkey has been a long, slow process now to be tested in the general elections.
- 3490 HOSKINS, HALFORD L. "The guardianship of the Suez Canal." *Middle East J.* 4 (Ap '50) 143-54. A discussion of Anglo-Egyptian relations in the light of Egypt's avowed desire to take over both the management of the Canal and its protection when the current concession and treaty agreements expire.
- 3491 KIMCHE, JOHN. "On the Nile." *New Statesman and Nation* 39 (Ja 28, '49) 88-9. On the chances of Anglo-Egyptian understanding under the Wafid government.
- 3492 KÖPRÜLÜ, ORHAN F. "Character and value of Cevri's history." (in Turkish) *Tarih Dergisi* 1 (S '49) 53-66. After an analysis of its sources the author arrives at the conclusion that the 18th century history of Edirne (Adrianople), known and printed under the name of *Cevri Târihi*, is really an earlier work of Örfî Mahmud Ağa who later wrote his *Örfî Târihçesi* on the same subject.
- 3493 EL MOUELHY (al-MUWAYLIHÎ), İBRAHİM. "L'Égypte à l'exposition de Philadelphie (1876)." *Cahiers d'Histoire Égyptienne* 1 (N-D) 316-26. An account, based on unpublished documents in the Abdin Palace archives, of the Egyptian participation in the Philadelphia exposition of 1876.
- 3494 NAYIRI, S. "The State university of Erivan." *Armenian Rev.* 3 (Mr '50) 121-4. Some instances of the degradation that came upon a potentially great university when less than a year after its inauguration on Jan. 31, 1920, it fell into Soviet hands.
- 3495 ÖZ, TAHSİN. "A diary kept by Selim III's secretary." (in Turkish) *Tarih Vesikalari* 3 (My 1949) 183-99. Ahmed Effendi's diary covered the years 1791 through 1797 and treated both court events and happenings of general interest elsewhere. (To be cont.)
- 3496 PERLMANN, M. "The Egyptian elections." *Middle Eastern Aff.* (New York) 1 (F '50) 41-8. Background of the recent elections and their results as interpreted in the light of the Egyptian press.
- 3497 SHWADRAN, BENJAMIN. "Jordan annexes Arab Palestine." *Middle Eastern Aff.* 1 (Ap '50) 99-111. Traces the background of the Hashimi house, King Abdallah's plans, his position in the Arab League and in the Palestine conflict, and his latest moves.
- 3498 SHWADRAN, BENJAMIN. "Peace and stability in the Middle East." *Middle Eastern Aff.* 1 (F '50) 35-40. Discusses the Clapp Mission report and the UN Social Welfare Seminar for the Arab States.
- 3499 STARK, FREYA. "The Arab background." *Islamic Culture* 23 (Jl '49) 117-9. The discovery of oil regained for the Arab countries the position they had lost by the discovery of the sea route round Africa in 1488. It finds a society well prepared by its liveliness of mind and its westernization inescapable.
- 3500 TAGHER, JACQUES. "Portrait psychologique de Nubar Pacha." *Cahiers d'Histoire Égyptienne*. 1 (Ag '49) 353-72. A review of the career of Nubar Pasha under Abbas and Said Pasha and the Khedive Ismail. The author believes that Nubar's most serious mistake in judgment was to believe that the British could be made to

- leave Egypt after their occupation of it in 1882.
- 3501 TASHJIAN, JAMES H. "The American Military Mission to Armenia." *Armenian Rev.* 3 (Mr '50) 66-82. Carries forward the history of the mission on Turkish soil from Sept. 1919 until it crossed the boundaries of the independent Armenian republic.
- 3502 TUKİN, CEMAL. "The institution of a weekly rest-day in our recent history." (in Turkish) *Tarih Dergisi* 1 (S '49) 139-44. As Islam does not prescribe a weekly rest-day, such an institution was not known in the Ottoman Empire. However, from early in the 18th century government offices used to be closed one day a week, mostly Thursday. In 1935, Sunday was legally made an obligatory rest-day.
- 3503 UNAT, FAİK REŞİT. "Documents on the foundation of the Anatolian and Rumelian Society for the Defense of Rights." (in Turkish) *Tarih Vesikalari* 3 (My '49) 161-70. The foundation of the Society in 1919 was one of the principal steps initiating the Kemalist Revolution. Documents added in facsimile.
- 3504 UNAT, FAİK REŞİT. "The story of Crimea or Necati Effendi's Russian mission." (in Turkish) *Tarih Vesikalari* 3 (My '49) 222-9. One more section of Necati Effendi's narration of the military events in Crimea in 1769-1774, and of his mission to St. Petersburg in 1775.
- 3505 UZUNÇARŞILI, İ. HAKKI. "Documents relative to Turkish-British relations down to the beginning of the 19th century." (in Turkish, abstract in French) *Bulleten* (Istanbul) 13 (Jl '49) 573-650. The majority of the documents (some illustrated in facsimile and all transcribed in modern Turkish characters) are communications between the Porte and the court and ambassadors of George III. Of special interest is the reproduction of a holograph letter from Lord Nelson to the Grand Vizier, dated at Malta, June 16, 1803.
- See also:* 3511, 3513, 3515, 3534, 3558, 3562, 3565, 3571.
- ### ECONOMIC CONDITIONS
- (General, finance, commerce, agriculture, natural resources, labor, transportation, and communications)
- 3506 "L'Algérie: prolongement de la métropole." *L'Économie* No. 232 suppl. (D 29, '49) 3-31. A brief review of the history of Algeria is followed by a series of articles by different authors bearing on Algerian economy: electric power supply, agricul-
- ture, foreign commerce, industries, natural resources, and means of transportation. A map with symbols to identify Algeria's railroad lines, principal dams, and location of major resources is included.
- 3507 "Le pétrole du Moyen Orient." *Documentation Française* No. 1,200 (S 16, '49) 3-19. This pamphlet gives statistical data on petroleum production, and the known and assumed reserves in Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Kuwait, Qatar, and on the Bahrein Islands. It also lists the existing concessions, pipelines, and refining facilities.
- 3508 "Le rail d'Addis-Abeba." *Tropiques* (Paris) 48 (Ja '50) 36-9. A brief history of the development of the Franco-Ethiopian railroad connecting Addis-Abeba with Jibouti in French Somaliland. Sketch map of area and photographs.
- 3509 "Die Stauanlagen Mohamed Ali im Nildelta." *Schweizerische Bauzeitung* 67 (Ap '49) 229.
- 3510 AKDAĞ, MUSTAFA. "The economic situation in Turkey in the period of founding and growth of the Ottoman Empire." (in Turkish, abstract in French) *Bulleten* 13 (Jl '49) 497-571. A well-documented discussion of economic conditions, balance of trade, currency, and taxes in Turkey and eastern Europe during the 13th-17th centuries. Tables and index.
- 3511 BAER, GAVRIEL. "The financial crisis in Iraq." (in Hebrew) *Hamizrah Hehadash* 1 (Ja '50) 122-7. The administration, including army and police, consumes 70% of the budget. The wealthy are not taxed. The Palestine war weighed heavily on the country's finances.
- 3512 BEAU, ANDRÉ. "L'Afrique du nord et l'avenir français." *Revue Maritime* No. 43 (N '49) 1396-425. This is a comprehensive review of the economic potential of French Morocco and Algeria, with particular reference to hydrology, dams, electric power plants, coal mines, petroleum, and metal resources.
- 3513 BEE, JOHN M. "Economic crisis checked Iraq's development." *Gt. Brit. and the East* 66 (Ja '50) 29-30. Iraq's development was given a severe setback by World War II. Nevertheless, the author concludes, one could be "extremely optimistic as to Iraq's future if it were not for the undue attention to politics in the Middle East." He feels that Iraq and the neighboring countries will become unprecedentedly prosperous very soon if they concentrate on their economic development.
- 3514 BIRDWOOD, C. B. "The economic development of the Middle East." *World Aff.* (London) 4 (Ap '50) 196-208. Analyzes

- the work of the UN Economic (Clapp) Mission, based on the interim report.
- 3515 BIRDWOOD, C. B. "Oil in the Middle East." *World Aff.* 4 (Ja '50) 48-59. Some sound observations on the political and economic implications of this oil, including a factual survey of the resources.
- 3516 FOURIER, J. M. "Le Souss et Agadir." *Tropiques* 48 (Ja '50) 19-26. A discussion of the Sous Valley, with emphasis on its agricultural possibilities and of the harbor of Agadir, its facilities and proposed modernization. Photographs.
- 3517 FRANCK, DOROTHEA SEELYE and PETER G. "The Middle East economy in 1949." *Middle East J.* 4 (Ap '50) 221-43. A comprehensive review of the year's economic conditions, foreign trade, balance of payments and financial assistance, internal finance, economic development. Thirteen statistical tables.
- 3518 HAKIM, GEORGE. "Point four and the Middle East." *Middle East J.* 4 (Ap '50) 183-95. An Arab delegate to ECOSOC criticizes proposed technical assistance measures as being too small, inadequately financed, and not sufficiently directed toward the objective to be achieved—greater productivity.
- 3519 KERWIN, ROBERT W. "The Turkish roads program." *Middle East J.* 4 (Ap '50) 196-208. The practical problems involved in this Turkish-American undertaking include administrative practices, methods of accounting, personnel, etc. Such problems must be solved before a program of this sort can be successful.
- 3520 FERID, KROMER. "Chromite and other mineral occurrences in the Tastepc district of Eskişehir, Turkey." *Mining Engineering* 187 (Ja '50) 108-10. This paper is the first of a series which will describe geology, mining, methods, and production costs of some of Turkey's more important minerals. In this paper chromite, meerschaum, and magnesite of the Tastepc district are described.
- 3521 MISRA, K. S. "Collection of fish from Iraq." *Indian Museum Records* 45 (Je & S '47) 115-27. The list includes various specimens both of edible and dangerous fish.
See also: 3498.
- ### SOCIAL CONDITIONS
- (General, education, population and ethnology, medicine and public health, religion, law)
- 3522 "The Medical College at Bagdad." *Lancet* (S 10, '49) 475. During 1948-49 there were 296 men and 39 women studying at the Medical College of Bagdad. About 80 students now enter yearly, about 40 qualify. The population of Iraq is about 4,500,000, and the number of doctors now on the register is only 528. If a standard of 1 doctor to 3,000 population is to be achieved, another 1,000 doctors are needed.
- 3523 "Sudan Government's aim—universal literacy." *Gt. Brit. and the East* 66 (F '50) 33. Discusses the revised Education Plan for the years 1949-1956 approved by the Sudan Legislative Assembly.
- 3524 ANDERSON, J. N. D. "Invalid and void marriages in Hanafi law." *Bull. of the Schools of Orient. and African Stud.* 13 (1950) 357-66. Abū Ḥanīfa distinguishes sharply between void and irregular marriages, the latter having some of the consequences of a legal marriage. His successors, Abū Yūsuf and al-Shābiṭānī, generally drop the distinction, which is revived, in an altered form, by later teachers of the school. Translation of two extracts.
- 3525 al-'AZMA, AHMAD MAZHAR. "The western world and the faith of Islam." *Islamic Rev.* 37 (N '49) 15-6. The author cites conservatism, misconceptions, the present backwardness of the Muslims, and the lack of organized effort to propagandize their faith as the main reasons standing in the way of Islam being adequately appreciated in the West.
- 3526 BENTWICH, NORMAN. "The Hebrew university of Jerusalem and education in Israel." *Quart. Rev.* No. 584 (Ap '50) 206-16. Problem of Arab education at the University. The Hebrew University is the only university in Palestine. Will it be able to attract Arabs from other lands if it holds strictly to Hebrew as the language of instruction?
- 3527 THORNSTEIN, GUTHIE. "Venereal diseases in Ethiopia: survey and recommendations." *Bull. World Health Organization* 2 (1949) 85-137. This article considers mainly the following: prevalent diseases; syphilis and related infections; treatment methods and medicaments; public-health organization; recommendations for a venereal disease program.
- 3528 HIRSCHBERG, H. Z. "Problems of Muslim law in the State of Israel." (in Hebrew) *Hamizrah Hehadash* 1 (Ja '50) 97-108. Purely religious matters should devolve upon Shari'ah court and should be left entirely in the hands of the Muslims. In other matters, as in the Muslim states, a combination of Shari'ah and secular law should be permitted to develop.
- 3529 al-HUSAYNĪ, ISHĀQ MŪSĀ. "Arabization of the Arabs." (in Arabic) *al-Abhāth* (Beirut) 3 (Mr '50) 26-41. The Arabs know little of their own heritage. But

- without it there can be no healthy growth of Arab nationalism and unity.
- 3530 al-KHALIDI, 'ANBARA. "Woman's role in Arab society." *Islamic Rev.* 37 (N '49) 19-22. Cites a number of outstanding Arab women from the past in an effort to prove that women in the Arab world have from earliest times been much more than pieces of chattel, that their modern renaissance is a well preceded phenomenon in Arab history.
- 3531 KHEIRALLAH, G. "The Karawiyyin—the oldest university of the Middle Ages." *Islamic Rev.* 37 (N '49) 23-6. An interesting account of the university which produced, among others, such distinguished alumni as Ibn Khaldūn, Ibn al-'Arabī, and Ibn Bājā (Avempace).
- 3532 NIZAMI, KHALIQ AHMAD. "Early Indo-Muslim mystics and their attitude towards the State." *Islamic Culture* 23 (Jl '49) 162-70. The attitude toward means of livelihood: disciples were encouraged to carry on a trade. Relations between rulers and saints.
- 3533 SIASSI, ALI AKBAR. "L'Iran et l'organisation de son enseignement." *Cahiers de l'Orient Contemporain* 6 (Winter '49) 193-201. The rector of the University of Tehran gives an account of the progress of the institution and discusses French influence on the educational patterns of his country.
- 3534 TAGHER, JACQUES. "Nubar Pacha et la réforme judiciaire." *Cahiers d'Histoire Égyptienne*. 1 (Ag '49) 373-412. Presents much important and largely unpublished correspondence of Nubar Pasha during the years 1866-1869 relative to judicial reform in Egypt.
- 3535 TURA, VEFİK. "The Library of the Museum, and how books were bequeathed to it." (in Turkish) *Türk Tarih, Arkeolojya ve Ethnografya Dergisi* No. 5 (1949) 229-33. Three important bequests (by Mahmud Ekrem Bey, Şakir Pasha, and Diyarbekirli Said Pasha) form the nucleus of the present library at the Archeological Museum of Istanbul.
- 3536 VON GRUNEBAUM, G. E. "Islam and Hellenism." *Scientia* (Como, Italy) 44 (Ja '50) 21-7. "Generally speaking the function of Hellenism in Islam was to provide forms of thought, means of rationalized articulation along with patterns of literary presentation, and to transmit an enormous amount of subject matter, on the scientific level as well as the sub-scientific . . . Threatened with disintegration, orthodox Islam fought to preserve as much as possible of its original structure through the deliberate elimination of Hellenism."
- 3537 WILKINSON, CHARLES K. "Life in the early Islamic city of Nishapur, Persia." *Trans. of the New York Acad. of Sciences* 12 (D '49) 66-77. The sources for this delightful study are historical and literary texts, archaeological finds, observations in the modern Orient and technical investigations. Unfortunately not illustrated.
- 3538 ZELTSER, M. "The population of Iran." *Yalqut Ha-Mizrah Ha-Tikhon* (in Hebrew) 1 (N-D '49) 22-30. Continues a survey of data on the Kurds, Lurs, Bakhtiaris, Qashqais, and Arabs as elements of the population.
- See also:* 3498, 3554, 3555, 3558.

ART

(*Archeology, architecture, epigraphy, numismatics, minor arts, painting and music, manuscripts and papyri*)

- 3539 AGA-OGLU, M. "An Iranian incense burner." *Bull. of the Boston Museum of Fine Arts* 48 (F '50) 8-10. A note on an Iranian incense burner inlaid with silver and gold of the early 13th century, signed by the artist Abū 'l-Munif b. Mas'ūd. Two illustrations.
- 3540 ARTUK İBRAHİM. "A precious dinar with the name of the Anatolian Seljuq prince Giyāseddin Keyhüsrev II." (in Turkish). *Türk Tarih, Arkeolojya, ve Etnografya Dergisi* No. 5 (1949) 103-11. Description of a gold coin recently acquired by the Ankara Archeological Museum. Historical notes, photographs.
- 3541 BAGATTI, P. B. "Lucerne fittili 'a cuore' nel Museo della Flagellazione in Gerusalemme." *Faenza* 35 (1949) 98-103. Discussion of 17 heart-shaped lamps (all illustrated) coming from different places in Palestine and now in the Flagellation Museum, Jerusalem. They seem to have appeared c. a. A.D. 634 and developed with a more degenerated decoration up to the Crusades.
- 3542 BINION, LAURENCE. "Iran's treasures escort the Shah." *Art News* 48 (D '49) 27-9, 61-3. This is a reprint of an earlier article by the late author; it is illustrated with pictures of objects shown in the two exhibitions of Iranian art in New York some of them from recent excavations.
- 3543 CARRATALA, JOSE GUILLOT. "Hispano-Arab art." *Islamic Rev.* 37 (N '49) 36-8. Some marble and silver caskets of the 10th and 11th centuries. Illust.
- 3544 ÇİĞ, KEMAL. "Ali al-Üsküdarî, a painter of lacquered work in the 18th century." (in Turkish). *Türk Tarih, Arkeolojya ve Etnografya Dergisi* No. 5 (1949) 192-202.

- Laquered book cover, pen cases, bows, etc. carrying the signature of this artist. Illustrations.
- 3545 DIMAND, MAURICE S. "Treasures of Iranian art." *Metropolitan Museum of Art Bull.* 8 (Ja '50) 145-53. Richly illustrated note on the exhibition of Iranian art from the Shah's collections, the Tehran Museum, and museums of shrines.
- 3546 İNAN, AFET. "Contributions to Turkish history through the research articles of the archaeological section of the Turkish Historical Society between 1943-1949." *Bulleten* 13 (in Turkish) (Jl '49) 479-95. Including brief mention of archaeological activities in the Seljuq field.
- 3547 KAFESOĞLU, İBRAHİM. "Historical and archaeological researches in Ahlat and its surroundings in 1945." (in Turkish) *Tarih Dergisi* 1 (S '49) 167-200. A short survey of historical (almost exclusively Islamic) buildings and other monuments in Van, Ahlat, and Adilcevaz. 1 map (of Ahlat), 16 sketches showing rock inscription at Araklı Dere, and 1 drawing showing various signs found on early Turkish monuments.
- 3548 RICE, D. S. "The Blazons of the 'Baptistère de Saint Louis'." *Bull. of School of Orient. and African Stud.* 13 (1950) 367-80. With seven photographs and six drawings. The author, from an investigation of heraldic detail, dates the vessel at approximately the beginning of the 14th century, but the person for whom it was made cannot be identified. Valuable details of Mamluke heraldry.
- 3549 ÜLKÜTAŞIR, M. ŞAKİR. "Historical monuments of the Seljuq period at Sinob." (in Turkish) *Türk Tarih, Arkeolojya, ve Etnografiya Dergisi* No. 5 (1949) 112-51. A short summary of the history of this city in Seljuq times is followed by a description of several important buildings (city walls and gates, with their inscriptions, the Alâüddin Mosque, a medrese, two türbes, and a fountain, all of them dating from the 13th century).
- 3550 ÜLKÜTAŞIR, M. ŞAKİR. "Sinob's historical monuments dating from the period of the Candar Oğulları." (in Turkish) *Türk Tarih, Arkeolojya ve Etnografiya Dergisi* No. 5 (1949) 152-91. A history of the Candar Oğulları dynasty which ruled over parts of northern Asia Minor from the late 13th to the first half of the 15th century, is followed by the description of numerous buildings dating from that time (4 türbes, 6 mosques, 3 fountains, inscriptions, tombstones).
- 3551 WENLEY, A. G. "Report on the Freer Gallery of Art." *Report of the Secretary*
- of the Smithsonian Institution (1949) 47-54. Among the new acquisitions of the museum are Muslim glass, metal and stone objects, Arabic and Persian manuscripts, and Indian, Persian, and Turkish paintings. A Mughal bird painting by Mansûr and a building inscription of 549 H. (A.D. 1154) are illustrated.
- See also:* 3477.
- ### LANGUAGE
- 3552 BOMBACI, ALESSIO. "Recenti edizioni di testi turchi in trascrizione." *Oriente Mod.* 29 (O-D '49) 176-89. Discussion of a number of old Turkish texts, edited in transliteration, which present many problems, since the original works were written by non-Turks.
- ### LITERATURE
- 3553 ARBERRY, A. J. "A Sufi tract." *J. Royal Asiatic Soc.* 2 (1950) 14. The tract "Al-isfâr 'an nâtâ'ij al-asfâr" is not by al-Jili, as G. A. L. has it, but by Ibn 'Arabi.
- 3554 ARBERRY, A. J. "The teachers of Shihâb al-Din 'Umar al-Suhrawardi." *Bull. of School of Orient. and African Stud.* 13 (1950) 339-56. Analysis of Suhrawardi's *Mashyakha*, or educational autobiography, with Arabic texts of the traditions contained therein.
- 3555 BAUSANI, ALLESANDRO. "Un 'gazal' di Qurratu l-'Ain." *Oriente Mod.* 29 (O-D '49) 190-2. The authoress was a distinguished figure in the Bâb movement, but very little of her poetry is known to us.
- 3556 BEESTON, A. F. L. "Darwîsh Ashraf." *J. Royal Asiatic Soc.* (1950) 15-9. Biography and extant works of "Ashraf the third" (d. 884 H.), and description of an MS of his poems in the Bodleian Library.
- 3557 PEARLMANN, M. "Ibn Hazm on the equivalence of proofs." *Jewish Quart. Rev.* 40 (Ja '50) 279-90. Contains a translation of a chapter from the *Fîjal* on atheists and agnostics.
- 3558 SCHACHT, JOSEPH. "A revelation of Islamic traditions." *J. Royal Asiatic Soc.* (1949) 142-54. Medinese law sometimes contradicts "Medinese" traditions, originating from Iraq. At first, reference is made to companions rather than to the Prophet. This is preceded by a stage when each school refers to one Companion. There is thus no authentic core of legal tradition from the Prophet. Much historical tradition is of legal origin. Traditions give much information on Umayyad administrative practice.
- 3559 AL-SINDÎ, BALOCH NABÎ BAKHSH KHÂN. "The Diwan of Abû 'Atâ' of

Sind." *Islamic Culture* 23 (Jl '49) 136-50. A collection of extant verses of this Arab poet (7th-8th cent. A.D.), born in Sind, lived in Iraq.

See also: 3461, 3464, 3468, 3472, 3474, 3479, 3483.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- 3560 GOBY, JEAN-EDOUARD. "De l'établissement d'une bibliographie de l'histoire de l'Égypte." *Cahiers d'Histoire Égyptienne*, 1 (n.d.) 283-94. Reviews the bibliographies of Egypt which have already appeared, and proposes the undertaking of a *Bibliographie de l'histoire de l'Égypte*. Sample entry cards are given.
- 3561 NALLINO, MARIA. "Bibliografia degli scritti di Carlo Conti Rossini." *Oriente Mod.* 29 (Jl-S '49) 103-12. Lists 200 books and articles and some 70 book reviews.
- 3562 RENTZ, GEORGE. "Literature on the kingdom of Saudi Arabia." *Middle East J.* 4 (Ap '50) 244-9. A critical survey of material in Western languages published since 1939.
- 3563 TAGHER, JACQUES. "Bibliographie analytique et critique des publications françaises et anglaises relatives à l'histoire du règne de Mohammad Ali." *Cahiers d'Histoire Égyptienne*, 2 (D '49) 128-235. A valuable annotated bibliography grouped under the following general headings: general studies on the reign; foreign relations, interior affairs; biographies; various; travels; general works on Egypt.

See also: 3483, 3535.

BIOGRAPHY

- 3564 "Abdulkadir Erdoğan, director of the Museum for Turkish and Islamic Antiquities." (in Turkish) *Türk Tarih, Arkeolojya ve Etnografya Dergisi* No. 5 (1949) 252-4. Erdoğan's life (1877-1944); list of his published and unpublished works.
- 3565 "Muhammad 'Ali." *Cahiers d'Histoire Égyptienne*, 2 (D '49) 1-235. A special number of this journal on the occasion of the centenary of the death of Muhammad Ali. Contains twelve articles dealing with the founder of the present Egyptian dynasty, his career and policies, and a bibliography of 521 French and English works touching upon his life and times.
- 3566 CERULLI, ENRICO. "Carlo Conti Rossini." *Oriente Mod.* 29 (Jl-S '49) 93-102. An evaluation of the work of this great Italian Ethiopic scholar who died on Aug. 21, 1949.
- 3567 DUYURAN, RÜSTEM. "We have lost Salâhattin Kantar, esteemed director of the Museum of İzmir." (in Turkish) *Türk Tarih, Arkeolojya ve Etnografya Dergisi*

No. 5 (1949) 255-6. Salâhattin Kantar died in 1943 at the age of 65.

KOŞAY, HÂMİT. "Sir Aurel Stein's life and works." (in Turkish). *Türk Tarih, Arkeolojya ve Etnografya Dergisi* No. 5 (1949) 257-9. Short summary of Sir Aurel's travels and books.

KÜRKÇÜOĞLU, KEMAL EDİP. "Tezkire-i Rumât." (in Turkish) *Tarih Vesikalari* 3 (My 1949) 171-82. The *Tezkire-i Rumât* is a biographical dictionary of famous archers, written between 1683 and 1691.

3570 OGAN, AZİZ. "The personality of the late Halil Etem, director of the museums of Istanbul." (in Turkish) *Türk Tarih, Arkeolojya ve Etnografya Dergisi* No. 5 (1949) 247-51. Life, education, and activities of Halil Edhem Bey (1861-1931).

3571 ÖZ, TAHSİN. "Ahmed Fethi Pasha and the museums." (in Turkish) *Türk Tarih, Arkeolojya ve Etnografya Dergisi* No. 5 (1949) 1-15. Ahmed Fethi Pasha (1801-1854), who had spent many years of his life as Ambassador in Vienna, Paris, etc., was the founder of the Imperial Museum of Antiquities and of the Imperial Museum of Ancient Weapons (both in 1846). A summary of the more recent history of the various museums in Istanbul is given.

3572 TAGHER, JACQUES. "Pietro Avoscani, artiste-decorateur et homme d'affaires." *Cahiers d'Histoire Égyptienne* 1 (n.d.) 306-15. A biographical sketch of the Italian artist and decorator who served the pashas and viceroys of Egypt from Muhammad 'Ali to Isma'il and who was responsible for building the Royal Opera House in Cairo. Based partly on unpublished material in the royal archives of Abdin Palace.

3573 UNAT, FAİK REŞİT. "İhsan Sungu." (in Turkish) *Türk Tarih, Arkeolojya ve Etnografya Dergisi* No. 5 (1949) 260-3. İhsan Sungu (1883-1946) was a leading personality in the reorganization of public education in modern Turkey.

See also: 3466.

BOOK REVIEWS

- 3574 Ignace Goldziher memorial. *J. Royal Asiatic Soc.* (1950) 94-5.
- 3575 Islamic Research Association miscellany. *J. Royal Asiatic Soc.* (1950) 82-3. (A. S. Tritton).
- 3576 Paiforce: the official story of the Persia and Iraq command. *Military Aff.* 13 (1949) 178-9. (T. H. Vail Motter).
- 3577 ABDULLAH, S. M. *A descriptive catalogue of the Persian, Urdu, and Arabic MSS in the Panjab University Library*. *Bull. of School of Orient. and African Stud.* 13 (1950) 508-9. (G. M. Wickens).

- 3578 ADAM, COLIN FORBES. *Life of Lord Lloyd*. Middle East J. 4 (Ap '50) 252. (Shafik Ghorbal). "... does not modify the impression prevalent in India and Egypt of Lord Lloyd as a self-centered or self-seeking careerist."
- 3579 ANAWATI, M. M. and KUENTZ, CHARLES. *Bibliographie des ouvrages arabes imprimés en Egypte en 1942, 1943, et 1944*. Oriente Mod. 29 (Jl-S '49) 142-3. (Maria Nallino).
- 3580 AWAD, MICHAEL. *Al-Ma'assir: land and sea toll barriers*. J. Royal Asiatic Soc. (1949) 198. (A. S. Tritton). "The result . . . is disappointing, but that is not his fault but the fault of the sources."
- 3581 BASRI, MEER S. *Mabāhit f'l-iqtiṣād al-'Irāqī* (*Essays on Iraqi Economy*). J. Royal Asiatic Soc. (1950) 64. (D. Cowan).
- 3582 BIRGE, JOHN KINGSLEY. *A guide to Turkish area study*. Middle East J. 4 (Ap '50) 260-1. (Jean Deny). A most competent survey. A few additional titles are mentioned.
- 3583 BLACHÈRE, RÉGIS. *Le Coran: traduction selon un essai de reclassement des sourates*. Oriente Mod. 29 (Jl-S '49) 139-40. (Francesco Gabrieli).
- 3584 BROCKELMANN, CARL. *History of the Islamic peoples*. Internat. Aff. 26 (Ap '50) 278. (George Kirk).
- 3585 CERULLI, ENRICO. *Il 'Libro della Scala' e la questione delle fonti arabo-spagnole della Divina Commedia*. J. Royal Asiat. Soc. (1950) 96-7. (A. S. Tritton); Oriente Mod. 29 (Jl-S '49) 137-8. (Francesco Gabrieli).
- 3586 DARAB, GHOLAM, HOSEIN. *Persian composition*. Bull. of School of Orient. and African Stud. (1950) 507-8. (G. M. Wickens). The book contains 111 pieces for translation, each with a special vocabulary, and a grammatical introduction.
- 3587 DICKSON, H. R. P. *The Arab of the desert*. Internat. Aff. 26 (Ap '50) 277. (Harold Ingrams); Middle East J. 4 (Ap '50) 249-51. (P. W. Harrison). Absorbing material on every aspect of the life of the Bedouin in the hinterland of Kuwait.
- 3588 DROWER, E. S. *Sfar Malwasia* (*The book of the Zodiac*). J. Royal Asiatic Soc. (1950) 72-3. (A. S. Tritton). A Mandaean treatise composed of pieces of various dates, partly after the Muslim conquest.
- 3589 ELDER, EARL EDGAR. (Ed.) *A commentary on the creed of Islam*. Middle East J. 4 (Ap '50) 262. (Majid Khadduri). A competent translation with notes of al-Nasafi's *Creed* and al-Taftazani's *Commentary*.
- 3590 ELISSEEFF, NIKITA. *Thèmes et motifs des 'Mille et une nuits', essai de classification*.
- 3591 EVANS-PRITCHARD, E. E. *The Sanusi of Cyrenaica*. J. Royal Asiatic Soc. (1950) (A. S. Tritton).
- 3592 FOSTER, SIR WILLIAM. (Ed.) *The Red Sea and adjacent countries at the close of the seventeenth century as described by J. Pitts, W. Daniel, and C. J. Poncet*. J. Royal Asiatic Soc. 75. (C. F. Beckingham).
- 3593 FUCK, J. *Die arabischen studien in Europa vom 12 bis in den Anfang des 19 Jahrhunderts*. J. Royal Asiatic Soc. (1950) 75. (C. F. Beckingham).
- 3594 GABRIELI, FRANCESCO, JR. *Il collare della colomba sull'amore e gli amanti di Ibn Hazm*. Oriente Mod. 29 (Jl-S '49) 147-8. (Ettore Rossi).
- 3595 GAMBLE, F. H. *Iraq: economic and commercial conditions*. Middle East J. 4 (Ap '50) 252-3 (Elgin Groseclose). "Though severely condensed and written in a spare, dry style . . . peculiarly complete."
- 3596 GARDET, L. and ANAWATI, M. M. *Introduction à la théologie musulmane: essai de théologie comparée*. J. Royal Asiatic Soc. (1950) 83-5. (A. S. Tritton).
- 3597 GIBB, H. A. R. *Modern trends in Islam. Hamizrah Hehadash*. 1 (Ja '50) 176-7. (M. Assaf).
- 3598 GIBB, H. A. R. *Mohammedanism*. J. Royal Asiatic Soc. (1950) 82. (A. S. Tritton); J. of Theological Studies (London) 50 (Jl-Oct '49) 255 (A. J. Arberry).
- 3599 HAMILTON, A. *The kingdom of Melchior*. Middle East J. 4 (Ap '50) 251-2. (Eric Macro). "Valuable not only as a badly needed history but as a good insight into social and political conditions of the period and a helpful background to the complex internal and international politics of present-day southwest Arabia."
- 3600 AL-HASANI, 'ABD AL-RAZZAQ. *Iraq: old and new*. J. Royal Asiatic Soc. (1949) 197-8. (A. S. Tritton).
- 3601 HITTI, P. K. *History of the Arabs*. Armenian Rev. 3 (Mr '50) 155. (H. Kuridian); J. Near East Stud. 9 (Ap '50) 115. (G. E. Von Grunebaum). "Alterations have been few in number and rather slight in substance, and owners of the third edition need not feel that their copy has become obsolete."
- 3602 JARRING, GUNNAR. *Materials to the knowledge of eastern Turki*. Oriente Mod. 29 (Jl-S '49) 143-5. (Alessio Bombaci).
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- 3605 KURAN, AHMED BEDEVI. *Inkilap tarikhimiz ve ittihad ve terakki*. Middle East J. 4 (Ap '50) 261-2. (Kerim K. Key). "Additional information about the origins and activities of the Young Turks in Turkey, Paris, Geneva, and Cairo."
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- 3607 LENCZOWSKI, G. *Russia and the west in Iran*. Hamizrah Hehadash. 1 (Ja '50) 178-9 (Irani).
- 3608 LEWIS, BERNARD. (Ed.) *Land of enchanters; Egyptian short stories from the earliest times to the present day*. Bull. of School of Orient. and African Stud. 13 (1950) 507. (A. Guillaume); J. Near East Stud. 9 (Ap '50) 114-5. (J. A. Wilson).
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- 3612 MINORSKY, V. (Tr.) *Tadhkirat al-Muluk: a manual on Safavid administration [ca. 1137/1725]*. Oriente Mod. 29 (Jl-S '49) 141-2. (Ettore Rossi).
- 3613 MISSIRLIAN, GEORGE. *Famous Armenians in Egypt*. (in Armenian) Armenian Rev. 3 (Mr '50) 155-6. (H. Kurdian).
- 3614 MONTAGNE, ROBERT. *La civilisation du desert*. Oriente Mod. 29 (Jl-S '49) 148. (Ettore Rossi).
- 3615 MOSCATI, SALVATORE. *Storia e civiltà dei semi*. Oriente Mod. 29 (Jl-S '49) 140-1. (G. Levi Della Vida).
- 3616 NYKL, A. R. *Selections from Hispano-Arabic poetry*. Bull. of the School of Orient. and African Stud. 13 (1950) 505-7. (A. Guillaume).
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- 3619 PERGAMO, P. BASILIO. *Tre secoli di attività missionaria . . . e suo contributo alla Missione Etiopica*. Oriente Mod. 29 (Jl-S '49) 145-6. (Ettore Rossi).
- 3620 ROOSEVELT, KERMIT. *Arabs, oil and history*. Internat. Aff. 26 (S '50) 277-8. (R. H. Bullard); Military Aff. 13 (1949) 184-5. (T. H. Vail Motter).
- 3621 SCHNEIDER, A. M. and M. IS. NOMIDIS. *Galata: topographisch-archäologischer Plan mit erläuterndem Text*. Tarih Dergisi 1 (S '49) 201-12. (Semavi Eyice).
- 3622 SCHRAM-NIELSEN, ERIC. *Studier over Erstatningslaerden i Islamisk Ret*. J. Near East. Stud. 9 (Ap '50) 113-4. (Herbert J. Liebeny). The author discusses the theories of damages of all four orthodox Islamic rites, with emphasis on the Hanefite. "The use of Dr. Schram-Nielsen's thesis to readers not familiar with Danish is facilitated by a fairly comprehensive French summary of its main contents."
- 3623 SETON-WILLIAMS, M. V. *Britain and the Arab states*. J. Royal Asiatic Soc. (1949) 196-7. (A. S. Tritton).
- 3624 STEPPAT, FRITZ. *Iran zwischen den Weltmächten 1941-1948*. Oriente Mod. 29 (O-D '49) 196. (Ettore Rossi). This short volume is to be recommended for its accuracy and documentation, derived from Persian, Russian, European, and American sources.
- 3625 THICKNESSE, S. G. *Arab refugees: a survey of resettlement possibilities*. Internat. Aff. (London) 26 (Ap '50) 278-9. (R. F. Jardine); Middle East J. 4 (Ap '50) 253-5. (Emile Marmorstein). Provides careful estimates of the number of refugees, age groups, previous occupations, value of their former property, and criticises a number of proposed development projects.
- 3626 TRIMINGHAM, J. SPENCER. *The Christian church in post-war Sudan*. Internat. Aff. (London) 26 (Ap '50) 281. (George Kirk).
- 3627 TRIMINGHAM, J. SPENCER. *Islam in the Sudan*. J. Royal Asiatic Soc. (1950) 85. (H. A. R. Gibb). ". . . encyclopaedic in range and structure . . . His criticism . . . of the deadening effects of the religious environment is rather overdone."
- 3628 WATT, W. MONTGOMERY. *Free will and predestination in early Islam*. J. Royal Asiatic Soc. (1950) 86. (H. A. R. Gibb).
- 3629 WHITTING, C. E. J., *Al-Fakhri*. Bull. of the School of Orient. and African Stud. 13 (1950) 504. (A. S. Tritton). "There are mistakes, but for the most part they do not seriously affect the sense."

- 3630 WILBER, DONALD N. *Iran: past and present.* Hamizrah Hehadash 1 (Ja '50) 178. (Irani); Internat. Aff. 26 (Ap '50) 280-1. (R. S. Bullard).
- 3631 ZETTERSTEEN, K. V. *Turkische, Tatarische und Persische Urkunden im schwedischen Reichsarchiv* J. Near East. Stud. 9 (Ap '50) 116. (A. R. Nykl).
- 3632 KITCHEN, HELEN A. *Al-Ahram: The Times of the Arab world.* Middle East J. 4 (Ap '50) 155-69. The story of this Egyptian newspaper demonstrates that there is a demand among the Arab reading public for responsible journalism.

Correction: #3307 (Vol. 4, Apr. 1950, p. 267) should read: MOTTER, T. H. VAIL. "American port operations in the Persian corridor." *Military Review* 29 (S '49) 3-12. The article is an abridgement of a chapter from the Army's forthcoming volume, *The Persian Corridor and Aid to Russia*.

ABBREVIATIONS

<i>English</i>	<i>Arabic</i>
Acad., Academy	J., Journal
Aff., Affairs	Mag., Magazine
Amer., American	Mod., Modern
Bull., Bulletin	Mus., Museum
Cent., Central	Natl., National
Contemp., Contemporary	Numis., Numismatic
Dept., Department	Orient., Oriental
East., Eastern	Pal., Palestine
Geog., Geographical	Philol., Philological
Gt. Brit., Great Britain	Polit., Political
Hist., Historical	Quart., Quarterly
Illust., Illustrated	Res., Research
Inst., Institute	Rev., Review
Internat., International	Soc., Society
	Stud., Studies
	Trans., Transactions
<i>Italian</i>	<i>Russian</i>
	Mod., Moderno
<i>Russian</i>	<i>Russian</i>
	Akad., Akademii
	Fil., Filosofii
	Ist., Istorii
	Izvest., Izvestiya
	Lit., Literaturi
	Otdel., Otdeleniye
	Ser., Seriya
	Yaz., Yazika

Americans and the Middle East: Partners in the Next Decade

*Fourth Annual Conference on Middle East Affairs, sponsored by
The Middle East Institute*

The Fourth Annual Conference on Middle East Affairs, sponsored by The Middle East Institute, March 17-18, 1950, was opened by welcoming and introductory remarks from George Camp Keiser, Chairman of the Board of Governors. After outlining briefly the general program of the Institute and the particular role that the annual conferences play in it, Mr. Keiser turned the meeting over to Mortimer Graves, Administrative Secretary of the American Council of Learned Societies, who acted as presiding officer of the first session: "Educational Partnership with the Countries of the Middle East." Dr. Graves introduced the principal speaker: Roderic D. Matthews, Professor of Education at the University of Pennsylvania.

Prof. Matthews began his address by emphasizing that in all international partnerships of this type, each party must understand the other's cultural environment, and must carry out the undertaking in a spirit of mutual give and take. Going on to survey the educational needs of the Arab countries of the Middle East, he singled out the establishment of stable governments which could carry through consistent policies; the building up in rural areas of a sense of responsibility toward education; and the placing of the administration of education in the hands of trained educators. A major practical problem of current importance is the extent to which Arab students become involved in and are utilized for political demonstrations. Linking the educational system to nationalistic ends is dangerous to the aims of true education; so, also, is a too close linking of education to religion. This is not to say that an element of nationalism and religion, if kept within proper bounds, is not entirely in keeping with successful educational policy.

Turning to the record of American institutions in the area, Prof. Matthews remarked that one of their most useful functions has been to prepare students for advanced training in this country, but emphasized that this must be done in such a way as to retain the students' desire to return to their native lands. American educational experience can also be put to good use in improving the instructional tools — many of which are inadequate and outdated — now being used in the schools of the Middle East, particularly in the elementary grades. Above all, the American concept of freer methods and curricula would be beneficial in pointing the way toward a more flexible educational system. American experience with

Note. While every effort has been made in this summary to reflect accurately the tenor of the addresses and comments, the Editor is ready to assume full responsibility for any unwitting misinterpretation of the speakers' remarks. A fuller publication of the proceedings of the Conference may be purchased from the Middle East Institute, 1830 Nineteenth Street, N.W., Washington 9, D. C. Price: 60¢. To members of The Middle East Institute and on orders of ten or more: 50¢.

vocational schools — although admittedly we ourselves have not done all we should in this regard — might be of value in giving this type of education its proper due. Also American educational research techniques could be put to beneficial use, for at present there is almost no analysis of the results of educational practices current in Arab countries.

In closing, Prof. Matthews broached the possibility of an American demonstration school in the Middle East, where American methods could be experimentally applied and the results studied and adapted to local conditions. To carry out such a project, he called for the training in this country of larger numbers of young men and women for service abroad in the cause of good will and understanding.

* * *

Prof. Matthews' address was commented upon by four panel speakers: Harold B. Hoskins, Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the American University of Beirut; Moshe Yuval, First Secretary of the Embassy of Israel, Washington; Howard P. Backus, Division of Exchange of Persons, Department of State; and T. Cuyler Young, Princeton University.

Mr. Hoskins underscored and amplified several of Prof. Matthews' points. With reference to rural education, he welcomed the idea now being practiced in Egypt of despatching teams rather than single individuals to villages so as to ease the strain and deadening effect of isolation. American schools, he believed, are doing their part to reduce the extremes of political demonstrations, as is evidenced by the relatively good record of attendance at these institutions. The problem of preparing students for study in the United States, only to have them prefer to remain there, has been partly solved by concentrating on graduate students who are less likely to become acclimated to the U.S. than younger students. The shortage of textbooks, maps, and other educational tools is as much a matter of the lack of funds as of the lack of imagination; the United States could certainly assist in this regard. Foreign language teaching is an obvious service that American schools in the area can perform, and should perform well. American schools already there are filling the function, to a certain extent, of demonstrating American methods — as, for example, the Robert College engineering school. In the vocational training field, very properly adverted to by Prof. Matthews, the American oil companies are already doing quite a bit to train native workers in skilled tasks. The missionary aspect of American institutions, in its narrow sense, should certainly be toned down, yet it is important for American Institutions to continue to convey to the Middle Eastern peoples the principles of character building in which Americans believe.

Mr. Moshe Yuval reviewed briefly the difficult educational problems facing Israel today, principally in respect to the large number of immigrants now entering the country, with their differing cultural backgrounds and the demoralizing experience they have lived through in central Europe and elsewhere. Yet because of the diminutive size of Israel, only a small number of educators and relatively little equipment, if properly used, could have the most beneficial effects. A continued exchange of persons and techniques between the United States and Israel would do much to develop the ideals which Mr. Yuval believed were shared by both countries.

Mr. Backus reviewed briefly the steps which the United States Government has taken since 1939 to promote cultural and educational exchange between the U.S. and other nations. These include the establishment of cultural attachés in our diplomatic posts abroad, and of committees for the screening of scholarship applicants; the Smith-Mundt Act authorizing the appropriation of funds for cultural interchange; and the Fulbright Act authorizing the use of certain foreign credits for a similar purpose. He then proceeded to discuss in greater detail the operation of the Fulbright Act in the Middle East. At the Act's disposal would be \$30 million worth of foreign credits in the countries where agreements had been signed; it thus promised to be a factor of tremendous importance. As many as 350 persons a year would benefit from the unusual opportunities offered as soon as the programs got fully underway.

In each Fulbright country a bi-national committee is set up — composed half of American citizens resident there and half of nationals — to screen applicants, disburse funds, and outline annual programs. In the United States a further board reviews all applicants from this end. The most vexing problem at present is the dollar shortage, since students coming to this country cannot have their tuition and living expenses paid out of foreign credits. Other problems to be met include such things as language requirements, scholarly standards, and the determination of suitability of personality.

Prof. T. Cuyler Young commented on the danger that Western education, particularly that of a scientific nature, when implanted in the Middle East, might wean the native populations away from their own cultural heritage, which is largely humanistic in character. When exporting educational methods to the area it is imperative that Americans be trained to appreciate and take into consideration this cultural heritage. It is therefore essential that we promote by every means the study of the Middle East in this country, and that those students from the Middle East who come here somehow be brought into direct contact with the American public in order that each might learn at first hand how the other thinks and lives.

II

The second session of the Conference was devoted to a discussion of "Technical and Economic Friendship," with Arthur Z. Gardiner, Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near East, South Asian, and African Affairs, presiding. Mr. Gardiner introduced as the main speaker Gordon R. Clapp, Chairman of the Board of the Tennessee Valley Authority and recently chief of the United Nations Economic Survey Mission for the Middle East.

Mr. Clapp first pointed out that the UN Economic Survey Mission had had the very practical objective of alleviating the Arab refugee problem, and that therefore its recommendations had been conditioned in this direction. Nevertheless, in surveying the refugee situation the Mission had arrived at certain conclusions regarding technical assistance to the area in a more general sense. The great need of the countries is capital. To find it, native capital must somehow be redirected from short-term investments at exorbitant rates of interest to long-term developmental projects. Royalties on oil are about the only native source of capital now available in any quantity to the governments; nor is the prospect of attracting foreign capital particularly bright.

Among other obstacles to development and technical assistance, Mr. Clapp enumerated the lack of experienced native personnel, the absence of sufficiently developed plans, limited governmental experience, and the problem presented by international boundaries. It was for these reasons, and because of the basic thesis that technical assistance should not outstrip each country's ability to absorb and manage developmental projects itself, that the Mission limited its recommendations to a number of pilot projects which could serve as demonstrations of bigger things to come. There is no easy way to the economic development of these countries; indeed, it would be beneficial for them to learn by the "hard way" of experience, as the United States itself had learned.

* * *

The following four panel speakers commented on the problem of "Technical and Economic Partnership" introduced by Mr. Clapp: George V. T. Burgess, Treasurer and Secretary of Overseas Consultants, Inc.; Robert Collier Page, Chief of the Medical Division of the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey; Sidney Sherwood, Secretary of the Export-Import Bank; and Afif I. Tannous, Middle East Regional Specialist in the Department of Agriculture.

Mr. Burgess reviewed briefly the work of Overseas Consultants, Inc. (OCI) in Iran as an example of technical and economic partnership between a private American company and a country of the Middle East. He described the study which OCI had made, at the request of the Iranian Government, of the latter's proposed Seven Year Development Plan, and of the problems which OCI found would have to be solved before such an ambitious undertaking could be carried through. The ramifications of the Plan, involving an expenditure of approximately \$650 million, were so wide that the OCI report covered practically every phase of Iranian life having any bearing in its economy: public health, education, agriculture, water resources, meteorology, surveying and mapping, town improvement and housing, transportation, communications, industry and mining, electric power, petroleum, statistics, distribution, legal affairs, etc. One of OCI's strongest recommendations was the transfer of government-owned industrial and mining enterprises to private ownership. Financing of the Plan was a problem to which OCI devoted special attention, blocking out provisions for both foreign exchange and rials, and the regulation of rial expenditures in such a way as to minimize the dangers of inflation. Upon completion of the survey, the Iranian Government engaged OCI to supervise its execution, in particular the letting of contracts.

Dr. Page deplored the little attention being paid in the Middle East to preventive medicine and public health. The type of diseases prevalent in the area—malaria, trachoma, tuberculosis, dysentery, malnutrition, etc.—were much easier to prevent than to cure. As examples of technical cooperation along this line he cited the studies of Lebanon and Syria which Dr. D. F. Milan made in 1947-48 on behalf of the Rockefeller Foundation. Dr. Milan proposed that a public health demonstration and teaching area be established not far from Beirut, to be supervised jointly by the Foundation and the Lebanese Government, both of which have now set aside sums for this purpose. The Near East Foundation likewise has a demonstration public health program underway, specializing in work among women. The great lack just now is qualified personnel who can assume leadership.

Mr. Sherwood opened his comments on the possibility of American investment in the Middle East by remarking that a certain suspicion, tied up with political and economic nationalism, must be overcome before much progress can be made. To do this, Americans must approach partnership with the Middle East in a spirit of understanding and humility; for their part, the countries of the Middle East must furnish some assurance of peace in the area. Americans can best demonstrate that they have not come as exploiters by actively seeking local investment in their enterprises; the governments, in return, must put them ~~yes~~ on a firmer financial basis, with revised taxation one of the first steps to be taken. Only then can they meet the challenge of economic development and profit safely from foreign technical assistance.

Dr. Tannous felt that certain points mentioned by Mr. Clapp deserved emphasis and elaboration. For example, technical assistance should not be viewed solely in terms of large-scale development schemes, but also in terms of such relatively inexpensive but extremely important matters as an improvement technique for cultivation of the soil. One misconception that must be guarded against is the idea that Americans can be transplanted to the Middle East and produce the same results as in this country. On the contrary, they must learn to work within the framework of the habits and thinking of the native peoples if they hope ever to achieve success. In our approach to the Middle East we must keep reminding ourselves and those we work with out there that the ultimate objective is to raise the standards of the majority of the population, not merely of a few at the top. All of this requires an appreciation, on the part of the American, of the culture of the country he visits. Finally, in all projects of technical development, such as the draining of a swamp or the extension of irrigation, larger social questions must sooner or later be answered: Who will own the new land? How will it be settled? These human questions are as important as the technical.

III

The dinner meeting on Friday evening, March 17, was presided over by Allen W. Dulles, Chairman of the Near East College Association and President of the Council on Foreign Relations. In his introductory remarks, Mr. Dulles emphasized the uniqueness of the position which the Middle East now holds in the international picture. Here communism has been checked, but the area must still be on its guard. During his visit to Iran in the spring of 1949 — his first to the area in 25 years — he had seen what progress was being made, and came away with the conviction that nowhere else in the world could a well-directed effort accomplish so much at so modest a cost. The Middle East, however, was not sure where it stood in relation to the political fight of the West against the spread of communism. It is up to us to clarify our relationship with these nations, and there is no time to be lost.

Speakers at the dinner were Harold B. Hoskins, Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the American University of Beirut; William A. B. Iliff, Loan Director of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development; and the Honorable George Wadsworth, U.S. Ambassador to Turkey. Mr. Hoskins reviewed briefly the addresses of the day, in particular those of the afternoon

session. Mr. Iliff then went on to suggest a few generalizations on the area, although admittedly generalizations are dangerous.

The Middle East as a whole he said, constitutes one of the great underdeveloped areas of the world; savings are small and hard to get at; the general standard of education is low; public health facilities are lacking; transportation is a bottleneck. Nevertheless, the area has resources, both material and human — the problem of development at bottom is more political than economic or financial. The materials are at hand, but the proper climate is absent. At best, economic development will be a slow and arduous process.

Ambassador Wadsworth recounted the story of American assistance to Turkey. American-Turkish cooperation has resulted in a mechanized army, increased coal production, an improved road system, and scientifically managed wheat farming. The net result of the whole effort, when the Marshall Plan comes to an end, will be an increased productive capacity, and many million dollars more of new exports.

IV

The final session of the Conference on Saturday morning, March 18, was devoted to a discussion of "Middle East Conceptions of Americans as Partners," with Edwin M. Wright, United Nations Adviser to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near East, South Asian, and African Affairs, presiding. The principal speaker was Nuri Eren, Director of the Turkish Information Office, New York.

Mr. Eren opened his discussion of Turkey's attitude toward partnership with Americans by pointing to its unique geographical, cultural, and economic position as part of both Europe and the Middle East. As a European country, Turkey has been receiving American aid through the Truman Aid program and ECA. Assistance in developing Turkey's economy — both agricultural and industrial — has been recognized as a necessary corollary to European recovery. Building on this thesis, U.S. aid to Turkey has been directed toward projects that contribute directly to the recovery of Europe; toward those that provide raw materials needed by the U.S.; and finally toward those that would be helpful to the Turkish economy. Projects have included the boosting of Turkey's grain production, so that by 1952 large quantities will be exportable to Europe; the modernization of mining, until by 1952 coal production will have increased by 33% and chrome by 40%; and the expansion of transportation facilities, particularly roads, with a planned total construction of 14,300 miles.

As important as the material results of this Turkish-American partnership, asserted Mr. Eren, are the less tangible benefits: the dissemination of technical knowledge; the strengthening of cultural bonds, in particular through the activity of American educational institutions; the growing appreciation of each other's ideals.

The four panel speakers to comment on "Middle East Conceptions of Americans as Partners" were as follows: Norman Burns, Office of African and Near Eastern Affairs, Department of State; Moshe Keren, Counsellor of the Embassy of Israel, Washington; M. Nemazee, Commercial Attaché of the Embassy of Iran, Washington; and Afif I. Tannous, Department of Agriculture.

Dr. Burns gave the five chief reactions to proposed technical assistance which

he had encountered in discussions with Middle Easterners: (1) Technical assistance should be directed toward speeding up industrialization, and should not be concerned with merely education and training. (2) Technical assistance must be accompanied by financial assistance if it is to be effective. (3) No political strings should be attached to such assistance. (4) Technical assistance preferably should be proffered through the United Nations, not arranged bilaterally, for in the latter case the dangers of exploitation are greatly increased. (5) The proposed program is slow in getting started, and too small in extent to be of great benefit.

Dr. Burns was careful to point out that these opinions of Middle Eastern countries were of serious concern to the United States Government. But for its part, the United States feared that the Middle Eastern countries were not putting sufficient thought on what they themselves must contribute in order to make the program a success. Self-help was medicine which the United States had taken, and one which would be equally beneficial to the countries of the Middle East.

Dr. Moshe Keren devoted his comments to the many ties, both official and unofficial, between Israel and the United States. Israel is not included in any of the great U.S. programs, nor did the Clapp Mission recommend a pilot project for its territory. Nevertheless, the financial support which Israel has received from this country in the form of voluntary donations and bank loans has been of the utmost importance in solving its economic problems. So also, American technical advice has been of great value in plotting Israel's economic development, a tie strengthened by the relatively large number of Israel students now in this country.

This partnership is necessarily unbalanced because of the vast difference in size between the two countries. Israel will repay its loans, but can never repay all the material advantages extended to it by the United States. Nevertheless, believed Dr. Keren, the United States in helping Israel is helping itself, because the two countries enjoy a common interest: stability in the Middle East.

Mr. Nemazee represented Iran in the presentation of Middle Eastern views. Here, as elsewhere in the area, are fears that must be overcome before a free and easy partnership can be developed. It is true that the native governments have not expended sufficient energy on development programs, but on the other hand they have bitter memories of the exploitative policies of foreign powers in this type of activity. Americans must now demonstrate that their motives are not of the old order, and that they will be satisfied with a reasonable return on their investments. Further suggestions for making technical aid acceptable are to make it practical rather than theoretical, and to liberalize the media for its financing.

The last commentator, Dr. Tannous, again brought forth obstacles which he believed must be removed before complete understanding and mutual confidence on the matter of technical assistance could be arrived at. First is the political cloud under which the United States labors because of its Palestine policy. Second is the Middle East's general suspicion of the West, in particular its fear of exploitation. Third is the subtle tension that develops between a giver and a receiver which, if not guarded against, can sour the best of relations. Finally, there is no doubt but that the people of the Middle East are prone to take the attitude that everything will be done for them, and fail to shoulder their share of responsibility.

At the same time, Americans are likely to miss some of the advantages which

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will accrue to them as a result of close association with the peoples of the Middle East. Beyond the cultural debt which the West already owes the East, there are tangible benefits that Americans are sure to receive in return. For example, experience in developing methods of cultivation, different varieties of plant life, and protection against disease will serve the United States in good stead. Greater purchasing power in the area will increase the demand for American goods. And finally, the whole program of technical assistance promises to be one of the most potent weapons for stability and peace.

* * *

The Conference discussions ended with a summation by Mortimer Graves, Administrative Secretary of the American Council of Learned Societies. Dr. Graves itemized the views emphasized by the speakers as follows: (1) In approaching a partnership with the Middle East, we must be prepared for a long-range problem. (2) There is a general suspicion, at least in the United States, of grandiose schemes for quick industrialization; an inclination, rather, to move toward small pilot enterprises. (3) The term "partnership" must be taken literally, with each party assuming its full share of responsibility. (4) A great deal can be accomplished through the stimulation of educational and vocational training. (5) The results of each phase of the partnership must be tested by its effect on the people's standards of living.

A sixth point, said Dr. Graves, one which might have been brought forward to better advantage, is the need for political and intellectual partnership to supplement the technical. By the first is meant an active partnership to create a stable political structure in the Middle East; by the second, a genuine meeting of minds between peoples of differing cultures and experience. All of this points directly to the need for providing Americans with a more thorough knowledge of the Middle East.

Readers' Commentary

[The Journal welcomes comment from its readers. All communications should be addressed to the Editor and bear the full name and address of the writer. A selection of those received will be published periodically in this column, preference being given to those which correct errors of fact, offer constructive criticism of an opinion expressed, or provide additional information on a topic discussed in the Journal's pages. Communications chosen for publication are subject to condensation at the Editor's discretion.]

Assassination of the Poet Eshqi

SIR:

I enjoyed reading Miss Nilla Cook's article on "The Theater and Ballet Arts in Iran" printed in your issue [of October 1949]. Despite my great admiration for Miss Cook's artistic abilities and creative genius, I regret to say that I lost historical confidence in her when in the footnote on page 412 she stated: "Eshqi was executed on charges of Communism." . . .

Eshqi (full name: Mir Zadeh Eshqi), great modern Persian poet and playwright and editor and publisher of the newspaper *Qarn-e-Bistom* . . . was assassinated in 1924. One morning there was a knock at the door and the maid came and told Eshqi, "Two gentlemen desire to see you." Eshqi went to the door in his pajamas, was promptly shot at and the "gentlemen" took to their heels. The poet was removed to a public hospital where he succumbed to his wounds. Thus died a great Persian poet, playwright, patriot. He became a victim of a political assassination owing to the publication of certain articles and poems in his paper, *Qarn-e-Bistom*.

Of course Eshqi's death was a great loss to the art of poetry and theatre in Iran. But we do not like this loss to be translated into a great gain for Communism through the wrong statement of Miss Nilla Cook. Happily, Iran has outlawed all Tudeh and Communist papers and parties. Otherwise these papers would have, on no less evidence than that of a highly esteemed and honored American magazine, dubbed our great Eshqi a Communist martyr and the reactionary press would have branded him a Communist and a traitor — while

Eshqi sacrificed his life for the cause of democracy. . . .

Eshqi was not a Communist; he was not executed; he was assassinated for certain political reasons which are absolutely forgotten now and buried in the dust of history. But his memory is ever green and as long as we remember his beautiful poems and weep with him over the death of Merium all matters connected with politics will be of no significance.

MOHAMMED ZARNEGAR
Tehran, Iran

Guardianship of the Suez Canal

SIR:

In its April 1950 issue *The Middle East Journal* carried a most useful article by Dr. Halford L. Hoskins entitled "The Guardianship of the Suez Canal." The article contains, however, certain errors of fact which, while not affecting the conclusions drawn by Dr. Hoskins, should nevertheless be pointed out if only for the sake of the record.

On page 150 it is stated that ". . . in April 1948 the Egyptian armies . . . began the invasion of Palestine and the Negev . . ." Actually, the Egyptian invasion of Palestine began on May 15, 1948. Furthermore, this statement gives the impression that the Negev is not part of Palestine, which, of course, is not the case.

The statement is made on the following page (151) that ". . . King Farouk summarily ousted the Wafdist . . . in February 1942." Here there is a confusion between the date when the Wafdist came into power (February, 1942) and the date they fell, which was October 8, 1944.

Finally, on page 153, it is said that "The Middle East Supply Center, which was to have been the basis for a British Point Four in the Middle East, did not long survive the war . . ." The MESC was not set up as a basis for a British Point Four program, but to conserve shipping space in the interests of the common Allied war effort. Such encouragement of local agriculture and industry as the MESC undertook was ancillary to this main objective, but was not its primary aim. When the war ended these developmental activities were carried on by the British Middle East Office, which is still very much alive, so that it cannot strictly be said that the MESC activities along this line disappeared with the cessation of hostilities.

HAROLD W. GLIDDEN
Arlington, Va.

Democracy in Turkey

SIR:

Dr. Bisbee notes in her article, "Test of Democracy in Turkey," appearing in the April 1950 issue of your journal, that hindsight frequently reveals interesting aspects of political actions. In view of the surprising results of the recent Turkish election, it seems timely to consider some of the points in her article.

No disagreement can be found with Dr. Bisbee's thesis of the presence of broad Islamic social democracy and the absence of Western democratic concepts of government in the Turkish historical past. Furthermore, Dr. Bisbee would probably agree that even social democracy was practiced so sporadically in Turkey's past that it lost its real significance.

It would seem that democracy in the Western sense has come to Turkey and to an over-

whelming majority of Turkish citizens only in republican times. In the 1920's and '30's and certainly in 1942 and 1943, the majority of Turks still feared the government and tried to propitiate it in many ways. There had been no positive demonstration of the processes of full Western democracy. Debates in the National Assembly always had a hollow ring. Dr. Bisbee's "constitutional checks and balances" were largely on paper.

I should like to suggest the theory that the great advances in democracy in Turkey which the recent election has so surely evidenced are a demonstration of the effectiveness of the teaching of democratic and constitutional principles. Twenty years ago the new Turkish histories, written for use in primary and secondary schools, in all advanced schools, in adult education groups, in the *halkevi*, and in the army, presented the democratic articles of the Constitution and the democratic sentiments of the speeches of Atatürk, İnönü, and other governmental leaders as accomplished facts. In the more illiterate sections of Turkey these theories had wide circulation, too, since much information is spread by word of mouth.

As demonstrated by the election, the Turkish citizen in every section of the country believed in 1950 that he possessed democracy and thus about eighty percent exercised the right at the ballot box. That a great majority believe in democracy is attested not only by the voting out of a party which brought victory, independence, and peace over a thirty-year period, but even more so by the orderly process by which that party acquiesced and surrendered its powers and position to the victor at the polls.

SYDNEY N. FISHER
Columbus, Ohio

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